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This book provides a historical account of the NGO Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe (CARE) as one of the largest humanitarian NGOs worldwide from 1945 to 1980. Readers interested in international relations and humanitarian hunger prevention are provided with fascinating insights into the economic and business related aspects of Western non-governmental politics, fundraising and philanthropic giving in this field. The book also offers rich empirical material on the political implications of private and governmental international aid in a world marked by the order of the Cold War, and decolonialization processes. It elaborates the struggle of so called "Third World Countries" to catch up with modern Western consumer societies. In order to do justice to CARE's growing dimensions and to try to make sense of the various challenges arising from international operations, the book contains five main chapters on CARE's organizational development, with three case studies. It tells CARE's story on two different yet connected levels. First, it tells the story as a history of individuals and their interactions, conflicts, initiatives, and alliances within CARE and second as an organizational history focusing on institutional networks, CARE's role in international diplomacy. By the start of the 1960s CARE's strategically planned transformation into a development-oriented agency was in full swing. With United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Food for Peace, and the Peace Corps, several new government agencies in the development assistance sector were founded that offered potential junctions and opportunities for cooperation for CARE and the voluntary agencies in general.
initialized in overall US foreign assistance policy and its institutional context. With USAID, Food for Peace, and the Peace Corps, several new government agencies in the development assistance sector were founded that offered potential junctions and opportunities for cooperation for CARE and the voluntary agencies in general. Both USAID and Food for Peace were important in terms of resource acquisition as
international relief had to be monitored, and these watchdog organizations were not only able but also highly willing to offer crucial information to anyone who was ready to pay. 123 From surplus disposal to food for peace Since CARE’s inception, its relief concepts had centered on food. Whether canned up and neatly boxed in CARE packages or stacked as bulk shipments for refugee
segment of American society (Food for Peace) or as demonstrating purely humanitarian concerns […] is there little difficulty passing authorization and appropriations bills. 1 There is currently a lively debate, spearheaded by several eminent historians, about the “shock of the global.” This debate identifies the 1970s as the
Agency for International Development (USAID) – in late 1961, the establishment of the Peace Corps as a civic development agency, the establishment of the Food for Peace Office, and finally the declaration of an Alliance for Progress with Latin America created a complex institutional setting that transformed foreign aid into a major US foreign policy tool in a bipolar world. 9 Technical assistance
, enclosed report on 1954 food package program, Egypt, March 26, 1955. 34 Robert R. Sullivan, “The Politics of Altruism: An Introduction to the Food-for-Peace Partnership between the United States Government and Voluntary Relief Agencies,” The Western Political Quarterly 23.4 (1970), pp. 762–8 (p
Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Food for War – Food for Peace. United States Food Aid in a Global Context , Cambridge, MA, 1980, p. 33; actually neither Poland nor Yugoslavia was communist, but each had a socialist government under Soviet influence. 162 CARE, Box 17, Paul French to all country directors
]. 78 JFK, personal papers of Richard Reuter, Box 4, brochure, United States Food for Peace in Korea 1955–1964 , USAID, [1965] unnumbered pages. 79 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, “Libertarian Paternalism,” The American Economic Review 93.2 (2003), pp. 175
to roughly $60 million annually. The situation became even more difficult following the failure of the 1961 cotton crop, the rising costs of maintaining the fight against Israel, as well as the post-1965 suspension of American food for peace shipments to Egypt (Amin 1995 ). Through his decision to sever diplomatic relations with West Germany, Nasser had also jeopardised some $290 million in bilateral aid. At the time, Egypt's domestic debt exceeded $1.5 million, while its foreign one was estimated at over $2.5 billion (Gerges 1994 , 205). Furthermore, the 1967
of production necessary to feed most of the population so as to be less exposed to international market fluctuations. The settings of the FAO plan were significantly different from the US government’s policy on food aid, which, in 1958, at the will of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, was summed up in the phrase ‘Food for Peace’. The programme envisaged the drawing up of bilateral agreements – in other words, between Washington and the individual countries involved – and responded mainly to the need to ensure the sale of US agricultural over-production, of expanding