even more complex because national minorities in some cases
prefer Russian-medium instruction due to the codification of the minority
language in the Cyrillic alphabet and the tradition of using Russian textbooks in schools and, in some cases, at higher levels of education, among
other reasons. This aspect is related to Russian functioning as the language
of multi-ethnic communication in the Soviet Union as a multi-ethnic and
multicultural unity. Purely linguistic features also influence the narrowing
of the distance between languages. Some of the functional
apparent decline or at least underwent a reinterpretation to the advantage of sovereignty. This ‘de-construction’ was, in the first instance, a result of the interaction of state leaders. Over time the competition and insecurity natural in a states system, particularly where regimes were vulnerable to trans-state subversion, reinforced the territorial differentiation between the individual states; moreover, from the beginning, those states whose sovereignty was threatened by Nasser’s attempt to impose Pan-Arab uniformity formed anti-hegemonic alliances against Cairo
borders and states, as such, exist. The transformations of this language of human rights, as of the forms of governance with which it is so intimately connected, are an on-going and largely unpredictable process. It is a language or a set of tools which can work in various ways and to various effects, and which has a complex, dense accumulation of traditions, debates and practices. What is meant by human rights in practice (and how widespread and functional the international standard in fact is) will evolve, if at all, not as a Western concept exported elsewhere, but
) takes a different perspective and talks of popular, interest or functional representation. Popular is based on the rights of citizenship, interests on some presumed social significance (usually occupational), and functional on presumed or recognized expertise (usually professional).
But, according to Pitkin’s seminal work on the subject, political representation is at its core about the representative ‘acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them’ (1967, 209). Claims to representativeness are underpinned and
teams within the Cabinet Office, FCO and UKRep contributed towards exaggerated expectations about their role.
In Ireland role differentiation between the DT and DFA was commonly blurred by virtue of the fact that responsibility for network management was split between the two. A number of officials suggested that they had become ‘almost indistinguishable’ as a result of functional overlap and cross-fertilisation of personnel. 41 Yet in contrast to the UK, the appointment of a Minister of State for Europe in 2002 did help considerably to
development of our selves. Such recognition ideally manifests itself
within three central spheres of ethical existence: in the family, in
civil society and in the state. In the family, members initially
experience an undivided feeling of love which gradually becomes
differentiated as self-consciousness matures into full personality. In
the sphere of civil society, consciousness manifests itself in the
dependent sovereign states. Limited independence has been a constant
feature of many small states over time, to be sure. To identify states as such,
and in particular small states, the standard of a “functionally independent”28 unitary actor in the system is applied here. Recognizing the near
impossibility of small states being truly independent in the narrowest
sense of the word, statehood will be assumed here if a small state has
sufficient independence to function as its own unit in the states system.
Autonomy has considerable overlap with independence, so much so
connecting organisations to vital resources
and allies outside of the United Kingdom.1 In doing so, these transnational networks not only demonstrated their capacity to alter actors’ material conditions
(e.g. through patronage), they wielded significant ideational power as well,
using the flow of information to reframe how key stakeholders understood the
causes of the Troubles and what was needed to bring about peace.
Although transnational ties were consequential during the Troubles, most
studies do not sufficiently differentiate among the various types of cross-
During this transition, the Ottomans invented their Turkishness under the influence of nationalist ideas from the West.
Third, and, more importantly, Turkish nationalism was not purely based on
primordialist ties and ethno-symbols. The pre-modern Ottoman identity was
based on the millet system that was characterised by religious communities rather
than ethnic communities or language.33 Within this system, there was a differentiation between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects but no official differentiation
among the Muslims by language or ethnicity. In terms of ethnic
sovereign (or of sovereignty) was particular. Its freedom to follow its own faith, or management of faiths, was supreme. The power of sovereignty was the power (in principle) of the particularist government to override all other claims to (worldly) authority. Despite radical shifts in the state system since Westphalia, this broadly constitutive element continues to serve as a powerful inscription of particularism. But within the evolving European state system this particularism and differentiation was held within the scope of both complementary and competing principles of