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This book examines the historical evolution of international humanitarian law, in particular the legal and political bases for the penalisation of infractions associated with this body of law. The interaction of law, politics and financial considerations have proved detrimental for staging criminal prosecutions, even to this day, but ultimately have not negated the criminal liability of perpetrators. The book explores the various forms of direct participation in humanitarian law offences and the concept of the doctrine of superior responsibility. It stipulates the liability of those persons who, being in a position of authority, fail to prevent or punish crimes committed by their subordinates. The book deals with the elaboration of a legal theoretical model, defined as the 'duty to control', which attempts to address the gap identified in the relevant law of causation. It traces the evolution of humanitarian law in the context of non-international armed conflicts, with the aim of determining the application of humanitarian and criminal norms therein. Although for the purposes of humanitarian law the distinction between non-international and international conflicts is becoming less significant, people must still be aware of the mechanism known as 'conflict classification'. The world's major powers, with the exception of the UK, have expressly or implicitly widened their judicial jurisdiction by penalising extraterritorial breaches committed in internal armed conflicts. The book focuses on the legislative and judicial efforts of developed nations, mainly from Europe and North America. For these countries, the suppression of extraterritorial crime is not of imminent importance.
illegal acts, but not those tolerating or failing to punish them. They do not argue that the doctrine is misconceived, they simply refuse to subject their military to it, as far as this is possible without showing forthright contempt for international humanitarian law. For example, the United States’ multiple grounds of refusal to subject its military personnel to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
’ following the 9/11 attacks, violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) have been described as ‘increasingly serious’, culminating – at the time of writing – in systematic attacks on hospitals and other civilian sites in Syria. Similar attacks in Afghanistan, Yemen and South Sudan add to the picture of once respected IHL being trampled. Some offer numbers as evidence, citing the fact that the overwhelming percentage of victims in World War I were soldiers, compared with
In the aftermath of conflict and gross human rights violations, victims have a right to know what happened to their loved ones. Such a right is compromised if mass graves are not adequately protected to preserve evidence, facilitate identification and repatriation of the dead and enable a full and effective investigation to be conducted. Despite guidelines for investigations of the missing, and legal obligations under international law, it is not expressly clear how these mass graves are best legally protected and by whom. This article asks why, to date, there are no unified mass-grave protection guidelines that could serve as a model for states, authorities or international bodies when faced with gross human rights violations or armed conflicts resulting in mass graves. The paper suggests a practical agenda for working towards a more comprehensive set of legal guidelines to protect mass graves.
For decades, nuclear weapons have been portrayed as essential to the security of the few states that possess them, and as a very ‘normal’ part of national and international security. These states have engaged in enormous programmes of acquisition and development, have disregarded the humanitarian implications of these weapons, and sought to persuade their publics that national security was dependent on the promise of killing hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of civilians. The term ‘nuclearism’ has been used to describe this era, and several elements of nuclearism are explored here to identify how these states have been able to sustain their possession of nuclear arsenals. By perpetuating a discourse of ‘security’ which avoided international humanitarian law, by limiting decisions on nuclear policy to small groups of elites, by investing vast amounts of resources in their nuclear programs, and by using the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to perpetuate their privileged status as nuclear states, despite their promises to disarm, the great powers have been able to sustain a highly unequal – and dangerous – global nuclear order. This order is now under challenge, as the Humanitarian Initiative explored the implications of nuclear weapons’ use. Its sobering findings led non-nuclear states, supported by civil society actors, to create the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, making these weapons illegal, for all states. The Humanitarian Initiative has posed a challenge to all the elements of nuclearism, and has resulted in a significant rejection of the existing nuclear order. The treaty will not result in quick disarmament, and it faces several hurdles. It is, however, a notable achievement, delegitimizing nuclear weapons, and contributing to the goal of a nuclear-free world.
acknowledges the fact that dealing with migration today in Europe is extremely political. It points to existing maritime law and international humanitarian law to remind states of their obligations. And what’s really interesting since the end of June is that we have ended up in a situation in which rogue European states are deliberately throwing the law to the dogs. Now we know exactly what’s going on in Libya. We know that European states are responsible for refoulement , sending people back to torture, rape and detention in Libya. This is completely
tasked her with defining those policies. She also warns of the contemporary trend to shift the use of risk management from enabling operations and facilitating access to populations to protecting the organisation from legal or reputational risks. All the contributions demonstrate that a reliance on international humanitarian law (IHL) and humanitarian principles to ensure the security of humanitarian teams and projects might well be unfounded. Rony Brauman offers his own historical perspective
undermines existing obligations of all parties under international humanitarian law to allow civilians in areas affected by fighting to leave in search of safety and impartial aid to reach those in need. It is on that basis that the concept is not one which the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) wishes to promote, even though it acknowledges its possible necessity for other humanitarian organisations ( ICRC, 2003 ) and has resorted to it on occasions. 1 Numerous examples of failed corridors and safe zones becoming the target of attacks during the post
violations of international humanitarian law by attacking and killing unarmed civilians.… The RPF permitted its soldiers to kill persons whom they took to be Interahamwe or other supposed participants in the genocide. They killed some in the course of their military advance, but they executed most in the days and weeks after combat had finished. They selected the victims from among civilians grouped in camps, sometimes relying on accusations by survivors, sometimes on their own interrogations. They executed some persons apparently because they were linked with parties
report / synthesis offered by Maelle L’Homme, the author returns us to the analysis of classical humanitarian action as defined in traditional international humanitarian law. Analysing the use and misuse of the discourse of ‘humanitarian corridors’, the author argues that the widespread use of the term challenges norms of humanitarian access to civilians in conflict settings. By creating corridors as zones of exception in which humanitarian norms apply, all other zones are normalised as non-humanitarian spaces, thereby constraining all other types and modes of access