This book takes the transatlantic conflict over the International Criminal Court (ICC) as the lens for an enquiry into the normative foundations of international society. It shows how the way in which actors refer to core norms of the international society, such as sovereignty and human rights, affect the process and outcome of international negotiations. The book offers an innovative take on the long-standing debate over sovereignty and human rights in international relations. It goes beyond the simple and sometimes ideological duality of sovereignty versus human rights by showing that they are not competing principles in international relations, as is often argued, but complement each other. The way in which the two norms and their relationship are understood lies at the core of actors' broader visions of world order. The book shows how competing interpretations of sovereignty and human rights and the different visions of world order that they imply fed into the transatlantic debate over the ICC and transformed this debate into a conflict over the normative foundations of international society.
Turkey’s Europeanisation saga, which began in 1959 and climaxed in 2005 with the opening of membership negotiations with the European Union (EU), presents a unique opportunity to understand how interstate actors negotiate their interests; what ‘common interests’ look like from their historically and culturally contingent perspectives; and what happens when actors work for their private, professional, public, personal or institutional interests, even when those interests may go against their mandate. Honing in on the role of diplomats and lobbyists during negotiations for Turkey’s contentious EU membership bid, this book presents intricate, backstage conflicts of power and interests and negotiations of compromises, which drove this candidate country both closer to and farther from the EU. The reader will find in the book the everyday actors and agents of Turkish Europeanisation and learn what their work entails, which interests they represent and how they do what they do. Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in Brussels, the book argues that public, private and corporate actors, voicing economic, political and bureaucratic interests from all corners of Europe, sought access to markets and polities through the Turkish bid instead of pursuing their mandate of facilitating Turkey’s EU accession. Although limited progress was achieved in Turkey’s actual EU integration, diplomats and lobbyists from both sides of the negotiating table contradictorily affirmed their expertise as effective negotiators, seeking more status and power. This is the first book-length account of the EU–Turkey power-interest negotiations in situ, from the perspective of its long-term actors and agents.
The Arab–Israeli conflict has been at the centre of international affairs for decades. Despite repeated political efforts, the confrontation and casualties continue, especially in fighting between Israelis and Palestinians. This new assessment emphasizes the role that military force plays in blocking a diplomatic resolution. Many Arabs and Israelis believe that the only way to survive or to be secure is through the development, threat, and use of military force and violence. This idea is deeply flawed and results in missed diplomatic opportunities and growing insecurity. Coercion cannot force rivals to sign a peace agreement to end a long-running conflict. Sometimes negotiations and mutual concessions are the key to improving the fate of a country or national movement. Using short historical case studies from the 1950s through to today, the book explores and pushes back against the dominant belief that military force leads to triumph while negotiations and concessions lead to defeat and further unwelcome challenges. In The sword is not enough, we learn both what makes this idea so compelling to Arab and Israeli leaders and how it eventually may get dislodged.
Karl Polanyi (1886–1964) returned to public discourse in the 1990s, when the Soviet Union imploded and globalization erupted. Best known for The Great Transformation, Polanyi’s wide-ranging thought anticipated twenty-first-century civilizational challenges of ecological collapse, social disintegration and international conflict, and warned that the unbridled domination of market capitalism would engender nationalist protective counter-movements. In Karl Polanyi and Twenty-First-Century Capitalism, Radhika Desai and Kari Polanyi Levitt bring together prominent and new thinkers in the field to extend the boundaries of our understanding of Polanyi's life and work. Kari Polanyi Levitt's opening essay situates Polanyi in the past century shaped by Keynes and Hayek, and explores how and why his ideas may shape the twenty-first century. Her analysis of his Bennington Lectures, which pre-dated and anticipated The Great Transformation, demonstrates how Central European his thought and chief concerns were. The next several contributions clarify, for the first time in Polanyi scholarship, the meaning of money as a fictitious commodity. Other contributions resolve difficulties in understanding the building blocks of Polanyi's thought: fictitious commodities, the double movement, the United States' exceptional development, the reality of society and socialism as freedom in a complex society. The volume culminates in explorations of how Polanyi has influenced, and can be used to develop, ideas in a number of fields, whether income inequality, world-systems theory or comparative political economy. Contributors: Fred Block, Michael Brie, Radhika Desai, Michael Hudson, Hannes Lacher, Kari Polanyi Levitt, Chikako Nakayama, Jamie Peck, Abraham Rotstein, Margaret Somers, Claus Thomasberger, Oscar Ugarteche Galarza.
values of rationality and impartiality’ (Zürn
2000: 186). This implies the dictum that efficient policy formation
directed at increasing general welfare is inconceivable without reference
to the public interest as it is determined by policy deliberation in a particular situation (Majone 1993). Harald Müller and Thomas Risse have
applied this notion of deliberation and arguing to the context of internationalnegotiations. In their contributions they have repeatedly stressed
that, in principle, negotiators have to be prepared to retreat from whatever their initial
most exchanges about economic interests targeted state and government offices
in Turkey and political platforms such as the European Parliament, instead of the
Commission or EU member state offices in Brussels.
More broadly, the cultures of diplomacy and lobbying, with their own practices, norms (rules and taboos) and codes (symbols) – performed by elites and
experts of the negotiation process – formed and informed internationalnegotiations from the bottom (everyday, ground level) up, instead of being dictated from
above. Embedded in localised yet shifting
often still are
– hampered by the difficult inner-European decision-making
process. First, the EU has to solve the question of who should
represent the Union in internationalnegotiations. Sometimes it is
the European Commission acting on behalf of the Council; sometimes the Union is represented by the Council Presidency. No
matter which option is being chosen, the decisive institution is
always the Council, meaning that the member states have to agree
Environmental politics in the European Union
on a common position prior to any internationalnegotiation.
entering the joint international climate commitments. We focus on the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the
post-Kyoto process leading up to the US withdrawal from the
Kyoto agreement. Second, we search for observable influence
within the two most important actors that to a large extent have
determined the international commitments: the US and the EU.
Notice that focus on the US is changed from domestic climate
policy (chapter 5) to the development of positions in internationalnegotiations. It is also important to note the dual role of the EU
in this context. On the one
commitments, regimes represent a serious challenge for reactive companies (Miles et al.,
2001). A strong global regime carries the potential of affecting
multinational companies all over the world, in sharp contrast to
the policy of one single state. On the other hand, international
institutions based on agreement may simply codify the behaviour
of the most ‘reluctant actor’ – a mechanism known as the ‘law of
the least ambitious program’ (Underdal, 1980; Sand, 1991). If a
reactive industry determines the position of the ‘least ambitious’
state in internationalnegotiations
SETTLEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND
A second lens for viewing Northern Ireland considers how domestic and international politics interact. Putnam developed this approach, proposing that
leaders face a two-level game when negotiating internationally.55 The first
level exists at the interstate level, while the second exists at the domestic level.
Various international issues activate different domestic groups, and these
groups subsequently constrain leaders in internationalnegotiations. A more
intricate version of this domestic–international story emerges