This book provides the first comprehensive analysis of Japan’s new security
partnerships with Australia, India, countries and multilateral security
structure in East Asia, as well as with the EU and some of its member
states. Most books on Japanese bilateral relations focus exclusively on the
Japanese perspective, the debate in Japan, positions of Japanese government
leaders and parties, or the public discourse. This edited volume is organized in
pairs of chapters, one each analysing the motivations and objectives of Japan,
and a second analysing those of each of the most important new security
partners. After solely relying on the United States for its national
security needs during the Cold War, since the end of the Cold War, Japan has
begun to deepen its bilateral security ties. Since the mid-2000s under LDP and
DPJ administrations, bilateral security partnerships accelerated and today go
beyond non-traditional security issue are as and extend far into traditional
security and military affairs, including the exchange and joint acquisition of
military hardware, military exercises, and capacity building. It is argued, that
these developments will have implications for the security architecture in the
Asia-Pacific. This book is a primer for those interested in Japan’s security
policy beyond the US-Japan security alliance, non-American centred bilateral and
multilateral security cooperation through the eyes of Japanese as well as
partner country perspectives. It is also an ideal as a course reading for
graduate courses on regional security cooperation and strategic partnerships,
and Japanese foreign and security policy.
administration and wider US foreign policy community perceived DPJ policies not as a legitimate reorientation of an allied country priority, but rather as a threat to the foundations of the alliance and consequently to the entire US strategic position in East Asia. 9 The Obama administration’s response was to nudge, and if necessary coerce, Japan into adopting a foreign policy aligned with Washington’s interests. 10
Hatoyama resigned in June 2010, nine months after his election. Resistance from the United States over his attempts to reorient Japaneseforeignpolicy was by
-Japan Financial-Market Relations in an Era of Global Finance’, in Curtis, G. (ed.), New Perspectives on US-Japan Relations (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange), p. 87.
Financial Times , 1997.‘Hashimoto Designs a Grander Foreign Policy: Changing Balance of Power in Asia Has Led to a More Active Development of Regional Links’, Financial Times , 14 January, p. 6.
Fukushima, A., 1999. JapaneseForeignPolicy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism (London: Macmillan).
Gaik ō Forum, 1997
war. Still, while seeking to retain control of the German
territories in China and the South Pacific that Japan had occupied during
the war, the leaders of Japan’s delegation were members of a faction who
favoured the peaceful internationalist policies that would characterise
Japaneseforeignpolicy throughout the next decade. They supported the
League of Nations and disarmament as part of cooperative diplomacy and
, namely Article 9 and a largely pacifist citizenry that is deeply against the use of the military and revision of the so-called pacifist constitution ( Miyashita, 2007 ). As a consequence of the decreasing efficacy of traditional tools of Japaneseforeignpolicy such as economic incentives, regional challenges have deepened Tokyo’s view not only of the salience of the US–Japan security partnership, but also of the importance of deepening its partnerships in Southeast Asia through economic, political and security linkages ( Nagy, 2017 ). In line with this view, Japan
The politics of conflict and the producer-oriented policy response
its study. The Japanese economy was considered especially
vulnerable since it had already achieved a high level of energy
efﬁciency, hence further improvement would incur greater marginal costs. In the absence of support from the largest producer
of carbon dioxide, the USA, any action would not be effective.
MITI, together with MOFA, also stressed the importance of good
relations with the USA (especially at a time when US–Japanese
trade friction was intensifying), which have been the core of
Japaneseforeignpolicy. Against these views, the EA argued that
unambiguous and also understandably unwelcome, as it conveys a patronising message of Brussels ‘supervising’ the quality of Japaneseforeignpolicies ( Reiterer, 2013 , 2015).
In September 2005, Brussels and Tokyo began discussing Asian security issues on a regular basis by launching the ‘EU–Japan Strategic Dialogue on East Asian Security’ ( Mykal, 2011 ). The establishment of that dialogue was preceded by the establishment of the ‘EU–US Dialogue on East Asian Security’ in 2004. Given that the EU weapons
Financial liberalisation and the end of the Cold War
This chapter explores the early consequences of the demise of Bretton Woods and American financial liberalisation, reporting the repercussions of the United States' economic and military power. West German firms quickly exploited the new markets and investment opportunities in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The events of 1979 led the Carter administration to another change in dollar policy, with huge consequences. The consequences of the second oil-price shock, and the foreign and economic policies of the Reagan administration, were more beneficial for the British and Italian modern democratic nation-states. The United States' final victory in the Balkans demonstrated much about US dominance of the post-Cold War world. India shares serious economic problems with other post-colonial countries. The international trading order that has developed since the end of Bretton Woods retains the capacity to generate significant political problems for the states of post-colonial developing countries.