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Introduction The trade policies, practices and reviews of the European Communities [EC] raise questions for enforcement – particularly in the light of the stature of the EC in international trade relations, and its complex organisational structure. This chapter focuses less on EC trade policies and practices, which are well covered elsewhere, 2
3 The PSOE and the European Community: from isolation to integration Given the salience of European integration for the PSOE, and given that there is little literature available in English on the membership negotiations which were concluded during the party’s first term in office under Felipe González, the present chapter considers Spain’s historic relationship with what is now the EU so as to place in context the party’s attitude towards European integration in the period since Spain became a member in 1986. Spain’s EEC membership was achieved only after one
On 1 January 1973 Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath brought the UK into the European Community. Although this was celebrated at first, by the end of the year the mood had changed from ‘hope to uncertainty’. Not only was 1973 a bad year to join the Community, the UK had done so on the promise that it would ‘join now and negotiate later’. This proved a poor strategy. Compounding these difficulties, Heath faced trouble at home which eventually led him to lose the February 1974 general election. Labour’s Harold Wilson returned to Downing Street, promising a fundamental renegotiation of the terms of membership and a referendum on whether to stay in the EC. This was what he delivered and, in the end, 67 per cent of voters said ‘yes’ to continued membership. Yet the renegotiation has been dismissed as a political strategy which ultimately delivered few results and the referendum is seen as an ‘unenthusiastic vote for the status quo’. But it is clear that in some areas, Wilson’s renegotiation was contiguous with the Heath government’s attempts to revise the terms of entry. Moreover, there was a lively campaign in 1975, which engaged the country in a wide range of arguments for and against membership. In this book, Lindsay Aqui seeks to understand what happened during the first year of membership, the extent to which the renegotiation changed the terms of membership, and whether voters were convinced of the pro-Market case in 1975.
This book takes up traditional approaches to political science. It aims to offer a mixture of conventional and specific analyses and insights for different groups of readers. In view of the European Union's multi-level and multi-actor polity, the book highlights the complex procedural and institutional set-up of nation states preparing and implementing decisions made by the institutions of the European Community (EC). In looking at the emerging and evolving realities of the European polity, it shows how European institutions and Member States (re-)act and interact in a new institutional and procedural set-up. It explores how governmental and non-governmental actors in different national settings adapt to common challenges, constraints and opportunities for which they are mainly themselves responsible. The book discusses the Belgian policy toward European integration as a significant demonstration of its commitment to multilateralism and international co-operation in security and economic affairs. Attitudes to European integration in Denmark, Germany, Finland, Greece, and Spain are discussed. Tendencies towards 'Europeanisation' and 'sectoralisation' of the ministerial administration during the process of European integration and the typical administrative pluralism of the Italian political system seem to have mutually reinforced each other. Strong multi-level players are able to increase their access and influence at both levels and to use their position on one level for strengthening their say on the other. German and Belgian regions might develop into these kinds of actors. A persistent trend during the 1990s is traced towards stronger national performers, particularly in terms of adaptations and reactions to Maastricht Treaty.
It is no secret that the British have not taken too warmly to Europe, since we joined the European Community in 1972. The referendum in 1975 gave a two-to-one majority in favour of staying in but since then Euro-scepticism has grown if anything. As the arguments are so complex, dealing with an organisation with twenty-seven members and twice as many people as the United States, many people switch off the subject of the European Union (EU), while maintaining what seems to be a fundamentally hostile or at minimum unsympathetic attitude. This chapter seeks to
parliamentary procedures, including the use of a guillotine motion, were also required in order to ensure the legislation made it through the committee stage, which consumed 173 hours of debate, 88 divisions and over 200 amendments. 72 In the end the European Communities Act was voted into law on 13 July by a majority of 15. 73 It received Royal Assent on 17 October 1972. Although the possibility of holding a referendum on Community membership had first been raised in 1969, it was during the debates on the European Communities Bill that support for giving the public the
On 1 January 1973, the United Kingdom joined the European Community (EC). 1 After the troubled course of Britain’s relationship with the process of European integration since 1945, and especially since the failures of the membership applications in 1961 and 1967, entry marked an historic achievement. Personally involved in that history, Edward Heath – arguably Britain’s most ‘European’ prime minister since the Second World War – declared that ‘A very exciting time is now beginning’. 2 The nation was treated to a two-week celebration called ‘Fanfare for Europe
in withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command structure; NATO’s adoption of the “Harmel Doctrine,” giving the alliance a dual defense and détente role in East–West relations; NATO’s approval of the military strategy of “flexible response” and the efforts to keep the strategy viable with deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe; British acceptance of an active role in continental Europe’s future through membership in the European Community (now European Union); Political maturation of the Federal Republic of Germany; Emergence of
first negotiated accession to the European Community in 1961–62, it also made a strong point of accommodating the interests of its own former colonies. This would be repeated during the second round of its accession negotiations in the early 1970s (Tulloch, 1975: 37, 101–3; Grilli, 1993: 16; Todd, 1999: 62–3). As a result, when the UK finally joined the European Community in 1973, the group of recipients of EC development assistance was drastically expanded to include a large number of the UK’s Commonwealth cooperation partners in Anglophone Africa, the Caribbean and
M1634 - HAYWARD TEXT.qxp:ANDY Q7 27/1/09 13:23 Page 116 6 Identity, nation and community This chapter examines the conceptualisation of identity in Irish official discourse in relation to the definition of the Irish ‘nation’ and the European ‘community’. As discussed in the first part of this book, ‘nation’ and ‘community’ constitute the broad conceptual frameworks for identity in nation-statehood and European Union respectively. These frameworks are legitimated and strengthened through the use of narratives, including story-lines regarding significant