Author: Andrew Klevan

This book provides an in-depth, holistic examination of evaluative aesthetics and criticism as they apply to film. Organised around the explanation of key concepts, it illuminates connections between the work of philosophers, theorists and critics, and demonstrates the evaluation of form through the close analysis of film sequences. The book advocates that aesthetic evaluation should be flexibly informed by a cluster of concerns including medium, convention, prominence, pattern and relation; and rather than privileging a particular theory or film style, it models a type of approach, attention, process and discourse. Suitable for students of film studies and philosophical aesthetics at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels, Aesthetic evaluation and film also provides a framework for academics researching or teaching in the area. At the same time, the crisp and lucid style will make the book accessible to a wider readership.

Affordable threats?

On the afternoon of September 11 2001 the Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach), Bertie Ahern ordered the ‘heads of the security services of key government departments’ to undertake a complete re-evaluation of measures to protect the state from attack. Hence, underway within hours of the 9/11 outrage in the United States was potentially the most far-reaching review of Irish national security in decades. This book, an academic investigation of Irish national security policy as it has operated since 9/11, provides a theoretically informed analysis of that re-evaluation and the decisions that were taken as a consequence of it up until September 2008. In so doing, it draws on unprecedented access to Ireland's police, security and intelligence agencies; over twenty senior personnel agreed to be interviewed. Questions are raised over the effectiveness of the Irish agencies, the relative absence of naval and airborne defence and the impact on national security of the policy imperative to transform the Defence Forces, particularly the army, for more robust missions overseas. The book also considers the securitisation of Irish immigration policy and the apparent absence of a coherent integration policy despite international evidence suggesting the potential for radicalisation in socially marginalised western communities. Theoretically, the book demonstrates the utility to the analysis of national security policy of three conceptual models of historical institutionalism, governmental politics and threat evaluation.

An exercise in pluralist political theory
Author: Allyn Fives

This is a book about parents, power, and children and, in particular, the legitimacy of parents' power over their children. It takes seriously the challenge posed by moral pluralism, and considers the role of both theoretical rationality and practical judgement in resolving moral dilemmas associated with parental power. The book first examines the prevailing view about parental power: a certain form of paternalism, justified treatment of those who lack the qualities of an agent, and one that does not generate moral conflicts. It proposes an alternative, pluralist view of paternalism before showing that even paternalism properly understood is of limited application when we evaluate parental power. According to the caretaker thesis, parental power makes up for the deficits in children's agency, and for that reason children should be subjected to standard institutional paternalism. The liberation thesis stands at the other end of the spectrum concerning children's rights. The book then addresses the counter-argument that issues of legitimacy arise in the political domain and not in respect of parent-child relations. It also examines the 'right to parent' and whether parents should be licensed, monitored, or trained children's voluntariness and competence, and the right to provide informed consent for medical treatment and research participation. Finally, the book talks about parents' efforts to share a way of life with their children and the State's efforts to shape the values of future citizens through civic education. The overall approach taken has much more in common with the problem-driven political philosophy.

Andrew Klevan

PART III The aesthetic evaluation of film The aesthetic evaluation of film 119 3.1  Medium A medium is a means or agency for communicating something. As Eran Guter describes, ‘Literally meaning something that stands between two other things, the notion of medium implies the possibility of transference of something from one side to the other, or mediation between the two sides. Hence the idea of medium patently gives rise to the idea of content, i.e. that which is transferred by the medium’ (Guter 2010: 126). The medium of film is all the elements that

in Aesthetic evaluation and film
Andrew Klevan

PART I What is evaluative aesthetics? What is evaluative aesthetics? 17 1.1  The origin and definition of aesthetics The concept of the ‘aesthetic’ is best considered as a cluster of interrelated meanings, and Part I will attempt to elaborate its multifaceted nature. Its Greek origin is aisthesis, meaning perception by sense, or feeling; more precisely it derives ‘from the Greek nominal aisthetikos, sensitive or sentient, derived in turn from the verb aisthanesthai, meaning to perceive, feel, or sense’ (Costelloe 2013: 1). Aesthetki is ‘the science of how

in Aesthetic evaluation and film
Abstract only
Jonathan Bignell

, obviously, but this fact has not always been recognised, since the discursive forms of theoretical writing set up the analyst as an other, both to the programmes he or she discusses and to the empirical ‘ordinary’ audience. The issue of why academic television criticism does not refer to Beckett’s work requires an evaluation of the ways that television drama is cited in academic writing, and on how a particular identity for ‘Beckett’ would be produced by Television Studies if it were to cite him as an example. If Beckett’s work is separated by television theory from the

in Beckett on screen
Andrew Klevan

PART II What is aesthetic criticism? What is aesthetic criticism? 59 2.1  Evaluation The etymology of the word ‘criticism’ points towards an evaluative practice. The word is derived from the Ancient Greek word krínō, ‘to judge’, and krités, ‘a judge’ or ‘juryman’ (Wellek 1981: 298). The word ‘critic’ – kritikos – is then derived from krités (Pearsall 1998). Over time, however, ‘criticism’ has become capacious referring to all manner of commentary and study of texts, and as a consequence what constitutes criticism is contested1. One outcome of the expansion

in Aesthetic evaluation and film
Allyn Fives

Part III The moral legitimacy of parental power In this the final part of the book, I examine some of the moral questions that arise when evaluating parental power. A great deal has been said already about the conceptual and methodological challenges faced when we do evaluate parental power. How then are we to proceed? To start with, we should acknowledge the growing interest among political philosophers in the debate between so-called ideal theory and non-ideal theory. This debate is concerned with whether and to what extent normative political philosophy

in Evaluating parental power
Allyn Fives

Part II Conceptual and methodological issues How are we to evaluate parental power? In the next four chapters, I will look at the conceptual and methodological issues raised by that question. I make the case for a pluralist approach to methodology generally and the conceptualisation of power more specifically. This is necessary, I will try to show, as efforts to reduce plurality fail. When we evaluate parental power, there is an irreducible plurality of morally significant features and of relevant moral considerations. In addition, because of this irreducible

in Evaluating parental power
Allyn Fives

6 Normative legitimacy In what way can we evaluate the normative legitimacy of parents’ power? What makes some power relations and some exercises of power legitimate and others illegitimate? Throughout the earlier chapters of this book I drew attention to the possibility of moral conflict. I argued that there is no sufficiently strong reason to accept, as a general rule or principle, that one moral claim is more fundamental than all others, and that, when they are in conflict, should be given priority over those other claims. The same holds for the normative

in Evaluating parental power