Cooperation and trust were increasingly scarce commodities in the inner councils
of the EU. This book explores why the boldest initiative in the sixty-year quest
to achieve a borderless Europe has exploded in the face of the EU. A close
examination of each stage of the EU financial emergency that offers evidence
that the European values that are supposed to provide solidarity within the
twenty eight-member EU in good times and bad are flimsy and thinly distributed.
The book aims to show that it is possible to view the difficulties of the EU as
rooted in much longer-term decision-making. It begins with an exploration of the
long-term preparations that were made to create a single currency encompassing a
large part of the European Union. The book then examines the different ways in
which the European Union seized the initiative from the European nation-state,
from the formation of the Coal and Steel Community to the Maastricht Treaty. It
focuses on the role of France and Germany in the EU. Difficulties that have
arisen for the EU as it has tried to foster a new European consciousness are
discussed next. The increasingly strained relationship between the EU and the
democratic process is also examined. The book discusses the evolution of the
crisis in the eurozone and the shortcomings which have impeded the EU from
bringing it under control. It ends with a portrait of a European Union in 2013
wracked by mutual suspicions.
European integration as a system of conflict resolution in the Franco-German relationship (1950–63)
of the conflict: territorial claims, annexation, and external control.
It first created a sectoral arrangement binding the French and German
war industries into the European CoalandSteelCommunity (1951). The
European Economic Community (1957) ensured the continued expansion of
integration into a systemic open-ended process of building common
institutions and policies. As a result of incremental institutional
success. When he heard that the foreign minister spent every weekend in Metz, to be with his family, Monnet lay in wait for him at Gare de l’Est
on the morning of Saturday 29 April. As Schuman sat waiting for the train to
leave, Monnet handed the startled foreign minister his well-developed plan for
a European CoalandSteelCommunity. Not noted for a particularly creative
mind, Schuman was nevertheless an astute politician who immediately saw how
Monnet’s proposal would solve several problems. For one, France would gain
equal access to Germany’s rich coal reserve and
Memory, leadership, and the fi rst phase of integration (1945– 58)
Peter J. Verovšek
fundamental political changes in the immediate aftermath of a historical rupture.
In this chapter I focus on the key individuals involved in the creation of the first institution of European integration, the ECSC, in 1951. I argue that three leaders played a particularly important and possibly irreplaceable role in founding the coalandsteelcommunity: its institutional architect and the primary visionary of integration based on the community method, the French technocrat Jean Monnet; French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, who took up these ideas despite France’s long
policymakers who were involved in the economic reconstruction of Western Europe after 1945, he was able to promote economic cooperation in the production of coal and steel among former combatant countries. Transfer of economic sovereignty to supra-national authorities like the European CoalandSteelCommunity, launched in 1953 with Monnet as its first head, had to proceed with caution. He became aware that political nationalism, though discredited by the uses that it had been put to in Europe between 1914 and 1945, had far from exhausted its credibility. The hankering for
warnings about the dangers which it posed for European cooperation reveal a strongly dysfunctional side to the EU – an entity confident and assured in its planning role but often hopelessly inept in managing and implementing some of its key projects.
Chapter 2 examines the different ways in which the European Union seized the initiative from the European nation-state, from the formation of the CoalandSteelCommunity to the Maastricht Treaty. Not only was a Europe without powerful nations a primary goal but there was a growing willingness to remove the project from
Reconstruction and reconciliation; confrontation and oppression
Kjell M. Torbiörn
1951 by founding the European CoalandSteelCommunity (ECSC).
After attempts to set up a European Defence Community and a
European Political Community failed in 1954, negotiations between the
‘Six’ (belonging to the overall successful ECSC) in 1957 led to the creation
of the European Economic Community (EEC).
However, West European integration projects and Central and Eastern European adaptation to Soviet communism were overshadowed
(and intensified) by pronounced East–West tensions, as expressed in the
1950–53 Korean War, the formal division of Germany into two
support for the EU, 1945–2015 (MARPOR data)
2008: 95). Labour was against joining the European CoalandSteelCommunity
(ECSC), as the UK’s coal and steel industries (amongst others) had recently been
nationalised, and the notion of transferring power over these industries to the
supranational level was strongly opposed (Leitolf, 1995: 275). What is more, consecutive Labour leaders saw the Commonwealth as the more relevant platform
for international trade and political engagement.
When in 1961, Anthony Eden’s Conservative government started to apply for
This book is about the European Union's role in conflict resolution and reconciliation in Europe. Ever since it was implemented as a political project of the post-World War II reality in Western Europe, European integration has been credited with performing conflict-resolution functions. The EU allegedly transformed the long-standing adversarial relationship between France and Germany into a strategic partnership. Conflict in Western Europe became obsolete. The end of the Cold War further reinforced its role as a regional peace project. While these evolutionary dynamics are uncontested, the deeper meaning of the process, its transformative power, is still to be elucidated. How does European integration restore peace when its equilibrium is broken and conflict or the legacies of enmity persist? This is a question that needs consideration. This book sets out to do exactly that. It explores the peace and conflict-resolution role of European integration by testing its somewhat vague, albeit well-established, macro-political rationale of a peace project in the practical settings of conflicts. Its central argument is that the evolution of the policy mix, resources, framing influences and political opportunities through which European integration affects conflicts and processes of conflict resolution demonstrates a historical trend through which the EU has become an indispensable factor of conflict resolution. The book begins with the pooling together of policy-making at the European level for the management of particular sectors (early integration in the European Coal and Steel Community) through the functioning of core EU policies (Northern Ireland).
conflicts and processes of conflict resolution (on the example of the
Franco-German relationship, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and Kosovo/Serbia)
demonstrates a historical trend. It proceeds from the pooling together
of policy-making at the European level for the management of particular
sectors (early integration in the European CoalandSteelCommunity and
the EEC customs union) through the functioning of core EU sectoral and