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German–Israeli relations, 1949–69
Author: Lorena De Vita

The rapprochement between Germany and Israel in the aftermath of the Holocaust is one of the most striking political developments of the twentieth century. German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently referred to it as a ‘miracle’. But how did this ‘miracle’ come about? Drawing upon sources from both sides of the Iron Curtain and of the Arab–Israeli conflict, Lorena De Vita traces the contradictions and dilemmas that shaped the making of German–Israeli relations at the outset of the global Cold War. Israelpolitik offers new insights not only into the history of German–Israeli relations, but also into the Cold War competition between the two German states, as each attempted to strengthen its position in the Middle East and the international arena while struggling with the legacy of the Nazi past.

Memory, leadership, and the fi rst phase of integration (1945– 58)
Peter J. Verovšek

One must know the past [ das Gestern ], one must also think about the past , if one is to successfully and durably shape the future [ das Morgen ]. Konrad Adenauer, speech at the University of Frankfurt (1952) Memory and the founding of Europe In the introductory section I argued that ruptures in historical time allow communities to reshape how they link the past to the future through the present by drawing on collective memory as a cognitive , motivational , and justificatory resource for social transformation. This chapter begins to apply

in Memory and the future of Europe
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Mervyn O’Driscoll

states were relegated to a secondary power status under the US defence umbrella. US-​backed trade liberalisation promoted growing Western European interdependence in the post-​war decade, while alliances (NATO, the Warsaw Pact and other pacts internationally) transformed global security. The first chancellor of the FRG, Konrad Adenauer, inherited an occupied and provisional state that was mistrusted by its neighbours because of its recent history and its strategic weight. He chose an unqualified Western orientation and adopted a policy of reconciliation and

in Ireland, West Germany and the New Europe, 1949– 73
Mervyn O’Driscoll

1 The Statist, 26 January 1962, pp. 261–​8. 2 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, Pressedokumentation, file: Staaten, Irland, 1951–​83, Press cutting, Bulletin, nr. 197/​S.1663, 23 October 1962. 3 FitzGerald, Protectionism to Liberalisation, p. 134. 4 See Maher, Tortuous Path, pp. 123–​6. 5 AA-​PA, Bestand B31, Band 221, Beitritt Irlands zur EWG, Note & aide-​mémoire, Harkort to Müller-​Armack, 3 July 1961; ibid., Note, Jansen to Lahr, 4 July 1961. 6 TNA, FO 371/​158220, M6114/​24, Memo, Gallagher to Wilford, United Kingdom and the Six

in Ireland, West Germany and the New Europe, 1949– 73
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The EU’s odd couple
Tom Gallagher

intransigence and deception, he managed to kill off what was feared to be a rival British ‘power-base’ that could inconvenience plans for a federal Europe. 27 Erhard was very much a Cassandra in his doubts about the EU. In the United States, there was cross-party and high-level elite backing for the project. Britain was too absorbed with managing imperial retreat and unfavourable economic trends at home to be able to be a coherent partner and Erhard had a boss who was a strong enthusiast. Adenauer disarms the French Konrad Adenauer had never been an enthusiastic German

in Europe’s path to crisis
From the Global to the Local
Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh

Babille , M. et al. (eds), Finding Means: UNRWA’s Financial Crisis and Refugee Living Conditions ( Oslo : FAFO ), pp. 157 – 78 . Charles , L. ( 2017 ), Lebanon Livelihoods: Economic Opportunities and Challenges for Palestinians and Lebanese in the Shadow of the Syrian Crisis ( Sankt Augustin : Konrad Adenauer Stiftung ). Dumper , M. ( 2018 ), ‘ Trump’s Cut to Funding for Palestinian Refugees Could Lead to Disaster ’, Guardian , 12 01 , www

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen

hold. ‘Never again war’ became the rallying cry for a disparate coalition of intellectuals, educators, unionists, politicians, and protestant clergy. On the centre right, the conclusion was different. ‘Never again alone’ was the precept for Germany’s democratisation, rehabilitation, and reconstruction – a precept that guided and informed the policy of the first post-war German government, headed by the Conservative Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer was convinced that the roots of the German disaster were to be found in the spiritual and strategic oscillation between East and

in Germany, pacifism and peace enforcement
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Mervyn O’Driscoll

unremitting Irish criticism of the artificial division of post-​war Germany. The anti-​communist convictions of Irish society and Dublin’s aversion to relations with the Soviet Union guaranteed that Ireland instinctively fell in with Bonn’s preferences, but there was an emerging utilitarian consideration too  –​ access to the West German market for agricultural products. Antipathy towards Moscow was principally a product of the pronounced Catholicity of Irish society. It inclined towards German Christian Democracy under the aegis of Konrad Adenauer rather than the Social

in Ireland, West Germany and the New Europe, 1949– 73
Open Access (free)
Geoffrey K. Roberts and Patricia Hogwood

-elected as President, defeating Le Pen on second ballot by 82.2 per cent to 17.8 per cent. Germany Bundestag elections, changes of government and election of federal presidents 14 August 1949 Bundestag election. CDU–CSU are largest party. 12 September 1949 Theodor Heuss (FDP) elected as first federal President. 15 September 1949 Konrad Adenauer

in The politics today companion to West European Politics
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Mervyn O’Driscoll

-​serving chancellor, Dr Konrad Adenauer, engaged in policies that went a long way to solving traditional West European rivalries. The newly minted West Germany, with its capital in Bonn, embraced international rehabilitation and integration into the democratic fold. West Germany’s position as the strategic fulcrum of Cold War Europe, its economic rebirth and the opportunities presented by West European cooperation smoothed its relative normalisation in little more than a decade. Adenauer consciously restrained the FRG’s freedom of action by enmeshing it deeply in multilateral

in Ireland, West Germany and the New Europe, 1949– 73