This is a comprehensive study of US policy towards China during the presidency of Lyndon Baines Johnson, a critical phase of the Cold War immediately preceding the dramatic Sino-American rapprochement of the early 1970s. Based on a wide array of recently declassified government documents, it challenges the popular view that Johnson's approach to China was marked by stagnation and sterility, exploring the administration's relationship to both the Vietnam War and the Cultural Revolution. By documenting Johnson's contributions to the decision-making process, the book offers a new perspective on both his capacity as a foreign-policy leader and his role in the further development of the Cold War.
to happen in 1960. They presume that the presidential candidate is going to have a normal life expectancy. They don’t say, “We don’t like
the presidential candidate, but we’ll vote for the vice presidential candidate.” [emphasis
John F. Kennedy’s public assessment of the vice presidential home state
advantage (HSA) was, if anything, even more emphatic than the one we have
presented in this book (and quite at odds with his later actions and private
Did LBJ really deliver Texas and the South?
comments concerning the selection of LyndonJohnson, as
column, not enough to decide the election
(since Kennedy had a nine-vote electoral majority of 279 without Texas) but
important because otherwise Nixon might have pressed vote fraud allegations in
Illinois and perhaps challenged the election results. To the vice president-elect’s
credit, Democrats held on to a majority of the Old Confederacy states. LyndonJohnson had done his job: he had delivered Texas, and the South. Such is the
judgment of history – as well as Johnson himself. Never one to be accused of
modesty, he relayed this update to Kennedy in an election
Family, gender and post-colonial issues in three Vietnam War texts
here provides aversion therapy to the reader. 19
It was LyndonJohnson who described Vietnam as ‘a
member of the Free World family’ in need of rescue. 20 But the family
metaphor was one shared by the Viet Cong. Vietnamese autobiographer Le
Ly Hay slip quotes Viet Cong cadres’ view of the war, designed for
broadcast to the peasantry: ‘A nation cannot have two
governments any more than a family can have
from ‘Congress or People’, but was opposed by his bureaucracy
(Schudson 2015; Archibald 1993). Politics then intervened from the other direction
as Republicans took a greater interest in the issue. A young Congressman named
Donald Rumsfeld became the right’s champion of FOI, co-sponsoring the Bill, and
the minority leader Gerald Ford expressed support (Kennedy 1978; Lemov 2011).
A series of Bills that followed were lost in the early 1960s, having been directed
into committees that simply let them disappear (Archibald 1993). With LyndonJohnson now in the White House
Bill through the legislature. Other
influential actors have a role in not stopping a law, as veto players who do not act
(Berliner 2010). LyndonJohnson stands out as the ultimate example; his negative
actions, against his own political instincts, ‘saved’ the 1966 FOI Act.
Survival hinges frequently on strengthening protections for government and
weakening the power and scope of the law. Recurrent bargaining takes place over
executive veto powers and the strength of particular exemptions, particularly over
policy-making, all the way to tailor-made exclusions of
The perception of a vice presidential home state advantage (HSA) – i.e., the running mate’s ability to “deliver” a home state in a presidential election – is engrained in American politics. Even today, this perception is evident among journalists, campaign advisors, and presidential candidates. But does the perception match reality? This book presents a multi-method analysis of the vice presidential HSA, using aggregate- and individual-level data. The data indicate that, in general, there is no statistically significant vice presidential HSA. Rather, the advantage is highly conditional; it occurs only when the candidate has extensive political experience within a relatively less-populous state. There is no clear evidence that a vice presidential HSA has influenced the outcome of a presidential election since 1884 – including the 1960 election; Lyndon Johnson was far less popular in Texas and the South than typically assumed, and therefore unlikely to have “delivered” those states to the Democratic ticket. However, empirical evidence indicates that a running mate could, under narrow circumstances, change the outcome of an election. Specifically, Al Gore could have won the 2000 presidential election had he selected then-Governor Jeanne Shaheen as his running mate. Further analysis indicates that vice presidential candidate evaluations influence vote choice, but much less so than presidential candidate evaluations. Based on the totality of evidence, the electoral influence of vice presidential candidates, particularly in home states, is minimal. Vice presidential selection, therefore, should focus far more on an individual’s qualifications to be vice president than the candidate’s ability to “deliver” an electoral advantage.
primary materials, Noam
Kochavi’s aptly titled A Conflict Perpetuated, the first and only fulllength account of the subject, reveals a President prone to alarmist
interpretations of Beijing’s motives and hostile to policy reform.
Beneath the surface, however, an agenda that foreshadowed the
sweeping changes of the Nixon era was articulated by a growing
chorus of US officials lobbying for a reappraisal of existing policies,
particularly those efforts aimed at ostracizing the PRC.5
LyndonJohnson’s China policy awaits a similarly comprehensive
treatment. Early assessments
Macmillan, 2000 ), p. 135.
Saki Dockrill, ‘Forging the Anglo-American
global defence partnership: Harold Wilson, LyndonJohnson and the
Washington summit, December 1964’, Journal of Strategic
Studies, 23: 4 (December 2000 ), p. 107.
D. Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in
French recognition and the Chinese nuclear test, 1963–64
2 Holes in the dam
French recognition and the Chinese
nuclear test, 1963–64
Mounting dismay abroad over the PRC’s continued exclusion from the
international community and high-level alarm over the mainland’s
nuclear progress all but ensured that China would figure prominently
among the several foreign policy items vying for the attention of
Kennedy’s successor. Indeed, LyndonJohnson’s first year in power coincided with a dramatic change in China’s international relationships. Both
French recognition of Beijing and China’s explosion of a nuclear device