This book explores the way in which the Anglo-American new world order (NWO) debate changed by 9/11, and the encouragement this has given to the 'neoconservatives' or 'neocons' within the George W. Bush Administration. It examines the policy-making process as it developed before the Versailles Conference of 1919. An extensive literature exists on the 'lessons of Versailles' and particularly on the 'failure' of the League of Nations (LON), one that started even before the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. The book then explores how the Conference and the LON attempted to frame the immediate problems of the post-war period. It shows how NWO architects' thinking developed in what might be called the area of 'global security' from the period of the First World War until the present. The clear evidence is that the American thinking on the NWO had a huge impact in Britain's processes in the same direction. President Theodore Roosevelt shared a deep suspicion of British motives for the post-war settlement in line with most Americans. He attributed blame for the inter-war crisis as much to British and French intransigence and balance of power politics at Versailles as to German aggression. The results of the Versailles settlement hung like a cloud over Allied relationships during the Second World War and gave a powerful impetus in American circles for an attitude of 'never again'. The variety of historical archival material presented provided the background to the current and historical American obsession with creating the world order.
over Allied relationships during the Second World War and gave a powerful impetus in American circles for an attitude of ‘never again’. Many in the United States had been deeply affected by what was perceived as a cynical disregard for MUP/Williams/ch3 80 23/10/98, 11:33 am 81 The planning of an American NWO morality in the debates at Versailles, and the institutional arrangements of the 1920s and 1930s. Britain and France’s appeasement of the dictators in the 1930s was but one example of this. This was often summed up in the United States as a greater concern
these creative and destructive tendencies in some detail to show that the vague Wilsonian ideas of 1919 were to be given a much harder normcreating effect that largely stood the test of the Cold War and provided the bedrock not only for the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe, but for the establishment of norms and practices that are now being universalised in the way that Wilson and Roosevelt wanted but never lived to see. The historiography of the Allied relationship, 1941–45 A number of bibliographical comments are in order at this point. It is acknowledged