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This book examines the underlying foundations on which the European Union's counter-terrorism and police co-operation policies have been built since the inception of the Treaty on European Union, questioning both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU's efforts in these two security areas. Given the importance of such developments to the wider credibility of the EU as a security actor, it adopts a more structured analysis of key stages of the implementation process. These include the establishment of objectives, both at the wider level of internal security co-operation and in terms of both counter-terrorism and policing, particularly in relation to the European Police Office, the nature of information exchange and the ‘value added’ by legislative and operational developments at the European level. The book also offers a more accurate appraisal of the official characterisation of the terrorist threat within the EU as a ‘matter of common concern’. In doing so, not only does it raise important questions about the utility of the European level for organising internal security co-operation, but it also provides a more comprehensive assessment of the EU's activities throughout the lifetime of the Third Pillar, placing in a wide and realistic context the EU's reaction to the events of 11 September 2001 and the greater prominence of Islamist terrorism.
period against both Russia and Islamist terrorism. The two tasks in many ways have become thoroughly interactive. Russia seeks to use the West’s open democratic systems to influence electoral outcomes to favor its interests while ISIL and similar groups use the freedoms presented by liberal democratic systems to engage in attacks against those systems. As retired general David Petraeus testified before the US House Armed Services Committee in February 2017, “President Putin … understands that, while conventional aggression may occasionally enable Russia to grab a bit
-border Islamist terrorism supported by Pakistan as part of its proxy war against the Indian state. It is important to underscore that towards the end of the 1990s, Pakistan lost control over the local tanzeems it supported in Kashmir, as several of these groups began to look beyond the ISI for support, funding and training. 23 This both augmented and further complicated Islamist terrorism within India. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, even Pakistan's militant proxies, such as Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, which in the post-9/11 period had moved more
as a whole. Traditional terrorism – a lingering impact Before moving on to the issue of Islamist terrorism, which has dominated the security agenda in the wake of 11 September, it is worth considering the lingering impact of traditional, secular terrorism beyond 2000. As the EU began providing its own, more detailed assessment in this period, covering both the scale of terrorist attacks and the policing and judicial measures taken to combat it, subsequent analysis will be based primarily on its results. While the US State Department continued with its overall
cooperating with Russia against Islamist terrorism? Good questions. There are answers. The threats posed by Islamist terror and Russian aggression present themselves in very different ways. But they have one thing in common: both seek to create political and economic chaos in the West, undermining Western economic, political and security systems and, in extremis, creating a new world order in which the West is not the dominant player. They are by no means the only authoritarian regimes out there, but they are the two that most actively seek to undermine the Western system
affiliation. 8 This system remained until the 2005 referendum, which restored multiparty politics within Uganda, although the recent abolition of term limits and the intimidation of the opposition that has taken place in recent elections have left questions over how democratic Uganda now is. 9 From the mid-1990s onwards, Uganda experienced both domestic terrorism and transnational Islamist terrorism. Domestic non-state terrorism arrived in 1996 in the form of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), who began by attacking border posts along the Uganda
fighters’ and the role of ‘ideology developed in third countries and messages broadcast or sent into Europe’, as areas that would need to be addressed.54 The period from January 2009 to March 2015 was characterised by further evolution in the ‘radicalisation’ strand of the ‘fight against terrorism’ discourse. The EU began to embrace a broader understanding of the ‘radicalisation’ process, noting that ‘radicalisation’ should not be seen as a process limited to just one form of terrorist threat. The removal of all references to ‘Islamic’ or ‘Islamist terrorism’ during this
Prevent as a demand for early intervention. The threat posed by Islamist terrorism is represented as novel, requiring a new strategic response. It is, as will be shown, therefore a problematisation that produces the threat of Islamist terrorism as requiring early intervention. In contrast to previous counter-terrorism strategies, Prevent represents a novel temporal ambition that one can, and should, intervene into the process of someone becoming a terrorist. The policy, therefore, explicitly seeks to act within conditions of
list of extremist organizations range from the right wing (radical nationalist, anti-migrant) and the radical left to religious sects. However, terrorist threats to Russia are strongly dominated by radical Islamist terrorism and related transnational connections (as of June 2017, out of twenty-seven groups on Russia's list of terrorist organizations, all but four were violent Islamist organizations). 19 There have been two main trends concerning domestic Islamist terrorism and militancy in Russia beyond Chechnya: one that has evolved since the 2000s and is
incident and noting that the Directory is not ‘a vehicle for the exchange of operational intelligence’.21 There is also a question mark over the principle underlying such a Directory, as it assumes that the best practice of one member state will be both useful and applicable to others. Techniques that may have worked well in Italy, against a primarily left-wing terrorist threat, may not necessarily be as applicable in Spain, to combat ETA, let alone in the face of the developing challenges of militant Islamist terrorism and wider radicalisation. There is no guarantee