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This is the first monograph length study that charts the coercive diplomacy of the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford as practiced against their British ally in order to persuade Edward Heath’s government to follow a more amenable course throughout the ‘Year of Europe’ and to convince Harold Wilson’s governments to lessen the severity of proposed defence cuts. Such diplomacy proved effective against Heath but rather less so against Wilson. It is argued that relations between the two sides were often strained, indeed, to the extent that the most ‘special’ elements of the relationship, that of intelligence and nuclear co-operation, were suspended. Yet, the relationship also witnessed considerable co-operation. This book offers new perspectives on US and UK policy towards British membership of the European Economic Community; demonstrates how US détente policies created strain in the ‘special relationship’; reveals the temporary shutdown of US-UK intelligence and nuclear co-operation; provides new insights in US-UK defence co-operation, and revaluates the US-UK relationship throughout the IMF Crisis.
3 A year of discord 1973–74 No special relations. Correct. They’ll [Britain] have the relation with the French. President Nixon to Henry Kissinger, 9 August 19731 A year of discord At the onset of 1973, the US–UK relationship was entering a new epoch. The East of Suez withdrawal had lessened Britain’s global commitments and Britain officially entered the EEC on 1 January 1973. Heath was determined to chart a more Euro-centric British foreign policy, which would involve the creation of common political, foreign, monetary and energy policies within the EEC. The
1 Introduction American leaders saw it [to be] in their self-interest to obtain British advice before taking major decisions. It was an extraordinary relationship because it rested on no legal claim; it was formalized by no document; it was carried forward by succeeding British governments as if no alternatives were conceivable. Britain’s influence was great precisely because it never insisted on it; the ‘special relationship’ demonstrated the value of intangibles. Henry Kissinger’s assessment of the US–UK ‘special relationship’1 Introduction The above quote
2 Re-assessing foreign policy 1969–72 There could be no special partnership between Britain and the United States, even if Britain wanted it. Prime Minister Heath to President Pompidou, May 19711 The jilted lover According to Henry Kissinger, Edward Heath rejected a close working partnership with Richard Nixon, which left him feeling akin to that of a ‘jilted lover’.2 Kissinger’s analysis has had an incredible impact upon the subsequent scholarly assessments of the US–UK relationship. As Heath’s official biographer Philip Ziegler has claimed, ‘Certainly it was
but rather were a constant of the US–European relationship. 16 Transatlantic conflicts arose, in the 1970s, over questions of currency and protective tariffs, over West Germany’s Ostpolitik , 17 over the initiatives of Senator Mike Mansfield to reduce troop levels in Western Europe, over the Middle East and the Yom Kippur War, 18 over the first oil crisis and over Henry Kissinger’s failed ‘Year of Europe’. 19 By contrast, successful cooperation was exercised in the reaching of the Helsinki accords 20 and in the establishment of the G7. As Matthias Schulz and
-building are newly espoused, even in the most inopportune circumstances.18 The American promotion of a particular nation-building vision, at home and abroad, connects different periods and people in American history. The national creed is deeply and widely held, often advanced by traditional outsiders –including Henry Kissinger and Barack Obama –whose own place in American society is contested. It gives them belonging. It also excludes others –and that is C. Vann Woodward’s point about the ‘strange career’. The ideals of democracy and nation- building that define an
4 Wilson returns 1974–76 You have to operate on the assumption that Great Britain is through. Henry Kissinger to President Ford, October 19741 Introduction Heath’s final months in office were dominated by economic and social problems. Continuing trouble with the trade union movement had resulted in a three-day working week being enforced, and the ongoing oil embargo had led to the British public having to restrict their energy use. This set of circumstances had led to what one popular British newspaper would term as Heath’s ‘Long agony in No. 10’.2 Following
the major powers is likely to return to world politics. Much of the older literature on the balance of power in the classical realist tradition was based on assumptions about multipolar conditions being present. Writers such as Hans Morgenthau 23 and Henry Kissinger 24 pointed to the centrality of shifting alliances in the operation of the balance of power. Whether one thinks of multi-partner, anti-hegemonial alliances like those formed to face down Napoleonic France
The Arab–Israeli conflict has been at the centre of international affairs for decades. Despite repeated political efforts, the confrontation and casualties continue, especially in fighting between Israelis and Palestinians. This new assessment emphasizes the role that military force plays in blocking a diplomatic resolution. Many Arabs and Israelis believe that the only way to survive or to be secure is through the development, threat, and use of military force and violence. This idea is deeply flawed and results in missed diplomatic opportunities and growing insecurity. Coercion cannot force rivals to sign a peace agreement to end a long-running conflict. Sometimes negotiations and mutual concessions are the key to improving the fate of a country or national movement. Using short historical case studies from the 1950s through to today, the book explores and pushes back against the dominant belief that military force leads to triumph while negotiations and concessions lead to defeat and further unwelcome challenges. In The sword is not enough, we learn both what makes this idea so compelling to Arab and Israeli leaders and how it eventually may get dislodged.
6 Conclusion As Henry Kissinger noted in 2001, the contemporary strains in the transatlantic relationship mirrored those experienced throughout the Cold War.1 As shown in the previous chapters, such an interpretation holds considerable merit. Given the political, economic and social changes witnessed in this era, perhaps scholars should not be surprised that the US–UK relationship was fraught with difficulties. Nevertheless, the traditional interpretation that the Nixon–Heath years were a period of constant acrimony for US–UK relations requires clarification