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The Nazi occupation of the small Channel Island of Alderney irreversibly altered the landscape and lives of both the contemporary population and the subsequent generations. The evacuation of the island’s 1,500 inhabitants in June 1940 paved the way for a period of occupation by the Germans that would last until May 1945. In 1941, Hitler issued an order to fortify the Channel Islands and make them an ‘impregnable fortress’; thus creating ‘Adolf Island’. This book seeks to collate and combine historical and archaeological data relating the occupation landscape in order to produce the definitive guide to the events that took place during this period. It addresses yet unanswered questions relating to the purpose of the occupation, the lives of the labourers, known and missing, and the post-war reaction to this legacy.
; green fields and quaint buildings were transformed by the presence of vast concrete megastructures, minefields and military equipment in order to protect against ‘even the strongest attempt at landing’. 11 In March 1942, Alderney’s fortifications became part of the Atlantic Wall after Hitler ordered the defence of the entire coastline from Norway to the French border with Spain. 12 Ultimately, five coastal artillery batteries, twenty-two anti-aircraft batteries, thirteen strongpoints, twelve resistance nests and
).33 This was not an isolated incident. To defend France from Allied attack and invasion, occupation authorities militarized the coastline. They laid millions of mines around the coast and at sea. Mines were a major hazard, denying civilians access to the land and sea, and claiming lives. In September 1941 winds blew a sea mine ashore at Roquebrune-Cap-Martin (Alpes-Maritimes). The mine exploded, killing a gendarme and spewing rocks 700 metres up into the air.34 German military authorities sought to defend the entire French Atlantic coastline with its Atlantic Wall
associated with the Todt organisation tasked with building the enormous Atlantic Wall, commanded a significant proportion of French building materials. Consequently, it took a long time for the companies contracted by the association, such as Tennis-Louvres, to acquire the necessary materials and specialised workers. The series of letters available at the association's archive demonstrate back and forth between the association and a variety of companies that preceded the construction effort. In a letter dated 12 September 1942, the builders complained of their difficulties
built the bunkers in Normandy, scant are the stories of the labourers sent to Alderney in books that have focused on the fortifications. 3 Yet, it was the exploitation of these men and (to a lesser extent) women that ensured that Alderney, and the Channel Islands more widely, ‘were fortified much stronger and much earlier than the Atlantic Wall’. 4 Without these people, the military personnel stationed on the island could not have realised Hitler’s vision to retain his little piece of England until the
–186. 4 A. Maddrell and Sidaway, J.D. (eds), Deathscapes. Spaces for Death, Dying, Mourning and Remembrance (London and New York: Routledge, 2010). 5 T. Davenport, Festung Alderney (Jersey: Barnes Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 7. 6 J.E. Kaufmann, H.W. Kaufmann, A. Jankovič-Potočnik and Vladimir Tonič. The Atlantic Wall: History and Guide (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2011), loc. 1353. 7
restaurant [and on] which days and at what times cinemas were open.’ 14 Living an extravagant lifestyle in small towns and rural villages would, however, have been inappropriate as it would have made agents conspicuous. Bob Maloubier, a saboteur who was based in Rouen, recollected: In Rouen, we tried not to attract attention. We didn’t go to bars, nightclubs, black-market restaurants which would have round-ups from time to time. There behind the Atlantic Wall, Germans were all over and very strict. We kept a low profile, looking like ordinary Frenchmen, courteous
Atlantic wall. The factors behind these changing attitudes and the accompanying implications for the Spanish republicans constitute the thrust of this chapter. The Spanish refugees were a valuable workforce. They were a mobile and already displaced group of workers who the authorities would deploy, if not at will, then with great flexibility. However, even though the refugees became of great interest to the Vichy government and the German Occupying authorities, their use as a labour force was initially far from inevitable and the path was strewn with difficulties. There
seemed established by the overwhelming vote of deputies and senators in favour of according Pétain emergency powers. Papon’s decision to accompany Sabatier to Bordeaux in the spring of 1942 172 The trial of Maurice Papon was consistent with his earlier behaviour. Bordeaux, southern anchor of Germany’s Atlantic wall and a major submarine base, lay firmly inside the occupied zone. Vichy’s decision to send such a senior civil servant as Sabatier reflected its determination to maintain French authority in the city and stop it slipping completely into Germany’s New Order
. 62 TNA, WO106/5248B, ‘M.I.19 (R.P.S.) 2253, Report, Channel Islands, Alderney’, 5 July 1944. 63 C. John, Organisation Todt: From Autobahns to the Atlantic Wall (Stroud: Amberly Publishing, 2014), loc. 1340. 64 TNA, WO311/13, ‘Translation of statement by Mil. Vorw. O/Insp. Hans Spann’, 5 September 1945. 65 TNA, WO311/13, ‘Translation of statement by Karl Hoffmann’, 2 September