Beneath the violence of the U.S. war in Iraq was a subterranean conflict between President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, rooted in their different beliefs and leadership styles. Bush was prepared to pay a high cost in American lives, treasure, and prestige to win. Rumsfeld favored turning the war over to the Iraqis, and was comfortable with the risk that Iraq would disintegrate into chaos. Only after Bush removed Rumsfeld in late 2006 did he bring U.S. strategy into line with his goals, sending additional troops to Iraq and committing to continued U.S. involvement. Bush abandoned Rumsfeld’s withdrawal approach, predicated upon the beliefs that “it's the Iraqis’ country,” and “we have to take our hand off the bicycle seat.” In Leaders in Conflict, Stephen Benedict Dyson shows that Bush and Rumsfeld thought about international politics, and about leadership, in divergent ways. The president embraced binary thinking, was visceral in his commitment to the war, and had a strong belief that the U.S. both could and should shape events in Iraq. The secretary saw the world as complex, and was skeptical of the extent of U.S. influence over events and of the moral imperative to stay involved. The book is based upon more than two dozen interviews with administration insiders, and appeals to those interested in the U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. presidency, leadership and wartime decision making.
The changes to propaganda in both the UK and the US and the huge investment in expanding the propaganda apparatus prompted demands for strategic coordination. Improved coordination of capabilities such as Psychological Operation (PSYOP) and Public Affairs, or between different government departments, was seen as a requirement of modern propaganda in a changing media environment. This chapter shows how the desired depth of coordination of propaganda proved challenging to impose on existing formal structures, particularly in the US. It discusses the 'turf war' over Donald Rumsfeld's desire to ring-fence Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) capabilities for the Defense Department and concern over the coordination of CIA efforts with the Department of Defense (DOD). CIA resources in the propaganda war are certainly far smaller than those of the Pentagon and State Department and Pentagon insularity and expansion contributed to an excessively protectionist CIA.
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown
(New York, Sentinel, 2011), 672.
Bradley Graham, By His Own Rules: The
Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of DonaldRumsfeld (New York: Public Affairs, 2009
empire in the west – a future that was free of the venality of what the British Empire had become. A central origin moment in US identity is that it fought a revolution against the British Empire and is thus (still) an anti-imperial project. This was a point still being made by DonaldRumsfeld in 2003 when he was interviewed by al-Jazeera. Despite this, ‘empire’ certainly appears freighted with positive value in the various images described above. This particular form of empire takes place within what would become the continental United States. It was nation
been assigned to the dustbin of history at the end of the Cold War. A further question was to ask why it was that this commentary was by and large so negative. Amongst politicians, DonaldRumsfeld, for example, one time United States secretary for defence under President George W. Bush, in a speech given in March 2006, expressed his concern about Latin Americans turning to ‘populist leadership … that clearly are worrisome’. President Alejandro Toledo of Peru expressed the belief that ‘cheap empty populism is the danger to democracy’. 1 In the mediaThe Economist, for
democracy. The Bush doctrine, then, was well named: another individual
in the position of president following 9/11 would have responded to the
DonaldRumsfeld favoured a different strategic response. He
disliked doctrines in general and the Bush variant in particular. He
sought to prevent the declaration of a war on terror, troubled by its
inaccurate presupposing of an entirely military
more than covers this. (Grossman, 19 October, 2001)
Crucially, Grossman takes the
justification to an even higher rhetorical realm by stating it is more
than simply a legal right of nations; it is also a moral right. Here the
language of morality ranks even higher than the language of law.
DonaldRumsfeld repeats a similar construction in
-Qaeda network responsible for 9/11 but also entailed overthrowing the
Taliban government of Afghanistan, which had failed to hand over the
network’s leader, Osama bin Laden. US Defense Secretary DonaldRumsfeld formally announced an end to ‘major combat
operations’ in Afghanistan on 1 May 2003, but in a sense this was
both belated and premature. It was belated because, even though the US
and its allies failed
constructing a myth of exceptional
grievance is to divest the nation of the moral responsibility for
counter-violence. Thus, as DonaldRumsfeld states in a press conference
concerning the US attacks on Afghanistan, ‘There are going to be
loss of life – there already have been. It started on
September 11th in this building. And there are going to be
more’ (Rumsfeld, 24 October, 2001). This message is