The first major post-Cold War conflict, the 1991 Gulf war, indicated how much had already changed. Saddam Hussein had enjoyed Western support in Iraq's war against Iran in the 1980s, but was abruptly cast as the 'new Hitler' after his invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. This book is about how the media have interpreted conflict and international intervention in the years after the Cold War. By comparing press coverage of a number of different wars and crises, it seeks to establish which have been the dominant themes in explaining the post-Cold War international order and to discover how far the patterns established prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks have subsequently changed. The key concern is with the legitimacy of Western intervention: the aim is to investigate the extent to which Western military action is represented in news reporting as justifiable and necessary. The book presents a study that looks at UK press coverage of six conflicts and the international response to them: two instances of 'humanitarian military intervention' (Somalia and Kosovo); two cases in which the international community was criticised for not intervening (Bosnia and Rwanda); and two post-9/11 interventions (Afghanistan and Iraq). There were a number of overlapping UN and US interventions in Somalia in the early 1990s. Operation Restore Hope was the first major instance of post-Cold War humanitarian military intervention, following the precedent set by the establishment of 'safe havens' for Iraqi Kurds and other minorities at the end of the 1991 Gulf war.
This book analyses the MH17 catastrophe as a prism that refracts the broader historical context in which it occurred, arraying its distinct strands and their interrelations in a rare moment of clarity. It argues that in the new Cold War with Putin's Russia, the West operates from a perspective inspired by the mentality of extreme risk-taking that stems from the dominant role of finance in contemporary capitalism. The book also argues that the dividing lines established by the enlargement of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in 1922 and the addition of Crimea to it in 1954, remained operational after independence. The armed seizure of power on 22 February 2014 occurred on the back of the demonstrations and put state power in the hands of Ukrainian ultra-nationalists and actual fascists. Based on the unpublished government and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) documents, the book offers an analysis of global political economy and contemporary debates about Russia and East-West relations. It reviews the results of the official investigations into the MH17 disaster, which Ukraine delegated to the Netherlands. Both were profoundly compromised by granting the coup government in Kiev a veto over any outcomes, a novelty in the history of aviation disaster investigation that was considered shameful even in Ukraine. The book investigates how the coup regime, encouraged by its backers in Washington and Brussels, responded to the anti-Maidan movement among Russian-Ukrainians with extreme violence.
The struggle in projects, ideas and symbols between the strongest Communist Party in the West and an anti-Communist and pro-Western government coalition was the most peculiar founding element of the Italian democratic political system after the Second World War. Until now, most historians have focused their attention on political parties as the only players in the competition for the making of political orientations and civic identities in Italian public opinion. Others have considered Italian political struggle in the 1940s and 1950s in terms of the polarisation between Communism and organised Catholicism, due to the undoubted importance of the Church in Italian culture and social relations. This book enlarges the view, looking at new aspects and players of the anti-Communist ‘front’. It takes into account the role of cultural associations, newspapers and the popular press in the selection and diffusion of critical judgements and images of Communism, highlighting a dimension that explains the force of anti-Communist opinions in Italy after 1989 and the crisis of traditional parties. The author also places the case of Italian Cold War anti-Communism in an international context for the first time.
Duality of détente in the 1970s and neo-Cold War in the 1980s
James W. Peterson
In the post-ColdWar decades, Russian–American tension has alternated with more tranquil periods of open discussion.
There were two clearly defined periods of mutual understanding between America and Russia in the late ColdWar. The first was the era of détente, admittedly hard to define in terms of years but probably at its high-water mark in 1972–79. The second accompanied the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev and his reformist period from 1985 to 1991. In each period the two powers and their leaders seriously sought mutual
Britain to start a ColdWar offensive involving
subversion and special operations in the Eastern Bloc, believing such
action, if enacted, would ‘endanger the position’ of allies
and unnecessarily provoke the Soviets for little gain. 3 Although this opposition
was gradually eroded, largely because of Soviet actions and attempts by
officials to force a rethink, the moratorium on anti-Soviet activities
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American films of the ColdWar
Representations of naval operations, up to and including actual combat, in films made during the ColdWar appear as varied and problematic
as the political and operational complexities afflicting the navies themselves in that period. The moral clarity and narrative certainty sought
in the war film genre, as it had evolved during the Second World
War (in the clear delineation of goals, the unity to be sought and the
enemies to be defeated in order to achieve them), were not readily or
Ministers, subversion and special operations, 1948–51
Daniel W. B. Lomas
any wider ministerial reluctance to engage in covert activities started
to erode as the ColdWar began, particularly following the Berlin Crisis
of 1948–49. 4 Other
than Valuable, Bevin also approved subversive activities inside the
Soviet zone of Germany aimed at undermining relations between East
German officials and Soviet forces, leading to recommendations that such
In a volume intended to have a
contemporary bearing, it may seem idiosyncratic to devote an entire
chapter to the ColdWar. There are, after all, other more recent
episodes which could be said to have shaped international politics and
to which connections can be drawn with the book’s central concerns
of inclusion/exclusion and security. Yet security relations in Europe
Why did the Russian take-over of Crimea come as a surprise to so many observers in the academic practitioner and global-citizen arenas? The answer presented in this book is a complex one, rooted in late-Cold War dualities but also in the variegated policy patterns of the two powers after 1991. This book highlights the key developmental stages in the evolution of the Russian-American relationship in the post-Cold War world. The 2014 crisis was provoked by conflicting perspectives over the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, the expansion of NATO to include former communist allies of Russia as well as three of its former republics, the American decision to invade Iraq in 2003, and the Russian move to invade Georgia in 2008. This book uses a number of key theories in political science to create a framework for analysis and to outline policy options for the future. It is vital that the attentive public confront the questions raised in these pages in order to control the reflexive and knee-jerk reactions to all points of conflict that emerge on a regular basis between America and Russia.Key topics include struggles over the Balkans, the expansion of NATO, the challenges posed by terrorism to both nations, wars fought by both powers in the first decade of the twenty-first century, conflict over missile defence, reactions to post-2011 turmoil in the Middle East, and the mutual interest in establishing priorities in Asia.
Tracy B. Strong
The social and political construction
of the Cold War
It may be difficult for us to believe but it still may be true that Stalin and
Molotov considered at Yalta that by our willingness to accept a general wording of the declaration on Poland and liberated Europe, by our own recognition
of the need for the Red Army for security behind its lines and of the predominant interest of Russia and Poland as a friendly neighbor and as a corridor
to Germany, we understood and were ready to accept Soviet policies already
known to us.