This book analyses the evolving Anglo-American counter-terror propaganda strategies that spanned the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as reconstruction, between 2001 and 2008. It offers insights into the transformation beyond this period, tracking many key developments as much as possible up to the time of writing (2013) and providing a retrospective on the 'war on terror'. Using empirical data located within multiple spheres, the book draws on sociology, political science and international relations, developing an interdisciplinary analysis of political communication in the international system. It shows how media technologies presented legal, structural and cultural problems for what were seen as rigid propaganda systems defined by their emergence in an old media system of sovereign states with stable target audiences. Propaganda successes and advances were an inconsistent by-product both of malfunction and of relationships, cultures and rivalries, both domestically and between the partners. The differing social relations of planners and propagandists to wider society create tensions within the 'machine', however leaders may want it to function. The book demonstrates that the 'messy' nature of bureaucracy and international systems as well as the increasingly fluid media environment are all important in shaping what actually happens. In a context of initial failures in formal coordination, the book stresses the importance of informal relationships to planners in the propaganda war. This situated Britain in an important yet precarious position within the Anglo-American propaganda effort, particularly in Iraq.
This book examines the underlying foundations on which the European Union's counter-terrorism and police co-operation policies have been built since the inception of the Treaty on European Union, questioning both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU's efforts in these two security areas. Given the importance of such developments to the wider credibility of the EU as a security actor, it adopts a more structured analysis of key stages of the implementation process. These include the establishment of objectives, both at the wider level of internal security co-operation and in terms of both counter-terrorism and policing, particularly in relation to the European Police Office, the nature of information exchange and the ‘value added’ by legislative and operational developments at the European level. The book also offers a more accurate appraisal of the official characterisation of the terrorist threat within the EU as a ‘matter of common concern’. In doing so, not only does it raise important questions about the utility of the European level for organising internal security co-operation, but it also provides a more comprehensive assessment of the EU's activities throughout the lifetime of the Third Pillar, placing in a wide and realistic context the EU's reaction to the events of 11 September 2001 and the greater prominence of Islamist terrorism.
Anglo-American relations in the
counter-terrorism propaganda war
This chapter will begin by tracing developing patterns of divergence and
convergence in the perceived interests dominant in each country’s leadership.
The international system which permitted the emergence of a predominantly
Anglo-American ‘war on terror’ was a security environment in transition.
Former adversaries now competed in the marketplace of capitalism, with China
a rising economic competitor to the US. The period was also characterised by
the emerging international position
Following the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, the so-called ‘psychological terrain’ was seen as the crucial counter-terrorism ‘battleground’ where
compliance might be created or conflict influenced in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Much has been written about the ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns of the governments of the United States and United Kingdom. Yet this book will illuminate
an unseen story, that of the planning behind the propaganda, from the mouths
of the key planners themselves. It traces their efforts to adapt propaganda
systems that were
Investigating the language of EU
counter-terrorism: analytical techniques
Research on counter-terrorism is united by a concern with the way in which
various actors define, understand and respond to the threat of terrorism.
However, beyond this broad commitment it is possible to identify a variety
of approaches to the study of counter-terrorism that differ as a direct result
of the implicit and explicit assumptions that each individual researcher
makes about the social world. Traditional approaches to counter-terrorism
predominantly begin from a
aspects: the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq; the strategic dimensions of American oil policy;
the operation and organisation of terrorist cells around the world;
international security cooperation between nations; the fate of
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay; the legal dimensions of counter-terrorism;
new homeland security measures such as law-enforcement cooperation and
immigration control; and the Bush
with Dr Sarah Leonard The
external dimension of EU counter-terrorism and international
This chapter analyses the external
dimension of EU counter-terrorism, a crucial aspect in the fight against
international terrorism, which has been much and hotly debated
(Reinares, 2000; Dubois, 2002; den Boer and Monar, 2002 ; Mitsilegas and Gilmore, 2007; Occhipinti, 2003
president to use America’s military might because, ultimately, ‘It’s what our fathers taught us’? 6 These shows make powerful, resonant, and consequential discursive interventions into policy debates, as is demonstrated by the fact it was to these shows that these three giants of American politics turned in explaining their lives and the challenges facing the US and its government. This chapter traces the interventions and impact of Homeland, 24 , and The West Wing on America’s world politics, with a particular focus on how Americans think and feel about counter-terrorism
came to be seen as obstructive within institutional cultures.
These changes will be shown in later chapters to have differed somewhat in the
US and UK, but for both countries were driven by informal in-agency, interagency and inter-country relationships that shaped the entire propaganda
Propaganda and counter-terrorism
Historically, there are two reasons why both Britain and America have divided
their propaganda capabilities according to audience. The first relates to ethics
and legitimacy. As explained in the introduction, a
informal channels as in-roads to ‘fix’ what were seen as American propaganda
and coordination ‘failures’. As America’s Iraq information war was delegated to
CENTCOM in Qatar, British personnel found engagement from Pentagon staff
dried up along with their engagement in the propaganda campaign (Interview:
Propaganda and counter-terrorism
Wright, 1st June 2009). They met the barriers to coordination within America’s
government and military by working around them where possible, with inconsistent outcomes. Initiative appears to have been enhanced in some cases in