Since the mid-1990s, the European Union has defined the Asia-Pacific as one of its key strategic targets on its ambitious road towards global power. The EU has ever since made consistent efforts to implement strategies, policies and activities in the Asia-Pacific. Over the past decades, big changes have taken place on both sides and the wider world. It is high time to evaluate the EU’s performance in its Asian policy. In fact, the EU is at crossroads with its Asia Pacific policy. On several aspects, the EU is compelled to redefine its interests and roles, and rethink its strategies and policies towards the dynamic and ever-important Asia-Pacific region of the contemporary world. This volume addresses this theme, by elaborating the general context, major issues and countries in the EU’s Asia-Pacific policy. It covers issues and areas of traditional security, economy and trade, public diplomacy, and human security and focuses on the EU’s relations with China, Japan, the ASEAN countries and Australasia.
This book represents the first ever comprehensive study of the EU’s foreign and security policy in Bosnia since the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation in 1991. Drawing on historical institutionalism, it explains the EU’s contribution to post-conflict stabilisation and conflict resolution in Bosnia. The book demonstrates that institutions are a key variable in explaining levels of coherence and effectiveness of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and that institutional legacies and unintended consequences have shaped CFSP impact over time. In doing so, it also sheds new light on the role that intergovernmental, bureaucratic and local political contestation have played in the formulation and implementation of a European foreign and security policy. The study concludes that the EU’s involvement in Bosnia has not only had a significant impact on this Balkan country in its path from stabilisation to integration, but has also transformed the EU, its foreign and security policy and shaped the development of the EU’s international identity along the way.
The concluding chapter summarises the findings and further reflects on the institutional and political challenges to the EU’s foreign and security policy in Bosnia. It reviews the impact of institutionalisation on the EU’s foreign and security policy, the politics of coherence and effectiveness and the overall contribution of EU foreign policy to conflict resolution in Bosnia. The case study of Bosnia provides evidence to support three key findings. First, that institutions have had a crucial impact on levels of coherence and effectiveness over time. Second, that contrary to rationalist assumptions about the purported efficiency of institutions, the increasing CFSP institutionalisation has not done away with problems of coherence and effectiveness and in some cases it has raised new ones. Unintended consequences, path dependency and obstacles to the institutionalisation of learning can be blamed in this regard. Third, the concluding chapter also provides evidence that intergovernmental, bureaucratic and local political contestation have played a key role in the formulation and implementation of a European foreign and security policy.
Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, Michael J. Tsinisizelis, Stelios Stavridis and Kostas Ifantis
interrelationship: what we
have learned to call the European ‘security architecture’. The final section of the
chapter deals with the issue of the Union’s role in world politics post-Cold War.
This section presents a detailed analysis of Europeanforeignandsecuritypolicy
as it has emerged after nearly fifty years of efforts by the EC/EU, dating back to
the early 1950s with the European Defence Community (EDC) saga, and bringing us up to the Amsterdam and Nice reforms of October 1997 and February
2001, respectively. Attention is given not
to take the
position as lead nation. The general in command was German, as were most of
the deployed soldiers – 600 out of a total of 1,000.8
In the parliamentary debates preceding the votes on Essential Harvest and
Amber Fox, the government emphasised the need to live up to Germany’s
European and Atlantic responsibility and signal commitment to the further
development and consolidation of a common Europeanforeignandsecuritypolicy.9 Moral and historical reasons were also invoked. To vote ‘no’ to the missions in
; circulating intelligence on member states and formal EU documentation to departmental players; maintaining the permanent representation and wider network of overseas embassies; serving as the lead department for institutional matters and Europeanforeignandsecuritypolicy; and developing public diplomacy at home – articulating and explaining national EU policy to the wider public.
The FCO’s role was further enhanced under Blair as it was given responsibility for driving forward the ‘Step Change’ programme. This was enshrined as a five-year public
existence of such national interests has often been seen as the most serious
obstacle to the emergence of a truly common Europeanforeignandsecuritypolicy. Before EPC had even been established, Hoffmann (1966) warned that a
‘logic of diversity’ in the sphere of foreign policy would not
only prevent the integration process from spilling over into this
traditional area of ‘high politics’ but would also, ultimately,
put a brake
opposition – SPD and the Greens – supporting the deployment. The
deployment was framed by its proponents as intimately tied to ‘broader
and higher issues’, namely the creation of a common Europeanforeignandsecuritypolicy, and the credibility and perception of Germany
around the world.
The success of the Government’s strategy of gradually but decisively
extending the Bundeswehr’s remit appeared to be further consolidated
with enhanced parliamentary support for IFOR in November 1995.
This time the majority in the Bundestag in support of deploying the
In sum, by examining the coherence and effectiveness of the
EU’s intervention in Bosnia, this book contributes to the
assessment of post-conflict stabilisation and resolution in Bosnia as
well as the complex and changing nature of EU foreign and security
policy. More specifically, the book defends the position that the
EU’s involvement in Bosnia has not only had a significant
challenge of democratisation. Some smaller
European states, such as Denmark, have made explicit efforts to square that
political circle by investing significant policy responsibilities in their national
parliament. Some progress in that direction has been made in Ireland but much
could yet be done to strengthen the underpinnings of democratic accountability
of foreign policy so as to involve parliamentarians more meaningfully in the
national and thereby the Europeanforeignandsecuritypolicy process.