The book examines the European debt crisis with particular reference to the case of Greece. It investigates its spillover from a Greek-specific problem to a Eurozone-wide crisis and chronicles the policy responses to combat it. The central argument of the book is that the principal cause of the Eurozone’s problems was, and still remains, the indecisiveness of European elites to tackle its underlying deficiencies. Leading Eurozone countries have been unwilling to commit to a common long-term plan which could deal convincingly with complex and inter-related problems affecting both its ‘core’ and its ‘periphery’. The guiding principle of policy responses thus far has been the pursuit of permanent fiscal discipline. Yet, fiscal discipline alone would not provide the long-term solutions required; a steady course towards economic governance and political unification is necessary.
Through the detailed tracing of the evolution of the crisis, the book provides valuable insights into the crucial interconnection between Greece’s own economic troubles and the wider European search for macroeconomic stability and sustainable economic growth. As such, the book appeals well beyond those with a narrow academic interest in Greece. This is very much a discussion about the future of the Eurozone and the European Union as a whole.
migrants from the Sea-Watch 3 ( Longhin, 2019 ). 15 On the history of the DGzRS, see Anders et al. (1997) and Claußen (2015) . 16 On the sinking of the Johanna , see Schramm (2009) . 17 Arguably, the idea of Europe was also challenged by the Eurozone countries’ response to the Greek debt crisis, and the German Willkommenskultur was also a reaction to the reputational damage perceived by Germans as a result of Germany’s role in that response (see Neumann, 2016 ). 18 An article in the online edition of the Bremen daily Weser
1 Was Greece ready for the euro? 1 The argument widely advanced across Europe was that the cause of the Greek debt crisis lay in the absence of the prerequisites to participate in the singlecurrency project. Greece was not ready. From the mid-1990s Greece had launched an intense effort to satisfy the con vergence criteria. All available financial tools were used: fiscal policy, monetary policy, taxation and redistribution, and the privatisation of banks and public sector companies. However calculated, the state deficit was reduced by 10 percentage points, from
14 Reforming Europe, renewing social democracy? The PES, the debt crisis and the Euro-parties Gerassimos Moschonas How to effect a transition from the type of organization characteristic of the preparatory stage of the socialist movement – usually featured by disconnected local groups and clubs, with propaganda as a principal activity – to the unity of a large, national body, suitable for concerted political action over the entire vast territory ruled by the Russian state? … It is clear that the Russian Social Democracy should not organize itself as a
growth is anaemic, and millions of people are still feeling the impact of unemployment and falling living standards. In fact, at the time of writing the spectre of permanent economic stagnation haunts Europe. The global financial crisis that metamorphosed into a debt crisis and deep economic recession has also had a profound political impact. For those few social democratic parties that were in power when the crisis hit Europe, the impact was devastating. As they were forced to implement draconian public spending cuts in response to ballooning public deficits, voters
in reality a global debt crisis. Many nations are still affected, but the case of Greece is particularly stark for its social dislocations and violence. Kouvelakis (2011) has argued that the debt crisis in Greece must be understood within the historical trajectory of Greece’s development that emerged after the dictatorship (1967–74). From 1981, successive administrations built up a social welfare state with a large public sector and generous entitlements such as jobs for life and generous pensions. The government also bought considerable military hardware from
events leading up to the debt crisis of the 1980s in what today is referred to as the Global South. We conclude the chapter with a brief examination of the sovereign debt crisis in the so-called heartland of global capitalism. Imperial monetization, transformation, and resistance European colonial encounters during the so-called age of exploration revealed modes of life, cultural practices, and systems of meaning that were different from those experienced in Christian Europe. Outside Europe, different forms of money and exchange were observed, but in many instances
term in office 2008–11, most particularly after the onset of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in May 2010, and briefly considers the party’s record in opposition since its crushing defeat at the 2011 general election. The conclusion then seeks to provide an appraisal of the PSOE’s performance, together with an attempt to identify its chief failings. On the edge of the precipice: the PSOE government in 2008 Given the innovative nature of many of its policies throughout its first term in office between 2004 and 2008, the economy was the one area which was notable for
developments remained short-lived. The scale of Jordan's debt crisis, coupled with the depth of public discontent over fiscal reform programmes, ultimately compromised Jordan's fiscal reform and pushed Amman to accept more aid from GCC states after unprecedented tax protests in 2018. The next section surveys the history of Jordanian fiscal and foreign policy. It highlights the centrality of aid and remittances in linking the two realms of policy. The third section illustrates how energy costs, levels of foreign aid, and remittances to Jordan have evolved
Introduction Portugal was seriously affected by the financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis. The crisis pushed the debate on European integration, notably on the European Monetary Union, into the public space. The bailout of the Portuguese state by the European institutions and the IMF in 2011 made austerity measures unavoidable and showed the other face of European integration – keywords in the public discourse switched from ‘modernisation’ and ‘funding’ to ‘austerity’ and ‘poverty’. Political