This article complicates the notion that Steven Soderbergh‘s films are simply a refashioning of familiar materials, as evidenced by his ongoing appropriation of classical Hollywood and the European art cinema. Through a close analysis of The Limey (1999), this essay argues that Soderbergh‘s film interrogates the idea of familiarity, as such, beginning with the perceptual experience that it generates for viewers. With reference to Victor Shklovsky‘s notion of defamiliarization as well as Martin Heidegger‘s formulation of temporality in Being and Time, this discussion proposes that Soderbergh‘s reiteration of the filmic past can be seen as a meaningful event for film-critical practice that sheds new light upon issues of filmic temporality and film history.
which was sung itself.2 – Martin Heidegger In the preface to Listening to the Wind, the first volume of his Connemara trilogy, Tim Robinson describes a range of sounds he associates with the landscape in that part of the world: ‘the sough (which we should not delude ourselves is a sighing) of the Ballynahinch woods, the clatter (not a chattering) of the mountain streamlets, the roar (not a raging) of the waves against the shore’ (see Figure 23).3 He goes on to discuss the ‘toneless bulk noise’ and the ‘vast, complex sounds’ characteristic of the Connemara soundscape
13 Joanna Hodge Aesthetics and politics: between Adorno and Heidegger Antinomies of reason The alignments of T. W. Adorno to the protracted, diﬃcult process of coming to terms with a broken Marxist inheritance and of Martin Heidegger to the Nazi politics of rethinking the human might seem to leave them at opposite non-communicating poles of political diﬀerence.1 Their views on aesthetics seem similarly starkly opposed, in terms both of judgements and of the place of aesthetics within the philosophical pantheon. Aesthetic theory for Adorno marks out a domain of
thinking about academic matters. Especially Krieck felt at the same time that the German university had to distance itself from the bourgeois nineteenth-century ideology connected to Humboldt’s name. No single vision of a new university has been the subject of so much scholarly discussion as the one presented by Martin Heidegger in his rector’s speech in Freiburg im Breisgau on 27 May 1933. For a long time, there was an apologetic tendency in the literature on this philosopher’s relationship to Nazism; it was seen as a temporary deviation in his biography, an expression
meaning of place-identity as interpreted from different viewpoints, including those of ordinary home-dwellers, academics, literary figures and architectural critics and theorists. The marked differences in the meanings attached to spaces and places by both inhabitants and observers lead in turn to a discussion of cultural relativism, as argued by prominent linguists and anthropologists. The early influence of Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology on the idea of place in architectural theory is also discussed, paving the way for an overview of related approaches by later
and theory. It then moves to a more detailed look at the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michael Polanyi1 on the body as the nucleus or fulcrum of human experience. Though neither author wrote directly about architecture or urban form, their work has significant implications for understanding the way people relate to their environment.2 Of the two, Merleau-Ponty is the better-known author and a philosopher in the same school of thought as Martin Heidegger, both of whom in turn acknowledge Edmund Husserl3 as the intellectual father of phenomenology. Together
it simply and neatly serve a structural function. Subjectification is political, then, but it is also many other things besides. John Simpson as Martin Heidegger This raises a difficult question about the status of the individual: how do we reconcile the fullness and seamlessness of individual experience with a phenomenology which characterises that experience as a reasonable but essentially interchangeable expression of a collective genetic template? It is easy to infer that Bourdieu is not interested in individuals, only in how collective practices of
for his sense of Bradleian eros: Pound’s logopoeia, for instance, as “the dance of the intelligence among words”, or Yeats’s antinomies: “Between extremities | Man runs his course”.5 There is also an engagement with writers peripheral to or influential on literary modernism in Hill’s later work, and on modernism in broader historical and intellectual senses: figures such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, F.H. Bradley, Walt Whitman, Gerard Manley Hopkins, Isaac Rosenberg, and even Martin Heidegger. Hill’s later work in criticism and poetry constitutes in no small part a
This chapter offers a phenomenology of the waiting body, which is also the body we are waiting for. Through an attentiveness to the body’s extremities, particularly its hands, the chapter finds a way, with Dante’s pilgrim, out of hell and into a new, if fragile, tactile resilience. Philosophers Martin Heidegger, Karmen MacKendrick and Jean-Luc Nancy add their voices, and hands, to a handful of lyric poets, including Antonia Pozzi, for whom the body is never something to be grasped, though it cannot fail to touch.
This chapter traces to what extent dialectics is an epistemological concern in Wilhelm Dilthey, E. Husserl, Georg Simmel and Max Weber. For Simmel, dialectics is a sort of methodological fragmentation, in the manner of the individual and society. By evaluating (implicitly) dialectics and (explicitly) scientific intersubjectivity, Simmel assesses the essence of his dual schema of forms and concepts, where both constitute the scientific criteria of the humanities. From a study of methodology, Dilthey proceeds to the philosophical contribution of epistemology and the epistemological contribution of philosophy to science. Philosophy and epistemology are pivotal parts of his theoretical concerns, without ever losing their conceptual equality in his work. Phenomenology's hermeneutic turn was inaugurated by Martin Heidegger. To be more precise, the hermeneutic turn that Heidegger introduced was an ontological turn of phenomenology, probably against Husserl's epistemological transcendentalism of the eidetic reduction.