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6 The Hoyos Mission 4 July–12 July: Documents (117)–(148) The documents in the following section demonstrate clearly that many of Vienna’s decision-makers were eager to grasp the opportunity of a ‘reckoning’ with Serbia which presented itself in the aftermath of the assassination. Particularly a younger generation of diplomats who had participated in Alois von Aehrenthal’s expansionist foreign policy in the early years of the century were of the opinion that an active foreign policy was the only way out of the internal stagnation they all felt Austria-Hungary
Ljuba Jovanović, the Minister of Education, who proclaimed: ‘We have no other choice but to fight it out.’2 The delivery of Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum spelt the end of a period of uncertainty during which Europe’s Great Powers had been playing a guessing game about Austria-Hungary’s likely move against Serbia. In Europe’s capitals, the reaction was largely one of surprise at the severity of the demands (232), followed by immediate attempts to find a way of defusing the crisis and arranging mediation. While Vienna’s (and Berlin’s) decision-makers expected Serbia to
9 ‘The machine is in motion’ 28 July–30 July: Documents (269)–(332) In the light of Serbia’s unexpectedly conciliatory reply to AustriaHungary’s ultimatum, it should have been possible to avert the threatening war. However, Austria-Hungary’s decision-makers were as determined as they had been right from the beginning of the crisis to use this opportunity for war (321). Austria-Hungary’s leaders were dismayed by the Serbian reply, and to prevent any further attempts at a diplomatic solution being found, refused Britain’s conference suggestion of 24 July
attack by Germany; the latter was safe, thanks to the tried pacifism and friendship of Russia, from révanche ambitions on the part of France; and Russia was secured, thanks to Germany’s need of maintaining amicable relations with her, against excessive intrigues by Austria-Hungary in the Balkan peninsula. Lastly, England, isolated and held in check by her rivalry with Russia in Persia, by her diplomats’ traditional fear of our advance on India, and by strained relations with France, especially notable at the time of the well-known Fashoda3 incident, viewed with 3 The
This book talks about the mass displacement of civilians, estimated to be 14 to 15 million, in the twentieth-century Europe during the First World War. It looks at the causes and consequences of the refugee crisis and its aftermath, and the attempts to understand its significance. Key sites of displacement extended from Belgium to Armenia, taking in France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, East Prussia, the Russian Empire, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and Serbia. The German army's occupation of Belgium, France, Poland and Lithuania prompted the mass flight of refugees, as did Russia's invasion of East Prussia in 1914. Jewish, Ruthenian and Polish civilians in the Habsburg Empire fled their homes or were deported by the military to distant locations. Following Italy's attack on Austria-Hungary in May 1915, the Habsburg authorities ordered around 100,000 Slovenian subjects of the empire to leave. The Austrian and Bulgarian invasion of Serbia brought about a humanitarian catastrophe as civilians and the remnants of the Serbian army sought safety elsewhere. However, mass flight of civilian refugees did not begin in 1914 nor did it come to an end in 1918. Muslim refugees fled to the relative safety of Anatolia in order to escape violent persecution by Bulgarian and other forces during the Balkan Wars on 1912-13. There were complex movements of population between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey before 1914. The complex process of repatriation and resettlement affected soldiers and civilians alike and rarely took place in stable or peaceful circumstances.
Lewis Namier was one of the most important historians of the twentieth century. His work on the politics of the 1760s, based on the ‘scientific’ analysis of a mass of contemporary documents, and emphasising the material and psychological elements of human motivation, was seen by contemporaries as ’revolutionary’ and remains controversial. It gave a new word to the English language: to Namierise. Moreover, Namier played a major role in public affairs, in the Foreign Office, 1915–20, and in the Zionist Organisation in the 1930s, and was close to many of the leading figures of his day. This is the first biography of Namier for half a century, and the first to integrate all aspects of his life and thought. Based on a comprehensive range of sources, including the entire corpus of Namier’s writings, it provides a full account of his background, examines his role in politics and reconstructs his work as a historian, showing the origins and development of his ideas about the past, and the subjects which preoccupied him: nationalism, empire, and the psychology of individuals and groups. Namier’s life and writings illuminate many of the key events of the twentieth century, his belief in the power of nationalism and the importance of national territory, foreshadowing problems which still beset our own world.
Horse-drawn carriages had given way to petrol-driven motorcars, but to glance at the procession that snaked its way through the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the morning of 28 June 1914, one could be forgiven for thinking they were witnessing an episode from the life of Napoleon III or Tsar Alexander II. Six highly polished vehicles comprised the motorcade that ushered Archduke Franz Ferdinand – heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary and nephew of the now eighty-three-year-old Franz Joseph – and his wife
from border regions. In a programme devised by the Ministry of War and implemented by the army in Cisleithanian border regions, Ruthenians, Poles and Jews in Galicia and Bukovina, as well as the Serb-Croatian population of Bosnia and (after 1915) the Italianspeaking population of South Tyrol and Trentino, were evacuated and deported into other parts of the monarchy.1 This chapter introduces refugee/evacuee politics in Austria-Hungary, in particular Cisleithania, and then explores the approach of the Habsburg administration towards refugees. (For the sake of
based upon the new scientific findings provided by bacteriology.6 In my opinion, the fact that most of the existing historiography on the relation between the Muslim pilgrimage and cholera concentrates Sanitary control of Balkan Muslim pilgrims 147 on Western Europe, the Middle East and British India is responsible for a most interesting part of the story remaining completely ignored. I am referring to the question of Balkan Muslims, and also in part to the role of the Habsburg Empire (Austria-Hungary), in the control of the Hajj from 1867. With regard to the
Secretary Kiderlen-Wächter died of a stroke on 31 December 1912. He was succeeded by Gottlieb von Jagow. 94 MUP_Mombauer_02_Pt1_Rev2.indd 94 19/05/2013 21:48 Documents from 1913 (54) 31 January 1913: Cartwright to Nicolson Relations between Russia and Austria-Hungary declining; Austria getting exasperated with threat from Serbia Vienna, 31 January 1913 Private […] It seems to me that the relations between Russia and AustriaHungary, instead of showing any signs of improvement, are growing worse from day to day, not officially perhaps but through the steadily increasing