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This book is the collective use of force within the framework of the Charter, whose ambitious project is based on the premise that armed force can be resorted to exclusively in the common interest. It begins with a short discussion of the powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the conditions under which these powers may be exercised. The United States, supported by its NATO allies, or at least some of them, openly challenged the authority of the Security Council and attempted to downgrade its authorisation from a legal requirement to a matter of political convenience. The book deals with the use of force by States either individually or jointly. Through the lenses of the interaction between the Charter and customary international law, it considers the evolution of the right to self-defence, the only exception expressly provided for in the Charter, and the possible re-emergence of other exceptions. The book focuses in particular on the controversial question concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in self-defence and of the pre-emptive military action against threats posed by these weapons. Often referring to the recent Iraqi crisis, it further deals with the collective and unilateral means at the disposal of the United Nations and its members to enforce disarmament obligations and tackle the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
, the Iraq regime stood in ‘material breach’ of several UN resolutions, including resolution 1441, which signified that an armed intervention was legitimate. 10 The analysis below reveals what the governments primarily aimed to protect in view of the Iraq crisis and how they differed. It is structured, as is explained in Chapter 1 , on issues central to framing analysis, on
Can Russia, the European Union and the three major EU member states adopt a unified policy line in the global arena? This book investigates the cohesiveness of ‘greater Europe’ through the detailed scrutiny of policy statements by the leadership elites in the UK, France, Germany, Russia and the EU in connection with three defining events in international security. The crisis in Kosovo of 1999; the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the Iraq crisis of 2003. This extensive empirical enquiry results in a critical constructivist response to neorealist understandings of European security. The book contrasts the EU's new way of ‘doing security’ with the established, competitive bilateral interplay in the European security sphere and provides a clue to the kind of security politics that will prevail in Europe. A joint Moscow Brussels approach would improve the chances of both increasing their relative strength vis-a-vis the USA, but serious cleavages threaten to undermine such a ‘greater European’ common view on security. The book considers the extent to which the major European players pursue similar objectives, and assesses the possible implications for and the chances of greater Europe emerging as a cohesive global actor.
-defence and of the pre-emptive military action against threats posed by these weapons. Often referring to the recent Iraqi crisis, it further deals with the collective and unilateral means at the disposal of the United Nations and its members to enforce disarmament obligations and tackle the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 1 See A. Cassese, ‘Terrorism is also
peripheral European countries (“the New Europe”) aligned with the US in the run-up to the Iraq Crisis of 2003 (balancing against the Franco-German tandem) and why all Visegrád countries today are likewise pushing against the EU core states, showing a predilection towards Atlanticism (Michta 2006 ). Similarly, CSDP can be interpreted as a form of softbalancing against the US, or a security guarantee in expectation of US withdrawal
community. In the Iraq crisis, they set out to punish a morally irresponsible actor who violated their preferred norms, even if this goal demanded violation of territorial integrity. Ulf Hedetoft elaborates on historical explanations for the British taste for moral endeavours: ‘the almost spine-shivering pleasure of putting your life on the line for a righteous cause.’Writing from
contribute to a peaceful resolution of the Iraqi crisis as a member of the Security Council and then later in reacting to the course of events, the Irish government faced a number of policy dilemmas. The sharpest of these was its position on the legality of unilateral action on the part of the multilateral coalition, the associated status of UNSCR 1441 and the necessity for a second UN resolution to authorise the use of force.The second issue was the use of Shannon Airport by US military personnel both in the build-up to the Iraqi war and following its commencement. On
2 New Democracy’s criminal indifference By the end of 2003, Greece’s international standing had risen drastically compared with the preceding decade and the efforts made to actively participate in European developments had gained international recognition. Greece was a member of the EMU and the introduction of the euro had been accomplished without difficulty. The Greek presidency of 2003 had succeeded in maintaining European unity over the Iraq crisis. The completion of negotiations over the accession of new states – including Cyprus – into the Union, as well
NATO prevailing in the defence of its founding values. 6 However, the debates which both Kosovo and Bosnia occasioned were essentially about the correctness of Alliance action, not the survival of NATO itself. 7 The issue of NATO’s future was raised, however, much more starkly within the context of the 2003 Iraq crisis. This was dubbed NATO’s ‘near death experience’ 8 on account, first
accompli 162 and amounted to little more than a damage limitation exercise. Similar considerations can be made with regard to the recent Iraqi crisis. The overwhelming majority of States, including three permanent members of the Security Council, repeatedly and unambiguously expressed their opposition to the use of force. Without modifying their position as to the illegality of the