This book explores the ways in which the unashamedly disturbing conventions of international horror cinema allow audiences to engage with the traumatic legacy of the recent past in a manner that has serious implications for the ways in which we conceive of ourselves both as gendered individuals and as members of a particular nation-state. Exploring a wide range of stylistically distinctive and generically diverse film texts, its analysis ranges from the body horror of the American 1970s to the avant-garde proclivities of German Reunification horror, from the vengeful supernaturalism of recent Japanese chillers and their American remakes to the post-Thatcherite masculinity horror of the UK and the resurgence of hillbilly horror in the period following 9/11 USA. In each case, it is argued that horror cinema forces us to look again at the wounds inflicted on individuals, families, communities and nations by traumatic events such as genocide and war, terrorist outrage and seismic political change, wounds that are all too often concealed beneath ideologically expedient discourses of national cohesion. Thus proffering a radical critique of the nation-state and the ideologies of identity it promulgates, horror cinema is seen to offer us a disturbing, yet perversely life affirming, means of working through the traumatic legacy of recent times.
Epilogue: Ireland, Germanreunification and remaking Europe
‘I shall not forget this.’1
Made in Germany
Ireland’s relationship with West Germany was an essential component in its
embrace of economic modernisation and European integration. By the mid-
1950s the Irish economy and society was moribund; the recipe of protectionism
and irredentism had demonstrably failed as the basis on which to sustain an
independent Ireland. The crisis acted as a catalyst and began the Irish movement
towards an alternative national economic model. German
The extraordinary achievement of Germanreunification in 1990 merits a separate discussion because of its continuing impact on German thinking about Russia. The dramatic events of 1989–90 offered hope to Germans who had been on the front line of the Cold War of a new peaceful era in a unified country in an undivided Europe. Gorbachev’s acquiescence to reunification and post-Soviet Russia’s acceptance of it pointed to an era of stability and harmony in Germany’s relations with Russia, and an unprecedented opportunity for Germany to feel at peace with itself
West Germany played a pivotal role in encouraging the Republic of Ireland's adaptation to a 'European' path. This book contends that Ireland recognised that the post- war German economic miracle offered trade openings. It analyses approximately 25 years of Irish-West German affairs, allowing a measured examination of the fluctuating relationship, and terminates in 1973, when Ireland joined the European Communities (EC). The general historical literature on Ireland's post- war foreign relations is developing but it tends to be heavily European Economic Community (EEC), United Nations (UN) or Northern Ireland centred. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is a worthy candidate for such a study as it was Ireland's key trading partner in continental Western Europe. Germany acted as a dynamic force in Ireland's modernisation from the mid- 1950s. Ireland wanted 'to ride the wave of the future', and the challenge was to adapt. This study of Irish- West German relations offers up a prism through which to reinterpret the shifts in Ireland's international reorientation and adaptation between 1949 and 1973. Like any relationship, even a relatively amicable one, the Irish- West German one was prone to strains. Bitter trade disputes beset Irish- German relations throughout the 1950s. The book sheds new light on post- war Ireland's shift from an Anglo- Irish focus to a wider European one. It also discusses land wars, Nazism, the Anglo- Irish Trade Agreement of 1938, the establishment of a 'new Europe' and Lemass's refurbishment of the Irish development model.
The ‘Gorbachev factor’ and the collapse of the German Democratic Republic
the Association of GDR Film-Makers against the East German
government: ‘The Soviet comrades have their problems. The SED favours
good cooperation. But the problems of the Soviet Union cannot be brought
into the GDR.’ He also expressed his indignation that the Russian poet,
Yevgeny Yevtushenko, had been allowed to speak out in support of Germanreunification during a trip to West Berlin. All references to this theme had
been deleted from the GDR’s 1974 constitution. Furthermore, the poet
had backed claims in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) about the
of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
rather than that of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Germanre-uniﬁcation has
been described as a ‘take-over’ of the GDR by the FRG. This certainly was the case in the
ﬁeld of foreign and security policy. The backdrop against which the current security
policy thinking of the German elite must be understood is the tradition of the FRG, not
that of the GDR.
validity of the 5 per cent
clause both as applied in Bundestag elections and for elections to Land
German electoral politics
legislatures, the freedom of parties to alter party lists after an election
(held by the Constitutional Court to oﬀend the principle of ‘direct elections’), the apportionment of constituencies, the constitutionality of proposals for adaptation of the electoral system to be used in the first
Bundestag election following Germanreunification, the existence of
surplus seats and the constitutionality of the three-constituency alternative to the 5
, which would have the task of creating constitutions for their Land, took place on 14 October 1990. Berlin, which became a reunited city through Germanreunification, held an election for its city assembly (the equivalent of a Land parliament) on the same day as the Bundestag election: 2 December 1990.
The employment of Article 23 avoided the need to create a totally new constitution for reunited Germany. However, it did involve certain consequential changes to the Basic Law. The preamble, which had originally referred to reunification as an obligation for Germans in
From Iraq to Iraq: full circle?
At the time of Germanre-uniﬁcation in October 1990, Germany followed a
policy of strict military abstinence in conﬂicts outside of Europe. The notion
that the Bundeswehr (the German armed forces) could be used for other purposes than defence of Germany was inconceivable across the political spectrum. Thus, not a single German soldier participated in the 1991 Gulf War.
Twelve years later, when another US-led coalition launched Operation Iraqi
Freedom to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Germans remained
practice since the 1950s, the Irish Republic
remained an unflagging adherent to the Hallstein Doctrine.34 It resolutely refused
to recognise the GDR as an independent sovereign state designating it ‘the Soviet
Occupied Zone of Germany’ in line with NATO practice.35 Bonn and West
German public opinion were grateful for Aiken’s plea for Germanreunification
at the opening general debate of the 14th session of UN General Assembly in
If a just and lasting peace is to be made in Europe, the problem of Germanreunification must be settled in accordance with the