The book examines the European debt crisis with particular reference to the case of Greece. It investigates its spillover from a Greek-specific problem to a Eurozone-wide crisis and chronicles the policy responses to combat it. The central argument of the book is that the principal cause of the Eurozone’s problems was, and still remains, the indecisiveness of European elites to tackle its underlying deficiencies. Leading Eurozone countries have been unwilling to commit to a common long-term plan which could deal convincingly with complex and inter-related problems affecting both its ‘core’ and its ‘periphery’. The guiding principle of policy responses thus far has been the pursuit of permanent fiscal discipline. Yet, fiscal discipline alone would not provide the long-term solutions required; a steady course towards economic governance and political unification is necessary. Through the detailed tracing of the evolution of the crisis, the book provides valuable insights into the crucial interconnection between Greece’s own economic troubles and the wider European search for macroeconomic stability and sustainable economic growth. As such, the book appeals well beyond those with a narrow academic interest in Greece. This is very much a discussion about the future of the Eurozone and the European Union as a whole.
Was Greece ready for the euro?
The argument widely advanced across Europe was that the cause of the Greek
debtcrisis lay in the absence of the prerequisites to participate in the singlecurrency project. Greece was not ready.
From the mid-1990s Greece had launched an intense effort to satisfy the
vergence criteria. All available financial tools were used: fiscal policy,
monetary policy, taxation and redistribution, and the privatisation of banks
and public sector companies. However calculated, the state deficit was reduced
by 10 percentage points, from
German Responses to the June 2019 Mission of the Sea-Watch 3
migrants from the Sea-Watch 3 ( Longhin, 2019 ).
On the history of the DGzRS, see Anders et al. (1997) and Claußen (2015) .
On the sinking of the Johanna , see Schramm (2009) .
Arguably, the idea of Europe was also challenged by the Eurozone countries’ response to the Greek debtcrisis, and the German Willkommenskultur was also a reaction to the reputational damage perceived by Germans as a result of Germany’s role in that response (see Neumann, 2016 ).
An article in the online edition of the Bremen daily Weser
renewing social democracy?
The PES, the debtcrisis and the Euro-parties
How to effect a transition from the type of organization characteristic of the preparatory stage of the socialist movement – usually featured by disconnected local
groups and clubs, with propaganda as a principal activity – to the unity of a large,
national body, suitable for concerted political action over the entire vast territory
ruled by the Russian state? … It is clear that the Russian Social Democracy should
not organize itself as a
growth is anaemic,
and millions of people are still feeling the impact of unemployment and falling living
standards. In fact, at the time of writing the spectre of permanent economic stagnation haunts Europe.
The global financial crisis that metamorphosed into a debtcrisis and deep economic recession has also had a profound political impact. For those few social
democratic parties that were in power when the crisis hit Europe, the impact was
devastating. As they were forced to implement draconian public spending cuts in
response to ballooning public deficits, voters
in reality a global
debtcrisis. Many nations are still affected, but the case of Greece is
particularly stark for its social dislocations and violence. Kouvelakis
(2011) has argued that the debtcrisis in Greece must be understood
within the historical trajectory of Greece’s development that emerged
after the dictatorship (1967–74). From 1981, successive administrations
built up a social welfare state with a large public sector and generous
entitlements such as jobs for life and generous pensions. The
government also bought considerable military hardware from
leading up to the debtcrisis of the 1980s in what today is referred to as
the Global South. We conclude the chapter with a brief examination of
the sovereign debtcrisis in the so-called heartland of global capitalism.
Imperial monetization, transformation, and resistance
European colonial encounters during the so-called age of exploration
revealed modes of life, cultural practices, and systems of meaning that
were different from those experienced in Christian Europe. Outside
Europe, different forms of money and exchange were observed, but in
term in office
2008–11, most particularly after the onset of the Greek sovereign debtcrisis in
May 2010, and briefly considers the party’s record in opposition since its crushing defeat at the 2011 general election. The conclusion then seeks to provide an
appraisal of the PSOE’s performance, together with an attempt to identify its
On the edge of the precipice: the PSOE government in 2008
Given the innovative nature of many of its policies throughout its first term
in office between 2004 and 2008, the economy was the one area which was
Portugal was seriously affected by the financial, economic and sovereign debtcrisis. The crisis pushed the debate on European integration, notably on the European Monetary Union, into the public space. The bailout of the Portuguese state by the European institutions and the IMF in 2011 made austerity measures unavoidable and showed the other face of European integration – keywords in the public discourse switched from ‘modernisation’ and ‘funding’ to ‘austerity’ and ‘poverty’.
labour movements is also outlined. Though there are problems with the extent to which trade unions and social-democratic parties represent certain categories of workers, I assert that these organizations are most representative and define labour movements in corresponding terms.
Operationalization of the research question is then discussed. The two periods in which the actions of labour movements are evaluated are outlined; these span from the launch of the euro to the outbreak of the sovereign debtcrisis (1999–2010) and from the onset of