Author: Ilan Danjoux

Cartoon analysis is the study of a non-elite communication. Ilan Danjoux examined over 1200 Israeli and Palestinian editorial cartoons to explore whether changes in their content anticipated the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in October of 2000. Political Cartoons and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict provide readers an engaging introduction to cartoon analysis and a novel insight into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Conflict researchers benefit from paying attention to popular fears because they influence the policies of career-minded politicians and autocratic leaders seeking to placate domestic dissent. The book begins by outlining the rationale for this research project, while explaining the choice of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study. It identifies the challenges of cartoon research and outlines the methodological approaches available to researchers. After laying the framework for this study, the book details the collapse of the Israel-Palestinian Peace Process into full-scale violence by October 2000. A description of Israeli and Palestinian media production follows. The book demonstrates the cartoon's ability to chronicle changes in conflict. Not only did both Israeli and Palestinian cartoons change their focus with the outbreak of violence, the mood of cartoons also shifted. It also shows that Israeli and Palestinian cartoons also changed the way that each portrayed the other. Changes in both Israeli and Palestinian cartoons corresponded with, but did not precede, the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

Defending democracy
Author: Ami Pedahzur

This book looks at the theoretical issue of how a democracy can defend itself from those wishing to subvert or destroy it without being required to take measures that would impinge upon the basic principles of the democratic idea. It links social and institutional perspectives to the study, and includes a case study of the Israeli response to Jewish extremism and violence, which tests the theoretical framework outlined in the first chapter. There is an extensive diachronic scrutiny of the state's response to extremist political parties, violent organizations and the infrastructure of extremism and intolerance within Israeli society. The book emphasises the dynamics of the response and the factors that encourage or discourage the shift from less democratic and more democratic models of response.

The parliamentary arena
Ami Pedahzur

constitutional barriers has helped Germany forestall representation of extremist parties at the federal Parliament level over the course of years and, in turn, has also helped stabilise the democratic system. The socio-political underpinnings of the response to extremism in Israel Both prior to the establishment of the State of Israel and in the years following, the party institution constituted a pivotal factor in the political processes involved in the nation’s construction. However, the role of the Israeli political party went far

in The Israeli response to Jewish extremism and violence
The social sphere
Ami Pedahzur

examine how the State of Israel has contended with these paradoxes and, by the same token, try to find an answer to the paramount questions. Has the state-run education system in Israel undergone a gradual transition towards an increased emphasis on democratic values in its school curricula, consequently leading to the reinforcement of the ‘immunisation’ of the ‘defending democracy?’ Alternatively, has the non-liberal element gained the upper hand, thus reducing the prospects for the complete abandonment of the ‘militant’ attitude in response to extremism

in The Israeli response to Jewish extremism and violence
From the Gromyko declaration to the death of Stalin (1947–53)
Joseph Heller

Western aggression, suspecting the Americans of wanting to turn the region into a new Cold War battleground. 19 The Kremlin, motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage, recognized Israel de jure just three days after it had declared its independence. The Kremlin also recommended to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia that they help Israel acquire artillery and aircraft

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Testing the Memorandum of Understanding (1965–67)
Joseph Heller

The Memorandum of Understanding turned Israel into a US client state, but its implementation had to be negotiated. In April 1965, Israel submitted a formal application for tanks and planes which was rejected by the Americans, who feared they would be used for unprovoked offensive military actions. 1 However, the State Department did not readily accept Israel as a client, interpreting

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Joseph Heller

Following the Kremlin, the Soviet press published articles attacking Zionism and accusing Israel of manufacturing nuclear weapons in the interests of Middle Eastern imperialism. 1 Nevertheless, Israel’s foreign ministry was optimistic because the Kremlin also attacked Nasser. 2 While the Soviet Union did call for the return of the Arab refugees and recognized only

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Joseph Heller

When Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964, Israel wondered how Soviet policies would change. Regarding the Jews, there were no changes. Ivan Dedioulia, first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Israel, claimed there was no anti-Jewish discrimination in the Soviet Union. Nasser’s threats, he stated, were ‘idle.’ The Alexandria summit proved that confrontation with Israel

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Joseph Heller

The Sinai Campaign could have meant turning acquired territory into diplomatic victory. Eban suggested Israel announce that it had no territorial ambitions and, in exchange for withdrawal, ask Eisenhower to get the Soviets to remove their aircraft from Syria. 1 Ben-Gurion, however, believed there was no cause for alarm. CIA Director Allen Dulles told the NSC that with Soviet aid

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
The Memorandum of Understanding (1964–65)
Joseph Heller

President Johnson wrote to Prime Minister Eshkol in January 1964 extolling the close relations between the two countries and expressing hope for continued mutual understanding. He also mentioned issues on which they differed, including Israel’s security, regional stability and the Arab refugees. 1 Israel replied that the balance of power was its number one priority

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67