The first major post-Cold War conflict, the 1991 Gulf war, indicated how much had already changed. Saddam Hussein had enjoyed Western support in Iraq's war against Iran in the 1980s, but was abruptly cast as the 'new Hitler' after his invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. This book is about how the media have interpreted conflict and international intervention in the years after the Cold War. By comparing press coverage of a number of different wars and crises, it seeks to establish which have been the dominant themes in explaining the post-Cold War international order and to discover how far the patterns established prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks have subsequently changed. The key concern is with the legitimacy of Western intervention: the aim is to investigate the extent to which Western military action is represented in news reporting as justifiable and necessary. The book presents a study that looks at UK press coverage of six conflicts and the international response to them: two instances of 'humanitarian military intervention' (Somalia and Kosovo); two cases in which the international community was criticised for not intervening (Bosnia and Rwanda); and two post-9/11 interventions (Afghanistan and Iraq). There were a number of overlapping UN and US interventions in Somalia in the early 1990s. Operation Restore Hope was the first major instance of post-Cold War humanitarian military intervention, following the precedent set by the establishment of 'safe havens' for Iraqi Kurds and other minorities at the end of the 1991 Gulf war.
’ for Iraqi Kurds and other minorities at the
end of the 1991Gulfwar. It forms the core of this case study, although
we shall also look at earlier and later coverage for purposes of
Divided under British, French and
Italian rule during the nineteenth century, Somalia became independent
in 1960, uniting the former British and Italian colonial territories
in Baghdad on 9 April, broadcast live around the world, as
signalling the victory of the coalition.
After its defeat in the 1991Gulfwar, Iraq was subjected to international economic sanctions, which
caused large-scale suffering. The UN Children’s Fund estimated
that rising mortality rates after 1991 had resulted in 500,000 excess
deaths of infants under the age of
This book is about the transformation of Germany's security and defence policy in the time between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 war against Iraq. It traces and explains the reaction of Europe's biggest and potentially most powerful country to the ethnic wars of the 1990s, the emergence of large-scale terrorism, and the new US emphasis on pre-emptive strikes. Based on an analysis of Germany's strategic culture, it portrays Germany as a security actor and indicates the conditions and limits of the new German willingness to participate in international military crisis management that developed over the 1990s. The book debates the implications of Germany's transformation for Germany's partners and neighbours, and explains why Germany said ‘yes’ to the war in Afghanistan, but ‘no’ to the Iraq War. Based on a comprehensive study of the debates of the German Bundestag and actual German policy responses to the international crises between 1991 and 2003, it provides insights into the causes and results of Germany's transformation.
The first element that needs to be analysed is the role played by the economic crisis of 1985–1986 in ‘forcing’ the ruling elites in Algeria to open up the system. Government revenues fell due to the oil counter-shock, resulting in widespread impoverishment among the general population, which in turn led to the October 1988 riots. The question that should be asked is whether the externally driven downturn in the economy had a causal link to the decision to liberalise. The FIS contends that it was the lack of political legitimacy rather than the economic crisis that led the ruling elites to try a new strategy of re-legitimisation. This chapter discusses external shocks and direct active policies and their impact on Algeria's transition to democracy, focusing on the war in Afghanistan and its consequences and repercussions on Islamism in the country, the 1990–1991 Gulf War, the end of the Cold War, the West's promotion of democracy, promotion of political Islam, and the role of financial institutions and multinationals.
From Iraq to Iraq: full circle?
At the time of German re-uniﬁcation in October 1990, Germany followed a
policy of strict military abstinence in conﬂicts outside of Europe. The notion
that the Bundeswehr (the German armed forces) could be used for other purposes than defence of Germany was inconceivable across the political spectrum. Thus, not a single German soldier participated in the 1991GulfWar.
Twelve years later, when another US-led coalition launched Operation Iraqi
Freedom to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Germans remained
Piers Robinson, Peter Goddard, Katy Parry, Craig Murray, and Philip M. Taylor
as ‘holding the military initiative’ (1986: 146). Similarly, Morrison’s UKbased study of the 1991GulfWar describes coverage as dominated by a concentration on the progress of the war, speculation over coalition strategy and
concern regarding air and missile attacks on coalition forces (Morrison, 1992:
68). A third characteristic of supportive coverage is reporting that reinforces
official justifications for war and avoids substantive criticism: as described in
Chapter 2, Hallin (1986) argued that the Vietnam War raised fundamental
questions for some about the
making sense of international conflict and cooperation. The first
major post-Cold War conflict, the 1991Gulfwar, indicated how much had
already changed. Saddam Hussein had enjoyed Western support in
Iraq’s war against Iran in the 1980s, but was abruptly cast as the
‘new Hitler’ after his invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
Neither the erstwhile Soviet enemy nor Arab states raised any serious
replacement until the outbreak of the Gulf War.
The 1991GulfWar had an isolating effect on the
Palestinian leadership after the PLO chose to publicly support Saddam
Hussein and his attacks on Israel. Siding with Iraq alienated Gulf State
sponsors and devastated international support. Scenes of Palestinians
cheering on rooftops as Iraqi Scud missiles smashed into Israeli cities
undid the image of Palestinians
during the 1991GulfWar, as did Hezbollah when it launched thousands of missiles at Tiberias and Haifa in the summer of 2006. On both occasions, the missiles were aimed at the general vicinity of Israeli cities rather than at specific military targets. On the later occasion, Israel also violated the rules. Of the more than 1,000 Lebanese civilians killed during the summer of 2006, some were struck by Israeli missiles as they followed Israeli instructions to leave their homes and villages. Others were hit because blasted roads, bridges and gasoline stations had made it