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An interview with Michael Lillis
Graham Spencer

largely from the British. The idea of setting up a power-sharing Executive and the agenda that was to be worked through was very much the drafting and the initiative of officials on the British side. But the Anglo-Irish Agreement was very largely an Irish initiative and, although not entirely, most of the ideas came from us. Were the British more interested in principles than pragmatism? One of the things that we had to recognise was that the British were not interested in discussing principles at all. And I

in Inside Accounts, Volume I
An interview with Noel Dorr
Graham Spencer

memory, a continuous process of officials meeting at intervals of every few weeks as you had in the 1980s for the Anglo-Irish Agreement, but there were various exchanges and meetings over 1973. Remember, both Governments had become members of the European Union from January of 1973. It was not the EU at the time but the EEC, and that had a very important effect because representatives from both Governments were now meeting regularly in Brussels in the form of the Council of Ministers and there was an easier relationship

in Inside Accounts, Volume I
The Irish Government and Peace in Northern Ireland, from Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement
Author: Graham Spencer

This study is the most comprehensive account yet of how the Irish Government worked to bring the Northern Ireland conflict to an end. Based on single long-form interviews with key officials it throws new light on how tensions and problems that emerged in the search for peace were confronted and overcome to bring about the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. This first of two volumes looks at previous attempts to develop peace as with Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreement before focusing on the foundations of the peace process that followed. The interviews reveal the iterative nature of the peace process and through the voices of those on the inside provide the most dramatic and authoritative picture yet of how that process came to change the course of history. Taking the reader into the heart of the negotiating room, this study provides an invaluable series of testimonies about Irish Government efforts to end conflict in Northern Ireland.

Abstract only
Graham Spencer

parties in Northern Ireland towards acceptance of a peace agreement and how the challenges that arose were faced. This first volume concentrates on early efforts to develop a political accommodation through Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 before then focussing on the formative years of the peace process that emerged through confidential dialogue in the late 1980s before taking on more formal political shape and momentum from the early 1990s. The relevance of Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreement provides a

in Inside Accounts, Volume I
An interview with Daithi O’Ceallaigh
Graham Spencer

during very difficult days. The murder of Airey Neave, the murder of Lord Mountbatten, the hunger strikes, extradition and the Falklands War were all difficult issues at that time. I came back to Dublin in 1982 and later that year I was moved into the Anglo-Irish division to work on Northern Ireland, largely with the nationalists. I did that job from then up to the signature of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in November 1985. When we signed the Agreement, an Anglo-Irish Secretariat was established at Maryfield, just outside Belfast

in Inside Accounts, Volume I
P. J. McLoughlin

differences.9 Indeed, the astonishing rise of Sinn Féin in the aftermath of the hunger strikes caused considerable panic in both capitals. There was now a genuine fear that the moderate nationalism of the SDLP would be eclipsed by the radical republicanism of Sinn Féin.10 Thus, it was the growth of Sinn Féin which provided the initial rationale for the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985, and the precursory New Ireland Forum (NIF) of 1983–84. The New Ireland Forum Cynical commentators saw the NIF merely as an attempt by the Irish establishment to ‘save’ the SDLP. By

in John Hume and the revision of Irish nationalism
P. J. McLoughlin

framework of thinking which I think could be summarised roughly like this: the middle ground is not taking shape in the way that we [in the SDLP] hoped it would as a consequence of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and it isn’t going to take shape, because of the divisive effect upon opinion being generated by the violence … and for as long as that violence goes on we are not going to get a sufficiently strong middle ground to mount any kind of structure of power … [However,] if we are going to switch off the violence, we have got to offer these guys [republicans] something; we

in John Hume and the revision of Irish nationalism
Chris Gilligan

the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA), an intergovernmental agreement signed by the governments of the UK and Republic of Ireland in 1985. The AIA marked the beginning of the institutionalising of official multicultural anti-racism. It shifted the understanding of the conflict from one of national sovereignty, to present it in cultural and psychological terms.57 Instead of the universalist language of equality regardless of race, religion or ethnicity, the AIA talked about taking ‘measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of the two traditions

in Northern Ireland and the crisis of anti-racism
Abstract only
Mark Garnett and Kevin Hickson

particularly critical of both the Single European Act and the Anglo-Irish Agreement before adopting a critical attitude towards the Major administration after 1990. This potted biography of Powell highlights a number of issues. Firstly, Powell was highly dedicated and ambitious and showed clear achievement in all he did, but also showed an equal willingness to resign. He quit academia for the army and then the army for politics and was to become known as a resigner over the course of his political life.14 Most of his political achievements came while he was out of office

in Conservative thinkers
Donnacha Ó Beacháin

would they come to the negotiating table. When asked if he thought Thatcher was likely to do this, Haughey replied in the negative, saying that Anglo-Irish relations would have to await ‘the right man’ and none had emerged since William Gladstone.138 The Anglo-Irish Agreement and its aftermath Pursuing the British for a deal on Northern Ireland had obvious risks for FitzGerald; a second rebuff from Thatcher could sink his administration. Influential actors in the US including the Reagan administration tried to assuage Thatcher’s misgivings about an agreement and this

in From Partition to Brexit