enforceable at the global level . We know what this looks
like because it is how the US has behaved for much of the last eighty to a hundred years. Now we
have two major powers, much like we did during the Cold War (which is not to say we are entering
another Cold War, the mutual dependence of the US and Chineseeconomies making that unlikely).
As China’s influence, its diplomacy, its money and its power flow into all areas of the
international political system, so it will be harder and harder to persuade either indifferent
or reluctant states that
"Over a hundred years since the beginning of modern imperialism, the former colonial world is still prevented from joining the club of imperialist powers. The gap between rich and poor countries is not narrowing but growing. China is usually presented as challenging the dominance of the United States and other rich countries. However, imperialist domination over the most sophisticated aspects of the labour process gives the rich countries and their corporations control over the global labour process as a whole – including in China. Third World producers are forced to specialise in the opposite types of work – in relatively simple and low-end labour, for which major price markups and large profits are rarely possible. This is the kernel of unequal exchange in world trade. The imperialist system develops two types of capital – monopoly and non-monopoly capital – and two types of societies – rich, monopoly, imperialist societies and poor, non-monopoly, ‘Third World’ societies. China’s ascendance to become the most powerful Third World country in no way threatens to topple continuing imperialist dominance. Most contemporary Marxist writing has not been focused on global income polarisation and imperialist exploitation of the poor countries. For this reason, it has been unable to explain how exactly the same countries continuously reproduce their dominance. However, the actual conditions of the neoliberal world economy have made explicit how this happens through the labour process itself. In doing so it has also shown how Marx’s labour theory of value can be concretely applied to the conditions of monopoly capital today.
to the way it has guided China from the tragedy and poverty that were associated with social experiments, like the Great Leap Forward; (1958–62), to the affluence of the east coast cities and their hinterlands. For most of the citizens, the social contract’s condition of material improvement has been met in considerable part. Since its transition from a centrally planned economy to a free market one, and particularly following the reforms initiated by Deng, the Chineseeconomy has grown exponentially. Some of this growth is attributable to strategic investment in
Over more than thirty years of reform and opening, the Chinese Communist Party has pursued the gradual marketization of China’s economy alongside the preservation of a resiliently authoritarian political system, defying long-standing predictions that ‘transition’ to a market economy would catalyse deeper political transformation. In an era of deepening synergy between authoritarian politics and finance capitalism, Communists constructing capitalism offers a novel and important perspective on this central dilemma of contemporary Chinese development. This book challenges existing state–market paradigms of political economy and reveals the Eurocentric assumptions of liberal scepticism towards Chinese authoritarian resilience. It works with an alternative conceptual vocabulary for analysing the political economy of financial development as both the management and exploitation of socio-economic uncertainty. Drawing upon extensive fieldwork and over sixty interviews with policymakers, bankers, and former party and state officials, the book delves into the role of China’s state-owned banking system since 1989. It shows how political control over capital has been central to China’s experience of capitalist development, enabling both rapid economic growth whilst preserving macroeconomic and political stability. Communists constructing capitalism will be of academic interest to scholars and graduate students in the fields of Chinese studies, social studies of finance, and international and comparative political economy. Beyond academia, it will be essential reading for anyone interested in the evolution of Chinese capitalism and its implications for an increasingly central issue in contemporary global politics: the financial foundations of illiberal capitalism.
still trying to catch up. The Chineseeconomy is not only the second largest in
Indian foreign policy
the world but also larger than the economies of the other four members
combined. China’s power makes the other members nervous, leading them
to hedge bets by investing in alternative alliances and partnerships even
as China’s rapid accretion of economic and political power adds to its own
challenges to make friends. Given the leverage that China enjoys in BRICS,
it should come as no surprise that Beijing has suggested that IBSA – the
grouping of democracies
account of China’s role in the world – its dynastic past, nineteenth-century travails and the current revival of fortune.
For many, possibly the majority of Chinese citizens, the idea that there is something inevitable in the logic of history to suggest that their political system is a temporary step on the path to a Western version of democracy is just imperialism in another form. The phenomenal success of the Chineseeconomy is evidence enough for them that improved material conditions for everyday life do not require accessible choice at a political level
No political system directly commands all resources and, by the
same token, none eschews public ownership completely. Nevertheless,
China is a noteworthy case in which the underlying balance between
the public and private has changed remarkably in recent decades. As an
overarching theme, the political economy of China is discussed in this
book in terms of the broad choices available to the government of the
PRC for regulating economic activity. The success of the Chineseeconomy is in many ways extraordinary but the balance between the
social upheavals associated
style of social science is more useful to policymakers than Grim and
Finke’s, just as charts and geolocation aids, rather than
NASA’s Blue Marble, are useful for navigators.
The future of religion in China, given the weight of
the Chineseeconomy, is surely of high importance for the world at
large. Grim and Finke show that, in the absence of a single national
prior to the slowdown in the Chineseeconomy and accompanying commodities bust ( Global Business Guide Indonesia, 2015 ). Indonesia has managed and de-prioritised its territorial dispute with China through diplomacy, preferring to prioritise comprehensive relations with China. This approach has been fairly constant, but changing economic relations as a result of the commodities bust, a more assertive China, and the 19 March 2016 incident in which an Indonesian Maritime Affairs and Fisheries patrol ship intercepted a Chinese trawler lowering its nets in waters at
gambit of equi-balancing’ by ‘pitting one great power against another’.
As explained earlier, dependence on the Chineseeconomy is a central factor in explaining reluctance by some Southeast Asian countries to deepen security ties with Japan. In the future, if the Chinese move away from an export-led, manufacturing-based economy and towards a service-based economy, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Myanmar and Vietnam might have a decreasing economic interest in China. Nagy argues in his chapter that this decline in economic dependency might