This book explores the evolving African security paradigm in light of the multitude of diverse threats facing the continent and the international community today and in the decades ahead. It challenges current thinking and traditional security constructs as woefully inadequate to meet the real security concerns and needs of African governments in a globalized world. The continent has becoming increasingly integrated into an international security architecture, whereby Africans are just as vulnerable to threats emanating from outside the continent as they are from home-grown ones. Thus, Africa and what happens there, matters more than ever. Through an in-depth examination and analysis of the continent’s most pressing traditional and non-traditional security challenges—from failing states and identity and resource conflict to terrorism, health, and the environment—it provides a solid intellectual foundation, as well as practical examples of the complexities of the modern African security environment. Not only does it assess current progress at the local, regional, and international level in meeting these challenges, it also explores new strategies and tools for more effectively engaging Africans and the global community through the human security approach.
states, state elites, long after independence, continued to depend on external protection and on resources provided by external powers or markets rather than raised domestically through consent; as such, most Middle East states were and remain relatively less accountable to domestic society than where they are indigenous products.
State-building was accompanied by class conflict because imperialism had fostered dominant classes that privately appropriated the means of wealth production, notably land at the expense of peasantries or natural
understanding the persistence of highly unequal core–periphery relations even after the retreat of imperial armies from the region, is Galtung’s (1971) structural model of imperialism. In his view, two mechanisms sustain penetration by the Western ‘core’: (1) the core created and left behind client elites and classes which have an interest in dependent relations, and (2) regional states were linked to the core, in feudal-like north–south relations, while horizontal (south–south) relations were shattered. Indeed, imperialism’s fragmentation of the Middle East into a multitude
modernisation – enough to reinforce without disrupting the traditional order. But military modernisation required or led to broader changes: bureaucratic centralisation, improved tax collection, conscription, the modern education to train modern officials. The result was the rise of a small modern middleclass affected by Western ideas of nationalism and democracy. Military officers, as the first to be educated and entrusted with the mission of Ottoman defence against the West, made up the vanguard of the early modernising nationalist groups. Middle-class opinion came to see
orientation and Syrian revisionism reaching a peak.
Saudi Arabia faced the ‘King’s Dilemma’ which proved fatal for several Middle East monarchies: how to modernise, yet prevent the new social forces created by modernisation from destroying the traditional order (Huntington 1968: 177–91). In the 1950s and 1960s, the regime was vulnerable to Pan-Arab ideology manipulated from Cairo as the small, educated, new middleclass and the working class in the oil fields, attracted by Nasser, embraced Arabism and reform. The al-Saud had, however, enough
landed-commercial elites ruled, the military, recruited to a great extent from the rising middleclasses, expressed their desire for the reform or overthrow of the old order, and the narrow-based old regimes offered little obstacle to military intervention in politics (Ayubi 1995: 258–60; Halpern 1963: 251–80; Trimberger 1978). However, as the military became politicised, it often fragmented along sectarian, regional or personal lines. Factions vying for political power destabilised Syria in the 1950s and 1960s and Iraq for a decade after the revolution of 1958. The
the same time, Labour’s constituency, rooted in the new technocratic-entrepreneurial middleclass, was embracing an economic strategy of globalisation and viewed peace negotiations as crucial to overcoming Israel’s poor record in attracting investment and to breaking out of the international diplomatic isolation which obstructed its access to markets (Solingen 1998).
However, it took global transformation and a watershed election to stimulate a new peace initiative in Israel. The end to the Arabs’ Soviet patron, the defeat of Iraq and the grave
process disrupted a multiplicity of regional ties while reorienting many economic and communications links to the Western ‘core’. In reaction, new supra-state ideologies, expressive of the lost cultural unity, were increasingly embraced: Pan-Arabism by the Arabic-speaking middleclass and political Islam among the lower middleclasses. Both, at various times, challenged the legitimacy of the individual states and spawned movements promoting the unification of states as a cure for the fragmentation of the recognised community. The result has been that the Arab world
badge or an ornament to make others uncomfortable, but always a star
he checked to set his own course’.
Thomas P. ‘Tip’ O’Neill Jr.
He was proudest of the fact that, during his life time, Democrats had
passed legislation to build the middleclass. By the time of his retirement in 1986, poverty in America had been reduced to 10 per cent.
In describing Tip’s bedrock beliefs, Senator Ted Kennedy said, ‘He
was never afraid to speak out for the average man and woman – the
worker trying to keep a job, the child
, significant numbers in refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria, and smaller numbers in Egypt and the Gulf. The loss of Palestine threatened Palestinians, now a stateless people, with the loss of their identity. However, the Palestinian Diaspora throughout the Middle East produced a stratum of politically active intellectuals who helped radicalise the rising middle-class nationalist movements in the various Arab countries and kept the Palestinian cause at the top of political agendas. The refugee camps became the crucible of the Palestinian resistance movement, reservoirs of