This book a study on the work of the Eurogroup—monthly informal meetings between euro area finance ministers, the Commission and the European Central Bank. It demonstrates how this small, secretive circle of senior decision-makers shapes European economic governance through a routinised informal policy dialogue. Although the role of the Eurogroup has been contested since before the group's creation, its actual operation has never been subject to systematic evaluation. This book opens the doors of the meeting room and shows how an understanding of the interplay of formal provisions and informal processes is pivotal to the analysis of euro area governance. The book advances the conceptual understanding of informal negotiations among senior European and national decision-makers, and provides an in-depth analysis of historical episodes of policy coordination. As other areas of European decision-making rely increasingly on informal, voluntary policy coordination amongst member states, the Eurogroup model can be seen as a template for other policy areas.
Europeaneconomicgovernance to incorporate objectives related to growth. Certain authorities envisage an EU without the euro, Höpner states that ‘Europe would be better off without the Euro’ and commends the European monetary system of 1979–98 ( 2014 : 665), yet implementation difficulties mean that most favour reform of the euro. A number of strategies have been outlined; ideas such as Eurobonds, growth orientated monetary and fiscal policies and transfer payments to periphery countries are commonly suggested. The fortification of social integration, including the
setting’, in Gautié, J. and Schmitt, J. (eds), Low-Wage Work in the Wealthy World
(New York: Russell Sage), pp. 147–82.
Bosch, G. and Weinkopf, C. (2013), ‘Wechselwirkungen zwischen Mindest-und
Tariflöhnen’, WSI-Mitteilungen, 66:6, 393–403.
Cruces, J., Álvarez, I., Trillo, F. and Leonardi, S. (2015), ‘Impact of the euro crisis on
wages and collective bargaining in southern Europe – a comparison of Italy, Portugal and
Spain’, in van Gyes, G. and Schulten, T. (eds), Wage Bargaining under the New EuropeanEconomicGovernance (Brussels: European Trade Union Institute), pp
- CALLAGHAN TEXT.indd 80
French social democratic economic policy
credibility, in combination with the political context of a Franco-German
axis on deficit forgiveness, created areas of room for manoeuvre, notably in
revising the interpretation and implementation of the SGP to align more
closely with French dirigiste preferences.
French socialism and dirigiste aspirations for Europeaneconomicgovernance
In 1997, the Jospin Government’s attempts at institutional re-engineering
of the supranational economic policy regime advocated a political role
Dribbusch , R.
( 2015 ) ‘ Where is the European general strike? Understanding the challenges of trans-European trade union action against austerity ’, Transfer , 21 ( 2 ): 171–185 .
Dufresne , A.
( 2015 ) ‘ The trade union response to the Europeaneconomicgovernance regime: transnational mobilization and wage coordination ’, Transfer , 21 ( 2 ): 229–242 .
Erne , R
Catherine Moury, Stella Ladi, Daniel Cardoso, and Angie Gago
guarantee bondholders that they will be paid back whatever the circumstances (De Grauwe, 2012 ).
The shrinking discretion of European governments became crystal clear during the sovereign debt crisis (Ferrera, 2017 ; Ladi and Graziano, 2014 ; Streeck, 2014 ), a period of ‘coercive Europeanisation’ (Ladi and Graziano, 2014 ). As described in the introductory chapter, Europeaneconomicgovernance rules were modified over this period, and the new instruments increased the EU's surveillance and enforcement capacity regarding the implementation of
competitiveness in very general terms. A key tripartite declaration of 2004, concerning competitiveness, stable employment and social cohesion, also makes no precise references to challenges related to Europeaneconomicgovernance in eight pages of text (Gobierno de España et al. , 2004 ). As with the case of Germany, it is reasonable to attribute such lack of preparation to difficulties associated with long-term planning. It is easy to suppose in hindsight that the specific goal of competitiveness within the single currency exercised key influence on the minds of unions
democrats exhibited solidarity with periphery countries was generally weaker than unions; this was the case in all countries. This result is far from surprising, scholars having long known that the broader bases of social-democratic parties and their need to govern in the national interest tend to make them less radical than unions, yet it is related to two more significant findings.
First, the current form of European integration appears to be driving a wedge between social-democratic parties and unions. In the last decade, Europeaneconomic
it has to date. 20
Along similar lines, Ulrike Guérot seeks to build on the federalist ideals of the EU’s founding fathers, arguing that such changes cannot be brought about by national leaders. Instead, she argues that what Europe needs is a European republic created by and for a truly European citizenry. By contrast, Yannis Varoufakis, the former Greek Finance Minister, has proposed to democratise Europeaneconomicgovernance through the creation of a European Investment Bank that would encourage spending and investment rather than austerity. 21 Whatever
Damian Grimshaw, Colette Fagan, Gail Hebson, and Isabel Tavora
collective bargaining, such
as in Greece during the post-2008 recession, protective labour market institutions can be easily dismantled. For this reason, Bosch and Lehndorff argue that a
more inclusive regulatory framework needs to be anchored not only to statutory
protections and minimum standards but also to strong participatory rights and
discuss the scope for national actors to move towards these goals under the new
Marchington and Dundon discuss the societal forces for ‘fair voice’ and the
challenges workers face in liberal