British and American perspectives

This book examines the intellectual frameworks within which the case for war in Iraq has developed in the US and the UK. It analyzes the neoconservative roots of the decision to go to war. The book also analyzes the humanitarian intervention rationale that was developed in the context of the Kosovo campaign, Tony Blair's presentation of it, and the case of Iraq. It looks at the parallel processes through which the George Bush administration and Blair government constructed their cases for war, analyzing similarities and divergences in approach. The book considers the loci of the intelligence failure over Iraq, the lessons for the intelligence communities, and the degree to which the decision to go to war in Iraq represented a policy rather than an intelligence failure. It then complements the analyses of US prewar intelligence failures by analysing what post-war inquiries have revealed about the nature of the failure in the UK case. The book discusses the relationship between intelligence and policymaking. It looks at how US Congress dealt with intelligence before the war. The book also examines how the Bush administration tried to manage public opinion in support of its war policies. It then looks at the decisionmaking process of the Bush administration in the year before the war in Iraq. Finally, the book also provides excerpts from a number of speeches and documents which are key to understanding the nature of national security decisionmaking and intelligence failure.

Ritual performance and belonging in everyday life

Iraqi women in Denmark is an ethnographic study of ritual performance and place-making among Shi‘a Muslim Iraqi women in Copenhagen. The book explores how Iraqi women construct a sense of belonging to Danish society through ritual performances, and it investigates how this process is interrelated with their experiences of inclusion and exclusion in Denmark. The findings of the book refute the all too simplistic assumptions of general debates on Islam and immigration in Europe that tend to frame religious practice as an obstacle to integration in the host society. In sharp contrast to the fact that Iraqi women’s religious activities in many ways contribute to categorizing them as outsiders to Danish society, their participation in religious events also localizes them in Copenhagen. Drawing on anthropological theories of ritual, relatedness and place-making, the analysis underscores the necessity of investigating migrants’ notions of belonging not just as a phenomenon of identity, but also with regard to the social relations and practices through which belonging is constructed and negotiated in everyday life.The Iraqi women’s religious engagement is related to their social positions in Danish society, and the study particularly highlights how social class relations intersect with issues of gender and ethnicity in the Danish welfare state, linking women’s religious practices to questions of social mobility. The book contextualizes this analysis by describing women’s previous lives in Iraq and their current experiences with return visits to a post-war society.

Issues for the intelligence community

The intelligence community’s uneven performance on Iraq from 2002 to 2004 raised significant questions concerning the condition of intelligence collection, analysis, and policy support. The discussion of shortcomings and failures that follows is not meant to imply that all surprises can be prevented by even good intelligence. There are too many targets and too many ways of

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq

In his decision to go to war in Iraq, President Bush did not follow the same path that he did during his decision to attack the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Immediately after 9/11 he met with his major national security policy team, deliberated with them about what to do, and made clear decisions about how to proceed in Afghanistan. In contrast, the decision to go to war in

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq

A dysfunctional relationship The most serious problem with US intelligence today is that its relationship with the policymaking process is broken and badly needs repair. In the wake of the Iraq war, it has become clear that official intelligence analysis was not relied on in making even the most significant national security decisions, that

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq

In promoting and prosecuting its war against Iraq, the administration of George W. Bush sought to accomplish two tasks in the management of American public opinion. In the run-up to the war, it tried to rally the public to support its planned venture, and, during the war itself, it tried to maintain public backing for the war even as costs increased. It failed in both of

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq

The 2003 invasion of Iraq appeared, certainly on the surface of things, to exemplify and realize several of the fundamental tenets of neoconservative thought in the US. The Bush Doctrine of preemption, the tendency toward unilateralism and working via “coalitions of the willing,” the willingness (even eagerness) to use and sustain American military power, the attendant

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq

Introduction This chapter examines the erroneous US intelligence prediction regarding the likely presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq in 2002, and why lawmakers in Washington, D.C., failed to question these estimates more thoroughly before they led the nation into war in the Persian Gulf the following year. Put simply, the main

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq

President Bush was accused by some in the popular press of lying in his arguments for taking the US to war with Iraq in 2003. But in order to make judgments about the accuracy of the president’s statements, the claims must be analyzed separately. This chapter examines several sets of statements by President Bush and his administration: first, about the implication that

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq

Howard had retrieved his electoral fortunes. First he had reversed some of his more unpopular domestic policies, but the key turning points came in August and September. On August 26, the Norwegian merchant vessel the Tampa properly responded to the distress calls of a sinking boatload of asylum seekers, mainly Afghans and Iraqis who had been heading for the northwest coast of Australia. According to

in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq