Tentative bridge-building to China during the Johnson years
Author: Michael Lumbers

This is a comprehensive study of US policy towards China during the presidency of Lyndon Baines Johnson, a critical phase of the Cold War immediately preceding the dramatic Sino-American rapprochement of the early 1970s. Based on a wide array of recently declassified government documents, it challenges the popular view that Johnson's approach to China was marked by stagnation and sterility, exploring the administration's relationship to both the Vietnam War and the Cultural Revolution. By documenting Johnson's contributions to the decision-making process, the book offers a new perspective on both his capacity as a foreign-policy leader and his role in the further development of the Cold War.

Christopher J. Devine and Kyle C. Kopko

to happen in 1960. They presume that the presidential candidate is going to have a normal life expectancy. They don’t say, “We don’t like the presidential candidate, but we’ll vote for the vice presidential candidate.” [emphasis added]1 John F.  Kennedy’s public assessment of the vice presidential home state advantage (HSA) was, if anything, even more emphatic than the one we have presented in this book (and quite at odds with his later actions and private Did LBJ really deliver Texas and the South? 111 comments concerning the selection of Lyndon Johnson, as

in The VP Advantage
Christopher J. Devine and Kyle C. Kopko

column, not enough to decide the election (since Kennedy had a nine-vote electoral majority of 279 without Texas) but important because otherwise Nixon might have pressed vote fraud allegations in Illinois and perhaps challenged the election results. To the vice president-elect’s credit, Democrats held on to a majority of the Old Confederacy states. Lyndon Johnson had done his job: he had delivered Texas, and the South. Such is the judgment of history – as well as Johnson himself. Never one to be accused of modesty, he relayed this update to Kennedy in an election

in The VP Advantage
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Family, gender and post-colonial issues in three Vietnam War texts
Marion Gibson

here provides aversion therapy to the reader. 19 It was Lyndon Johnson who described Vietnam as ‘a member of the Free World family’ in need of rescue. 20 But the family metaphor was one shared by the Viet Cong. Vietnamese autobiographer Le Ly Hay slip quotes Viet Cong cadres’ view of the war, designed for broadcast to the peasantry: ‘A nation cannot have two governments any more than a family can have

in Gender and warfare in the twentieth century
Two firsts and the greatest?
Ben Worthy

from ‘Congress or People’, but was opposed by his bureaucracy (Schudson 2015; Archibald 1993). Politics then intervened from the other direction as Republicans took a greater interest in the issue. A young Congressman named Donald Rumsfeld became the right’s champion of FOI, co-sponsoring the Bill, and the minority leader Gerald Ford expressed support (Kennedy 1978; Lemov 2011). A series of Bills that followed were lost in the early 1960s, having been directed into committees that simply let them disappear (Archibald 1993). With Lyndon Johnson now in the White House

in The politics of freedom of information
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Why do governments pass FOI laws?
Ben Worthy

Bill through the legislature. Other influential actors have a role in not stopping a law, as veto players who do not act (Berliner 2010). Lyndon Johnson stands out as the ultimate example; his negative actions, against his own political instincts, ‘saved’ the 1966 FOI Act. Survival hinges frequently on strengthening protections for government and weakening the power and scope of the law. Recurrent bargaining takes place over executive veto powers and the strength of particular exemptions, particularly over policy-making, all the way to tailor-made exclusions of

in The politics of freedom of information
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How running mates influence home state voting in presidential elections

The perception of a vice presidential home state advantage (HSA) – i.e., the running mate’s ability to “deliver” a home state in a presidential election – is engrained in American politics. Even today, this perception is evident among journalists, campaign advisors, and presidential candidates. But does the perception match reality? This book presents a multi-method analysis of the vice presidential HSA, using aggregate- and individual-level data. The data indicate that, in general, there is no statistically significant vice presidential HSA. Rather, the advantage is highly conditional; it occurs only when the candidate has extensive political experience within a relatively less-populous state. There is no clear evidence that a vice presidential HSA has influenced the outcome of a presidential election since 1884 – including the 1960 election; Lyndon Johnson was far less popular in Texas and the South than typically assumed, and therefore unlikely to have “delivered” those states to the Democratic ticket. However, empirical evidence indicates that a running mate could, under narrow circumstances, change the outcome of an election. Specifically, Al Gore could have won the 2000 presidential election had he selected then-Governor Jeanne Shaheen as his running mate. Further analysis indicates that vice presidential candidate evaluations influence vote choice, but much less so than presidential candidate evaluations. Based on the totality of evidence, the electoral influence of vice presidential candidates, particularly in home states, is minimal. Vice presidential selection, therefore, should focus far more on an individual’s qualifications to be vice president than the candidate’s ability to “deliver” an electoral advantage.

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Michael Lumbers

primary materials, Noam Kochavi’s aptly titled A Conflict Perpetuated, the first and only fulllength account of the subject, reveals a President prone to alarmist interpretations of Beijing’s motives and hostile to policy reform. Beneath the surface, however, an agenda that foreshadowed the sweeping changes of the Nixon era was articulated by a growing chorus of US officials lobbying for a reappraisal of existing policies, particularly those efforts aimed at ostracizing the PRC.5 Lyndon Johnson’s China policy awaits a similarly comprehensive treatment. Early assessments

in Piercing the bamboo curtain
Open Access (free)
Jonathan Colman

: Macmillan, 2000 ), p. 135. 24 Saki Dockrill, ‘Forging the Anglo-American global defence partnership: Harold Wilson, Lyndon Johnson and the Washington summit, December 1964’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 23: 4 (December 2000 ), p. 107. 25 D. Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in

in A ‘special relationship’?
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French recognition and the Chinese nuclear test, 1963–64
Michael Lumbers

2 Holes in the dam French recognition and the Chinese nuclear test, 1963–64 Mounting dismay abroad over the PRC’s continued exclusion from the international community and high-level alarm over the mainland’s nuclear progress all but ensured that China would figure prominently among the several foreign policy items vying for the attention of Kennedy’s successor. Indeed, Lyndon Johnson’s first year in power coincided with a dramatic change in China’s international relationships. Both French recognition of Beijing and China’s explosion of a nuclear device exposed

in Piercing the bamboo curtain