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Results and reactions

The range of results and reactions prompted by the use of the ‘five techniques’ in Aden are the subject of this chapter. There is sufficient available evidence to be able to comment on how successful the techniques were in eliciting intelligence from the people interrogated this way. This is not the only respect in which the success of controversial interrogation techniques

in Interrogation, intelligence and security

The use of the ‘five techniques’ to aid interrogation during the years of the Aden Emergency is the subject of this and the following chapter. Aden is the first use of the ‘five techniques’ to be analysed in depth because it was the first that received sustained retrospective attention from the government. As a result of this, written records were created that allow

in Interrogation, intelligence and security
Open Access (free)
Humanitarianism in a Post-Liberal World Order

( Whitman, 2017 ), or to slavery and genocide against Native Americans, or forward again to the use of mass incarceration by liberals in the US more recently ( Murakawa, 2014 ). We can add torture by the British government in Aden and Northern Ireland and more recently, as we well know, US torture in the ‘war on terror’. These are just the examples that come to mind. There are many more. Yet, having said all of that, it remains a core liberal belief that, broadly speaking, things are moving in the right direction morally. That things are getting better

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Controversial British techniques

Interrogation, Intelligence and Security examines the origins and effects of a group of controversial interrogation techniques often described as torture, known as the ‘five techniques’. Focusing on the colony of Aden at a time when British rule was being challenged by nationalist insurgents (1963-67), on the height of ‘the troubles’ in Northern Ireland (1971) and the conflict in Iraq (2003), the book explores the use of hooding to restrict vision, white noise, stress positions, limited sleep and a limited diet. Through its in-depth analysis the book reveals how British forces came to use such controversial methods in counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and internal security contexts. In Aden and Northern Ireland the techniques were a part of policy, used because of the British military’s belief – a belief adopted by members of government – that the techniques would increase the amount and quality of intelligence obtained during interrogation. In Iraq the techniques were used for a much more complex set of factors that can be categorised into facilitating and motivating factors. The book finds that while it is likely that some intelligence was produced from these interrogations, the techniques had widespread and long-lasting negative effects that should be taken into account when judging whether these and similar techniques can be justified.

Retreat from Aden

5 Holding the thin red line: retreat from Aden You British! We will expel you as you were expelled by the nations of Asia and Africa . . . We, the women, shall be at the front until the last drop of our blood. We are not afraid of death. We are not afraid of . . . your aeroplanes, your armoured cars, your tanks . . . We will fight you by word and deed . . . We shall take our freedom by force and faith. Oh, Arab nation . . . We all know Britain. We have known it in Port Said, Cyprus, Malta, Kenya. So why are we afraid. Death comes once. Why should we not die, if

in Defending the realm?
The politics of Britain’s small wars since 1945

Britain is often revered for its extensive experience of waging ‘small wars’. Its long imperial history is littered with high profile counter-insurgency campaigns, thus marking it out as the world's most seasoned practitioners of this type of warfare. Britain's ‘small wars’ ranged from fighting Communist insurgents in the bamboo-laden Malayan jungle, marauding Mau Mau gangs in Kenyan game reserves, Irish republican terrorists in the back alleys and rural hamlets of Northern Ireland, and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan's Helmand province. This is the first book to detail the tactical and operational dynamics of Britain's small wars, arguing that the military's use of force was more heavily constrained by wider strategic and political considerations than previously admitted. Outlining the civil-military strategy followed by the British in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan, Defending the Realm argues that Britain's small wars have been shaped by a relative decline in British power, amidst dramatic fluctuations in the international system, just as much as the actions of military commanders and civilian officials ‘on the spot’ or those formulating government policy in London. Written from a theoretically-informed perspective, grounded in rich archival sources, oral testimonies and a reappraisal of the literature on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, Defending the Realm is the definitive account of the politics of Britain's small wars. It will be of interest to political scientists and historians, as well as scholars, students, soldiers and politicians who wish to gain a more critically informed perspective of the political trappings of war.

darker sides to the end of Empire have been more commonly associated. The hasty withdrawal from Palestine in June 1948 set a precedent in the way in which the policing the end of Empire would take place. Essentially this came about as former Palestine policemen took their experiences to other police forces, which included both the Cyprus and the Aden Police. However, in both cases the Colonial Office

in At the end of the line
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the Air Ministry took control of defence in the Aden Protectorate and the Palestine Mandate, but these small exceptions do not validate Beaumont’s assertion. In both Aden and Palestine only a single squadron was normally deployed; in both territories aerial action was confined to rural areas or the desert hinterland and did not displace ground forces in cities; and in Palestine air policing had anyway demonstrably failed by

in Air power and colonial control

July 1967 that it should leave the ‘East of Suez’, including Aden, Malaysia, Singapore and the Persian Gulf. This view rests upon three ideas: That the withdrawal from the Gulf was decided upon as part of the retreat from a larger area ‘East of Suez’; That the decision had been taken by July 1967; and That economic pressure was the main driver behind the whole process. The next

in Britain and the formation of the Gulf States
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The Scottish military tradition in decline

vied with one another to show how in touch they were with Scottish concerns and how staunch they were in defence of Scottish interests. But to start in 1967, with 1st Argylls on their way back from an ‘end of empire’ deployment in the Aden Colony and Protectorate in southern Arabia, during which their role and tactics excited a remarkable degree of media coverage and controversy, would

in Scotland, empire and decolonisation in the twentieth century