-term investment and development programme for Europe. (DGB, 2012)
Voluntaristic nonsense. (IG Metall leader Bertold Huber on the 14 November 2012 European Day of Action and Solidarity)
Germany is the archetypal core Eurozone country. After the launch of the euro, wage moderation helped guarantee competitive advantage for the country within EMU. A number of authorities have associated this outcome with the efficacy of German sectoral bargaining (Hancké, 2013 ; Hassel, 2014 ; Johnston
Germany: fragmented structures in a
Introduction: preferences of a tamed power2
Germany’s political class is marked by a positive and constructive attitude
towards European integration. The main objective of European policy
was and still is to achieve effective and democratic European co-operation
and integration.3 All governments and the vast majority of political
parties contrive their general European policy agenda around the fundamental aim of far-reaching integration towards some kind
Empire. The Soviet Union had to undertake substantial physical reconstruction and consolidate its regime in a country that had proved once again to be vulnerable to invasion from the west.
Germany, though, had a far greater burden to carry, a burden that consisted of three distinct components. First, like all the other European participants in the war, but more intensively than any except the USSR, it had to cope with enormous physical, demographic and economic damage. Second, in terms of international politics, it had to accept the status of an occupied state
“Why don’t you write your experiences?” – “Why don’t you write the story of
your life?” – “Why don’t you write a book?” Such and similar are the suggestive
questions put to me whenever I reminisce on my stage, suffrage, birth control
or ordinary life experiences. Though writing, especially the mechanical part, is
a great effort to me, to justify the faith my numerous friends in England and
America have expressed in my ability to do it, I will do my best.
Some of my earliest recollections are of home with father and mother – stepmother – in
The most complete guide available to the correct pronunciation of German for native English speakers. Revised and updated, a new feature for this edition is that the discussion of English-speaking learners' pronunciation problems has been extended to include American learners, reflecting the worldwide usage of the first volume. Each chapter deals with a separate aspect of the problems of modern German pronunciation; vowels, consonants, stress and intonation, and the reduced ('weak') forms of conversational pronunciation. Comprehensively illustrated with clear pronunciation and intonation diagrams emphasising common problems experienced when learning German. The Manchester University Press website also gives readers access to twenty-two audio files which complement the content of the book, providing examples of pronunciation, stress and intonation, and listening exercises.
This book focuses on the ways in which German urban élites tried to mould German cities between the 'birth' of modern planning in the 1890s and the complete cessation of building caused by the economic collapse around 1930. It investigates the attributes which 'metropolis', was given by early twentieth-century Germans. The book takes Munich as its 'still point in the turning world' of German urban development in particular, but makes arguments relevant well beyond the southern capital's city limits. It presents a case study of the urban landscape of modernity and modernisation which was increasingly. The book commences with exploration of the balanced construction of 'the city' in planners' world views. It addresses contemporaries' 'action plans' as responses to the problems of modernity, and characterises these actions as themselves distinctly modern. The book also tries to restore an emphasis on contemporaries' nuanced views of modernity and modernisation, and explores the balanced construction of 'the city' in planners' world views. Discussing hospitals, old people's homes and social housing, the book discusses that space could be a highly coercive tool for the social reformer, and scholars need to address material effects. It also demonstrates how intellectual impasses in manipulating the technologies of space could have profound political consequences. The ways that the built environment is currently used as evidence in historical writing are problematic. The book treats modernity with little eye for Modernism.
History overshadows Germany’s relations with Russia today, greatly complicating Berlin’s efforts to design effective policies to manage the challenge posed by Russia to Europe’s stability. This book examines the impact of Germans’ intense and dramatic relationship with Russia going back centuries to explain the failure of Berlin’s Russia policy after 1991. It focused heavily on ‘soft’ power by promoting people to people contacts and encouraging trade. Grateful for Moscow’s blessing of reunification and anxious to avoid confrontation, German policymakers ignored Russia’s drift to authoritarianism, its growing confidence fuelled by high commodity prices and its gradual alienation from Europe. Confrontation was inevitable once Russia no longer felt bound by the security principles that ended the Cold War. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a deep shock to the German elites. It caused a sharp shift in Russia policy as Chancellor Merkel led a European response to stabilise Ukraine, which included imposing economic sanctions on Russia. However, true to its old instincts, Germany continued to promote energy cooperation with Russia and even supported the expansion of a gas pipeline from Germany to Russia that was damaging to Ukraine. The book discusses these policies and their outcomes and argues that the economic relationship is overstated and camouflages the true state of overall relations. The analysis also considers the issue of Russian influence in Germany and the dangers it poses. The book concludes that Germany needs to think strategically about Russia and to define policy goals based on interests not emotions.
The Chronicon of Thietmar of Merseburg has long been recognised as one of the most important sources for the history of the tenth and early eleventh centuries, especially for the history of the Ottonian Empire. Although there is sufficient evidence of continuity between the Ottonians and the early Salians to justify a long Ottonian period extending at least to 1056, it is the Ottonians alone who defined the mental landscape of Bishop Thietmar of Merseburg. Thietmar's testimony also has special value because of his geographical location, in eastern Saxony, on the boundary between German and Slavic cultures. He is arguably the single most important witness to the early history of Poland, and his detailed descriptions of Slavic folklore are the earliest on record. Among anglophone readers, Thietmar's reputation rests chiefly on the various studies of Ottonian society and politics produced by the late Karl Leyser, one of the most influential historians of his generation. Although Thietmar placed great importance on kings and royal politics, he was scarcely reticent when it came to expressing his opinions on other matters. Notwithstanding his emphasis on the Divinity's role in directing Ottonian kings, Thietmar did not conceal the fact that the effect of royal government could be disruptive.
expected, separately or together, were France and Russia,
with Germany more likely an ally than an enemy. Sir Charles Dilke, for instance, writing in
1888, said: ‘I shall … mention only Russia and France as probable enemies,
because … Germany has no interests at variance with our own sufficiently important to
be likely to lead to a quarrel.’ A little further on he added: ‘between ourselves
and France differences are frequent, and between ourselves and Russia war is one day almost
During the latter part of