3 Australian foreign policy and the vernacular of national belonging Katie Linnane On 22 October 2014 a gunman opened fire on the Canadian National War Memorial and Houses of Parliament, killing a soldier on ceremonial duty and injuring three others. In expressing sympathy on behalf of all Australians, then Prime Minister, Tony Abbott (2013–15), announced: ‘today more than ever, Australians and Canadians are family’ (Wroe 2014). On the surface, such a statement of solidarity appeared both appropriate and unexceptional. In times of crisis or catastrophe
This book provides the first comprehensive analysis of Japan’s new security
partnerships with Australia, India, countries and multilateral security
structure in East Asia, as well as with the EU and some of its member
Most books on Japanese bilateral relations focus exclusively on the Japanese perspective, the debate in Japan, positions of Japanese government leaders and parties, or the public discourse. This edited volume is organized in pairs of chapters, one each analysing the motivations and objectives of Japan, and a second analysing those of each of the most important new security partners.
After solely relying on the United States for its national security needs during the Cold War, since the end of the Cold War, Japan has begun to deepen its bilateral security ties. Since the mid-2000s under LDP and DPJ administrations, bilateral security partnerships accelerated and today go beyond non-traditional security issue are as and extend far into traditional security and military affairs, including the exchange and joint acquisition of military hardware, military exercises, and capacity building. It is argued, that these developments will have implications for the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific.
This book is a primer for those interested in Japan’s security policy beyond the US-Japan security alliance, non-American centred bilateral and multilateral security cooperation through the eyes of Japanese as well as partner country perspectives. It is also an ideal as a course reading for graduate courses on regional security cooperation and strategic partnerships, and Japanese foreign and security policy.
: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Sydney, 1988), p. 186. 11 Rose, Academic Sojourners, p. 109. 12 Dennis Altman, Defying Gravity: A Political Life (Sydney, 1997), p. 63. 13 Woods, ‘Fulbright Internationalism’, p. 23. 14 Molly Battie, ‘Fulbright Women in the Global Intellectual Elite’, in Alessandro Brogi, Giles Scott-Smith and David J. Snyder, eds, The Legacy of J. William Fulbright: Policy, Power, and Ideology, (Kentucky, 2019), [p. 10].
surveillance and communication satellites, and also radio facilities to send commands to its submarines in the Indian Ocean, ‘the most important and controversial issue posed by the American Alliance or Australian foreign policy generally’.24 The Fulbright Program belongs in the context of the unique relationship between these Pacific allies who were working towards securing their mutual interests in the region. In the Fulbright division of the world, Australia and New Zealand are firmly located by their geography in the east Asia-Pacific sphere of the globe (see Figure I.1
Identity is often regarded as something that is possessed by individuals, states, and other agents. In this edited collection, identity is explored across a range of approaches and under-explored case studies with a view to making visible its fractured, contingent, and dynamic features. The book brings together themes of belonging and exclusion, identity formation and fragmentation. It also examines how identity functions in discourse, and the effects it produces, both materially and in ideational terms. Taking in case studies from Asia-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America, the various chapters interrogate identity through formal governing mechanisms, popular culture and place. These studies demonstrate the complex and fluid nature of identity and identity practices, as well as implications for theorising identity.
International Humanitarian Law’ – adding that his government ‘regards acts of torture as breaches of basic human rights and infringements of personal dignity’. 80 Keen to present himself as a multilateralist and friend of the liberal world order, Whitlam wanted to move Australian foreign policy away from US domination. 81 Yet, he no doubt shared the perspective that historian Barbara Keys identifies among many liberal Americans
. 17 Caroline Elkins, ‘The reassertion of the British Empire in Southeast Asia’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 19:3 (Winter 2009), p. 365; also see David Reynolds, ‘Empire region, world: the international context of Australian foreign policy since 1939’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 51:3 (2005 ), p. 348
was nothing to suggest that Curtin’s remarks at the end of 1941 represented a major departure in Australian foreign policy, or that he envisaged a long-term security relationship with the United States continuing into the peace. Indeed, in the mid to late 1940s the United States rejected time and again Prime Minister Ben Chifley and External Affairs Minister H. V. Evatt’s entreaties for some kind of
. Ltd, 1939 ). 14 G. Evans, Making Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Australian Fabian Society, 1989 ). 15 A. Linklater, ‘What is a Good International Citizen?’, in P. Keal (ed.), Ethics and
to be more ‘nuanced’ as well as more ‘pro-Chinese’. This may not matter, as the strategic partnership is now firmly embedded into Australian foreign policy and has thus acquired a bureaucratic/institutional momentum of its own. Moreover, as a diplomatic priority, it enjoys bipartisan support in Australia (as well as Japan). Peter Jennings confirms that ‘growing military ties with Tokyo aren’t accidental but the result of careful and bipartisan policy development over recent years’ ( Jennings, 2012 : 12). The strategic partnership therefore has firm support in