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German–Israeli relations, 1949–69
Author: Lorena De Vita

The rapprochement between Germany and Israel in the aftermath of the Holocaust is one of the most striking political developments of the twentieth century. German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently referred to it as a ‘miracle’. But how did this ‘miracle’ come about? Drawing upon sources from both sides of the Iron Curtain and of the Arab–Israeli conflict, Lorena De Vita traces the contradictions and dilemmas that shaped the making of German–Israeli relations at the outset of the global Cold War. Israelpolitik offers new insights not only into the history of German–Israeli relations, but also into the Cold War competition between the two German states, as each attempted to strengthen its position in the Middle East and the international arena while struggling with the legacy of the Nazi past.

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Lorena De Vita

From that year onwards, West German and Israeli football teams began exchanging expertise, with Israeli coaches travelling frequently to Cologne for training purposes. 5 The links between the German Trade Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) and its Israeli counterpart, the Histradut, also grew closer. 6 But Shinnar maintained his focus on high politics for the time being, fixated on his goal of establishing diplomatic relations. The desire for a closer cooperation with the Federal Republic was something that David Ben-Gurion seemed to be ‘possessed

in Israelpolitik
Ahmad H. Sa’di

MUP FINAL PROOF – <STAGE>, 08/19/2013, SPi 1 The formation of a discourse The need for a discourse In the autumn of 1948, while the eventful war was drawing to an end, David Ben-Gurion, who led the organized Jewish community – the Yishuv – to what has been described until recently in the media and history books as a miraculous victory, began his moves for the next stage. At the personal level, he had to reaffirm his leadership through a popular vote. In the international arena, he had to manoeuvre for international recognition of Israel without making

in Thorough surveillance
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Contextualising reconciliation
Lorena De Vita

.), Deutschland und Israel: Solidarität in der Bewährung: Bilanz und Perspektive der deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen (Gerlingen: Bleicher, 1992); G. Lavy, Germany and Israel: Moral Debt and National Interest (London: Frank Cass, 1996); N. Hansen , Aus dem Schatten der Katastrophe. Die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen in der Ära Adenauer und David Ben Gurion ( Düsseldorf : Droste , 2002 ); Y. A. Jelinek , Deutschland und Israel, 1945–1965. Ein neurotisches Verhältnis ( Munich : Oldenbourg , 2004 ); D. Trimbur , De la Shoah à la Réconciliation? La Question

in Israelpolitik
Constructing security in historical perspective
Jonathan B. Isacoff

; b 1992, estimated. Source : Central Intelligence Agency 2000 . The consolidation of Israeli militarism: David Ben-Gurion v. Moshe Sharett The Ben-Gurion v. the Sharett ‘lines’ During the late

in Redefining security in the Middle East
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Joseph Heller

favor, juggling ideology and geopolitics. Between the end of World War II and the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the superpowers, fighting proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam and contending over Berlin and Cuba, calculated their national interests in the Middle East according to bilateral global factors. For Israel, those factors determined the nature of its relations with each of the superpowers. David Ben-Gurion

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Simon Mabon

of residents’, which was central to the broader Zionist project.57 In support of this, a subcommittee was established, focusing entirely upon industry in Jerusalem to facilitate its rebirth. For David Ben Gurion, the subcommittee was to facilitate a rise in ‘Jewish settlement in Jerusalem and its environs, to rehabilitate and strengthen its economic basis, and to ensure that the capital of our country will have a Jewish majority in population and building’.58 In spite of such demands, before the establishment of Israel in 1948 Jerusalem became peripheral to the

in Houses built on sand
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Lorena De Vita

Nasser’s increasing popularity in the region, of the spectre of Soviet penetration of the Middle East, and of a possible imminent reduction in the US armed forces stationed in Europe, it was easy for the Chancellor to understand why David Ben-Gurion would justify the Sinai campaign as a pre-emptively defensive, rather than an offensive, act. 47 This, in turn, came close to putting the FRG onto a road to covert defiance of the United States, while the relationship between Adenauer and Ben-Gurion, and the West German and Israeli security establishments, grew ever closer

in Israelpolitik
Attitudes towards subversive movements and violent organisations
Ami Pedahzur

surprising odds with the fact that in its struggle against political parties the inchoate Government of Israel suffered from a dearth of measures in its effort to protect itself from radical political manifestations, we find that in regard to (extra-parliamentary) extremist movements and violent uprisings Israel tended, even in its early days, to adopt highly rigorous forms of warfare against subversive groups. This approach is given prominence in the words of the first prime minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, only a short time after the founding of the State

in The Israeli response to Jewish extremism and violence
Joseph Heller

/11. 46 Ben-Gurion to ICAB, April 20, 1958; ‘Interview, May 16, 1958, with the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. David Ben-Gurion, and 31 Members of the National War College,’ Washington, D.C., ISA 7226/6a. 47 ICAB, April 27, 1958, ISA. 48

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67