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Open Access (free)
The evolving international financial architecture
Shalendra D. Sharma

. The goal was to expeditiously formulate and implement measures to prevent (or at least mitigate) the risk of future crises and to cope more effectively with those that still occur. At the Halifax Summit of 1995, the G-7 governments made a number of recommendations to this effect. Most notably, they urged the IMF to intensify its surveillance of its members’ policies and to send explicit messages to governments that seem to be avoiding the necessary policy reforms. In addition, the G-7 asked the IMF to set standards for the publication of economic and financial data

in The Asian financial crisis
Susan Strange

of the others. But financial regulation is certainly one of the most urgent. As noted in ­chapter  2, two very different international institutions have been engaged in it for some years now  – the BIS and the IMF. What does their record, and that of other intergovernmental institutions, tell us about their potential for taking over from the national regulators? The central bankers’ bank Although the BIS dates back to 1930, it really got involved with the management of private banking only in the 1970s. Two dramatic bank failures in 1974 spotlighted the problems

in Mad Money
Costas Simitis

does not detail what was, and is, necessary for the successful provision of support to ailing nations by the EU. In June 2013, the IMF published an ‘ex post evaluation’ of its 2010 stand-by arrangement (SBA) support programme for Greece.17 The IMF indicated that, thanks to the programme, strong fiscal consolidation was achieved and ‘Greece Greece.indb 292 3/13/2014 1:56:51 PM Evaluations of the assistance programme to Greece 293 remained in the euro-area, which was its stated political preference’.18 It underlines, however, that there were also notable failures

in The European debt crisis
Bailout politics in Eurozone countries

Since 2010, five Eurozone governments in economic difficulty have received assistance from international lenders on condition that certain policies specified in the Memoranda of Understanding were implemented. How did negotiations take place in this context? What room for manoeuvre did the governments of these countries have? After conditionality, to what extent were governments willing and able to roll back changes imposed on them by the international lenders? Do we find variation across governments, and, if so, why?

This book addresses these questions. It explores the constraints on national executives in the five bailed out countries of the Eurozone during and beyond the crisis (2008–2019).

The book’s principal idea is that, despite international market pressure and creditors’ conditionality, governments had some room for manoeuvre during a bailout and were able to advocate, resist, shape or roll back some of the policies demanded by external actors. Under certain circumstances, domestic actors were also able to exploit the constraint of conditionality to their own advantage. The book additionally shows that after a bailout programme governments could use their discretion to reverse measures in order to attain the greatest benefits at a lower cost. It finally explores the determinants of bargaining leverage – and stresses the importance of credibility.

Open Access (free)
Crisis, reform and recovery
Shalendra D. Sharma

Indonesia: crisis, reform and recovery 6 per cent (McLeod 1999, 209). Finally, the exchange-rate was adjusted to realistic levels through large devaluations, while the administered system of foreign-exchange allocation was gradually replaced by a market mechanism. Following the unification of the exchange rate in 1970 and a further devaluation in 1997, the capital account was fully liberalized. In 1967, Indonesia rejoined the World Bank and the IMF, which enabled it to receive substantial foreign assistance for its adjustment program and work out arrangements to reschedule

in The Asian financial crisis
Costas Simitis

. The Union also bears responsibility for not paying closer attention to, and directing further efforts to redress, the levels of disparity between the North and the South. During negotiations at the beginning of February 2010, the possible participation of the IMF in the solution was discussed. The Union had already sought assistance from the IMF in cases of members that were not part of the Eurozone, such as Lithuania (2008) and Hungary (2008). The IMF had both the capital at its disposal, as well as the experience and expertise in the field of economic management

in The European debt crisis
Open Access (free)
Issues, debates and an overview of the crisis
Shalendra D. Sharma

. In desperation, the Korean authorities (on November 20) widened the band in which the won was allowed to fluctuate – and the won fell quickly to the edge of the new band. The very next day, the Korean government turned to the IMF for help. On December 4, an IMF-led support package of US$57 billion was announced, and two days later the won was allowed to float.10 However, in spite of all these measures, Korea was, nevertheless, plunged into a deep recession. Indeed, the crises turned out to be so severe that, in a matter of weeks, East Asia’s high-performing “tiger

in The Asian financial crisis
Thomas Robb

5 All out of money 1976–77 There is a difference between being a charitable benefactor and host to a parasite. William Simon’s explanation of US policy towards Britain during the IMF crisis1 Introduction Allegedly suffering from the first stages of Alzheimer’s disease, Harold Wilson announced he would resign as prime minister in March 1976. As one close associate of the prime minister recalled, Wilson had simply ‘had enough’.2 A battle for the party leadership (and thus to become prime minster) ensued which the ‘champion of the moderates’ James Callaghan

in A strained partnership?
Abstract only
Costas Simitis

6 The bitter truth The only thing that Greece gained was a little breathing space. But the govern­ ment did not realise that. They thought they had achieved a great success. Many celebrated: they believed the interest rate crisis had been resolved, Germany had been obliged to yield and the IMF would not be dealing in detail with the Greek problem. The government’s policy of giving absolute priority to the positive spin of its policy, of glorifying its actions and downplaying the problems served only to obscure the real situation. The government itself was led

in The European debt crisis
Abstract only
Costas Simitis

30 Cyprus The temporary improvement of the situation did not ensure peace in the Eurozone throughout the whole of 2013, as the Eurogroup, the European Commission and the IMF had hoped. In March, developments in Cyprus provoked unforeseeable and severe turmoil, indicating that the measures constructed to guard against future risk in the single-currency area were not sufficient. The risk of an economic crisis erupting in Cyprus had grown steadily following the restructuring of Greek debt in the spring of 2012. Owing to the haircut of Greek sovereign bonds, the

in The European debt crisis