The European Commission had become one of the more contentious actors during both Irish referenda on the Lisbon Treaty. This book discusses the role of the European Commission and institutions more generally, as well as the policy area of justice and home affairs. It argues that it is important to evaluate the role of EU institutions for the process of European integration. The book suggests a reconceptualisation of the framework of supranational policy entrepreneurs (SPEs), which is often referred to by the academic literature that discusses the role of agency in European integration. It focuses on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) at the policy and treaty levels; primarily on four grounds: academic literature, SPE behaviour, EU's policymaking, and the interplay between treaty negotiations and policy-making. To analyse the role of the European institutions, the book combines an analysis of the Lisbon Treaty in relation to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice with an analysis of the policy-making in the same area. The public policy model by John Kingdon with constructivist international relations literature is also outlined. The external dimension of counter-terrorism in the EU; the role of the EU institutions in EU asylum and migration; and the role of he Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is discussed. The book also analyses the role of the EU institutions in the communitarisation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, and thus subsequently in the Lisbon Treaty.
the Lisbon treaty in June 2008 ( EUobserver, 3 October 2009).
Less obvious to the general European public, the European
Commission had become one of the more contentious actors during both
Irishreferenda on the Lisbon Treaty. Firstly, during the first Irish
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008, Irish government officials
perceived that the fear of losing the ‘Irish commissioner’
retained control over the necessary policies to promote national economic wellbeing in a global economy.50 The ‘Celtic Tiger’ phenomenon and Dublin’s (un)
conscious blending of Boston and Berlin’s socio-economic models had produced
a unique perspective on the EU in at least some Irish quarters, and it also fuelled
a sense of economic and national confidence.
This was epitomised by the Irish electorate’s rejection of both the Nice Treaty
and the Lisbon Treaty in Irishreferenda in 2001 and 2008, which led to reruns
in 2002 and 2009. Both the first Nice (Nice I) and