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Crisis, reform and recovery

The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 shook the foundations of the global economy and what began as a localised currency crisis soon engulfed the entire Asian region. This book explores what went wrong and how did the Asian economies long considered 'miracles' respond, among other things. The combined effects of growing unemployment, rising inflation, and the absence of a meaningful social safety-net system, pushed large numbers of displaced workers and their families into poverty. Resolving Thailand's notorious non-performing loans problem will depend on the fortunes of the country's real economy, and on the success of Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC). Under International Monetary Fund's (IMF) oversight, the Indonesian government has also taken steps to deal with the massive debt problem. After Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency's (INDRA) failure, the Indonesian government passed the Company Bankruptcy and Debt Restructuring and/or Rehabilitation Act to facilitate reorganization of illiquid, but financially viable companies. Economic reforms in Korea were started by Kim Dae-Jung. the partial convertibility of the Renminbi (RMB), not being heavy burdened with short-term debt liabilities, and rapid foreign trade explains China's remarkable immunity to the "Asian flu". The proposed sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) (modeled on corporate bankruptcy law) would allow countries to seek legal protection from creditors that stand in the way of restructuring, and in exchange debtors would have to negotiate with their creditors in good faith.

Abstract only
Amy Levine

military government and Kim Dae Jung, a long-time opposition leader from that region, was viewed as responsible. Before Gwangju, the US was widely seen as ‘sacred and inviolable’ (Lee N.H. 2007). Many of those involved in the 1970s democratisation movements were 30 South Korean civil movement organisations Christian and received funds from the US to support their activities. Some with ties to the US took increasing risks with the expectation that the US government would back them up (Lee N.H. 2007). When the US did not intervene despite having troops stationed in and

in South Korean civil movement organisations
Open Access (free)
Crisis, reform and recovery
Shalendra D. Sharma

The Asian financial crisis 4 Korea: crisis, reform and recovery We don’t know whether we would go bankrupt tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. I can’t sleep since I was briefed. I am totally flabbergasted . . . This is the bottom. It’s a matter of one month, no, even one day. I just can’t understand how the situation came to this (President-elect Kim Dae-Jung, December 23, 1997).1 In the 1950s, Korea was among the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita income of under US$100. In per capita terms, this placed the country below Haiti, Ethiopia, Peru

in The Asian financial crisis
Conventional and alternative security scenarios
Roland Bleiker

the subsequent South Korean presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun ( Harrison, 2001 ; Dujarric, 2001 ; Moon, 2001a ; Wolfsthal, 2006 ). The task of this chapter is to discuss these opposing approaches, using the US and South Korean positions as key points of reference. The fact that there is a relatively significant

in Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific
Less than theory, smaller than ideology
Amy Levine

conceptual vocabulary around the optics of political economy (Corsin Jimenez 2013), but also affected an analytical scale change. Just as subjectivity broadened the scope of personal agency, governmentality broadened the scope of state agency such that power operates at every level of scale. Jesook Song’s study of (neo-)liberal welfare policy during the Kim Dae Jung administration draws upon Foucauldian scholarship to argue for a broad and encompassing sense of power, ‘which challenges the presumption of a solid line between the state and the society’ (2009: 13). Her work

in South Korean civil movement organisations
Abstract only
Amy Levine

and Kim Dae Jung – ­persevered, however, and took their turn as president in 1992 and 1997 respectively. The economy rapidly globalised, then tanked and rebounded from the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. The term ‘386 generation’ was coined in the early 1990s when two-thirds of South Korea’s 43 million people were under the age of 40, the GNP was rising steadily, and democratic reforms accelerated (Dong 1993: 1; Lee N.H. 2007). Conventionally, the 3 of 386 refers to people in their thirties, the 8 to the decade they attended university (1980s), and the 6

in South Korean civil movement organisations
Amy Levine

minority shareholder activism to several large Korean business conglomerates (Rho 2007). The result was a series of high-profile scandals during the 1990s. Park named the financial crisis and the election of Kim Dae Jung in the last part of the decade as major catalysts for PSPD’s anti-corruption investigations, particularly the CAGE movement in 2000. He said it was a ‘good chance’ to push for transparency, but that the current moment – 2006 – was no longer a ‘fresh’ or ‘interesting’ time for transparency. Park shared an anecdote to explain what he meant by this, which

in South Korean civil movement organisations
Washington’s painful search for a credible China policy
Börje Ljunggren

but failed to deliver any lasting results. As Head of the Asia Department in the Swedish Foreign Ministry I visited North Korea a number of times. In 2001 I accompanied Prime Minister Göran Persson, then-chairperson of the European Council, to Pyongyang for an EU–North Korean summit with Kim Jong-il. South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine policy and the Clinton administration’s advanced direct talks with Pyongyang had created a conducive climate, but when President George W. Bush entered the White House in 2001, he launched a policy reversal, choosing to

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Nuclear weapons in the US–South Korea alliance
Stephan Frühling
and
Andrew O'Neil

crisis, when the incoming South Korean President, Roh Moo-hyun, expressed concerns over potential entrapment in a US-led war against North Korea. 22 For its part, the Bush administration made no secret of its scepticism regarding efforts by Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun to engage Pyongyang through the so-called ‘Sunshine Policy’. 23 Notwithstanding these periodic tensions, however, the

in Partners in deterrence
Bruce Cumings

Japan and South Korea working together under the umbrella of the American alliance. The smaller problem, however, was that Seoul had been through a fit of “anti-Americanism” as Beltway denizens saw it, under Presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and, especially, Roh Moo-hyun (2003–8). Fortune eventually smiled in the form of President Lee Myung-bak (2008–13), a former Hyundai executive who harked back to the days of Korean–American amity when the dictators were in power (1948–87). Even better, they thought, was the subsequent election of Park Geun-hye, a daughter of one

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific