The nineteenth century and the rise of mass participation
Torbjørn L. Knutsen
Two revolutions convulsed the Old Regime: the political revolution in France and the Industrial Revolution in England. They occurred with rough simultaneity. Together they created new conduits for political and economic mass participation: large-scale armies, mass parties, mass production of consumer goods and rapid growth of consumer markets.
The triumphant growth of industry and human power over the physical world gave nineteenth-century people new confidence in reason and science. Scholars applied novel scientific techniques and logic to
The long sixteenth century saw the evolution of the basic elements of modern international politics – territorial states, sovereign rulers, military structures and overseas ventures. It also witnessed the first stirrings of theoretical considerations about the nature and the operation of these new phenomena. Seventeenth-century thinkers integrated these elements into the vision of a recognizable state system. They forged it on the anvil of the Thirty Years War (1618–48).
The Thirty Years War was the climax of an escalating religious conflict
Machiavelli, one of the most famous political theorists of the Renaissance, is an example. When he discussed politics in terms of virtue and fortune he drew on established, medieval terms. When he discussed affairs of state, he had the city-state foremost in mind. There is no doubt that Machiavelli was a pioneer of political analysis. However, his contributions to International Relations are surprisingly modest. His younger contemporary, Francesco Guicciardini, offered a more elaborate International Relations argument and will here be deemed to be the more important
patrol the skies. Too late, it turned out, to prevent a third passenger plane from crashing into the Pentagon forty-five minutes later.
It is often said that ‘9/11’ changed international politics. This is an exaggeration. The fact of the matter is that international politics had already changed. It had been changed dramatically a decade earlier by the unravelling of the Soviet empire. This had marked a transition from a bipolar to a unipolar system. It had also involved a normative shift; a rapid fading of the communist ideology and a strengthening – to the
The eighteenth century has many names: the Age of the Old Regime, the Age of Enlightenment, the Age of Democratic Revolution, the Age of Cosmopolitanism … It is rarely called the Age of Upheaval, although it is an apt label: The eighteenth century began with a wave of great wars. These wars stimulated the emergence of the modern state. The growth of the state was one of the characteristic features of the century. Debates about the nature of states and about their interrelations mark the political thought of the age.
The evolving institutions of
will introduce writers like the Italian diplomat Alberico Gentili and the Spanish lawyer Francisco de Vitoria. But it will emphasize the writings of the French scholar Jean Bodin who formulated the modern concept of ‘sovereignty’ and exerted a formative influence on the subsequent scholarship of interstate relations.
Social innovations, economic changes and political power
No one knows who invented gunpowder. The ancient Chinese certainly possessed it. It came via the Islamic empire to Europe. The Europeans put it to purposeful military use in the
were marked by the almost total absence of discussion about foreign policy by the candidates, with the subject being restricted to a single throwaway line about security and drug smuggling. The scant discussion of Brazilian foreign policy was all the more surprising given its increasing importance to a wide range of economic interests as well as the succession of managerial crises afflicting Itamaraty as it sought to adapt to an increasingly democratized process with an absence of clear political guidance and support. Apart from the occasional rant against US
subtler morphing of the structures of regional and global politics and economics to create more space for their country to pursue its interests. Often this ocurred in symphony with the foreign policy agendas of established major international actors, although there were inevitable divergences. Part of the reason why this theme has been overlooked is the nature of scholarship and coverage of Brazil. A common theme to the more popularized English-language books published on contemporary Brazil is an attempt to provide insight into how this enormously complex country
a largely symbolic victory for Bolivia’s political leadership (Mesa, 2011 ). The longer-term pay-off for Brazil was keeping Bolivia onboard its South American initiatives and retaining close access to decision makers in La Paz. In the Ecuadorian case of threats to not repay BNDES loans, the benefits of this measured approach was particularly apparent as the Correa government moved during the Dilma administration to autonomously advance some of the economic coordination and integrationist initiatives necessary for a reshaping of elements of the hemispheric
policy worked steadily to encourage national economic sectors to use the domestic and regional market as a springboard for expanded penetration of international markets. The result was an, at times, conflicting pattern of liberalism and protectionism, all wrapped in an approach to trade policy that frequently appeared to subsume it to political priorities. Embedded in this are a series of lags between where Brazilian exporters are going and what the government thinks is taking place. Part of the story was the shifting nature of the Brazilian economy, which first saw