The rapprochement between Germany and Israel in the aftermath of the Holocaust is one of the most striking political developments of the twentieth century. German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently referred to it as a ‘miracle’. But how did this ‘miracle’ come about? Drawing upon sources from both sides of the Iron Curtain and of the Arab–Israeli conflict, Lorena De Vita traces the contradictions and dilemmas that shaped the making of German–Israeli relations at the outset of the global Cold War. Israelpolitik offers new insights not only into the history of German–Israeli relations, but also into the Cold War competition between the two German states, as each attempted to strengthen its position in the Middle East and the international arena while struggling with the legacy of the Nazi past.
Memory, leadership, and the fi rst phase of integration (1945– 58)
Peter J. Verovšek
One must know the past [ das Gestern ], one must also think about the past , if one is to successfully and durably shape the future [ das Morgen ].
KonradAdenauer, speech at the University of Frankfurt (1952)
Memory and the founding of Europe
In the introductory section I argued that ruptures in historical time allow communities to reshape how they link the past to the future through the present by drawing on collective memory as a cognitive , motivational , and justificatory resource for social transformation. This chapter begins to apply
states were relegated to a secondary power status under the US defence umbrella. US-backed
trade liberalisation promoted growing Western European interdependence in the
post-war decade, while alliances (NATO, the Warsaw Pact and other pacts internationally) transformed global security.
The first chancellor of the FRG, KonradAdenauer, inherited an occupied and
provisional state that was mistrusted by its neighbours because of its recent history and its strategic weight. He chose an unqualified Western orientation and
adopted a policy of reconciliation and
1 The Statist, 26 January 1962, pp. 261–8.
2 KonradAdenauer Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, Pressedokumentation, file: Staaten, Irland,
1951–83, Press cutting, Bulletin, nr. 197/S.1663, 23 October 1962.
3 FitzGerald, Protectionism to Liberalisation, p. 134.
4 See Maher, Tortuous Path, pp. 123–6.
5 AA-PA, Bestand B31, Band 221, Beitritt Irlands zur EWG, Note & aide-mémoire,
Harkort to Müller-Armack, 3 July 1961; ibid., Note, Jansen to Lahr, 4 July 1961.
6 TNA, FO 371/158220, M6114/24, Memo, Gallagher to Wilford, United Kingdom
and the Six
intransigence and deception, he managed to kill off what was feared to be a rival British ‘power-base’ that could inconvenience plans for a federal Europe. 27
Erhard was very much a Cassandra in his doubts about the EU. In the United States, there was cross-party and high-level elite backing for the project. Britain was too absorbed with managing imperial retreat and unfavourable economic trends at home to be able to be a coherent partner and Erhard had a boss who was a strong enthusiast.
Adenauer disarms the French
KonradAdenauer had never been an enthusiastic German
M. et al. (eds),
Finding Means: UNRWA’s Financial Crisis and Refugee Living Conditions
( Oslo : FAFO ), pp.
157 – 78 .
L. ( 2017 ), Lebanon
Livelihoods: Economic Opportunities and Challenges for Palestinians and Lebanese in the Shadow
of the Syrian Crisis ( Sankt Augustin :
KonradAdenauer Stiftung ).
M. ( 2018 ),
‘ Trump’s Cut to Funding for Palestinian Refugees Could Lead to
Disaster ’, Guardian , 12
01 , www
hold. ‘Never again war’ became the rallying cry for a disparate coalition of intellectuals, educators, unionists, politicians, and protestant clergy. On
the centre right, the conclusion was diﬀerent. ‘Never again alone’ was the precept
for Germany’s democratisation, rehabilitation, and reconstruction – a precept
that guided and informed the policy of the ﬁrst post-war German government,
headed by the Conservative KonradAdenauer.
Adenauer was convinced that the roots of the German disaster were to be
found in the spiritual and strategic oscillation between East and
unremitting Irish criticism of the artificial division of post-war Germany.
The anti-communist convictions of Irish society and Dublin’s aversion to relations with the Soviet Union guaranteed that Ireland instinctively fell in with
Bonn’s preferences, but there was an emerging utilitarian consideration too –
access to the West German market for agricultural products. Antipathy towards
Moscow was principally a product of the pronounced Catholicity of Irish society.
It inclined towards German Christian Democracy under the aegis of KonradAdenauer rather than the Social
as President, defeating Le Pen on second ballot by 82.2 per cent to 17.8 per
Bundestag elections, changes
of government and election of federal presidents
14 August 1949 Bundestag
election. CDU–CSU are largest party.
12 September 1949 Theodor
Heuss (FDP) elected as first federal President.
15 September 1949 KonradAdenauer
-serving chancellor, Dr KonradAdenauer, engaged in policies that went a long way to solving
traditional West European rivalries. The newly minted West Germany, with its
capital in Bonn, embraced international rehabilitation and integration into the
democratic fold. West Germany’s position as the strategic fulcrum of Cold War
Europe, its economic rebirth and the opportunities presented by West European
cooperation smoothed its relative normalisation in little more than a decade.
Adenauer consciously restrained the FRG’s freedom of action by enmeshing it
deeply in multilateral