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The inside history of the Treasury since 1976
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The Treasury is one of Britain’s oldest, most powerful and secretive institutions. But all too frequently it has escaped public scrutiny when it comes to investigating the ups and downs of the UK economy. More often, it is depicted as a saviour, repeatedly rescuing the nation’s finances from the hands of posturing Prime Ministers, powerful special interests, and the combustions of world financial markets. It is a bedrock of government stability in times of crisis.

However, there is another side to the story. The Exchequer, more than any other institution, has shaped modern Britain’s economic system. In between the highs there have been many lows, from botched privatizations to dubious private finance initiatives, from failing to spot the great financial crisis to contributing to ever-growing regional imbalances and economic inequalities.

Davis’s book goes behind the scenes to offer an inside history of the Treasury, in the words of the chancellors, officials and civil servants themselves. It shows the failings as well as the successes, the personalities and the thinking which have shaped Britain’s economy since the 1970s. Based on interviews with over fifty key figures from the last five decades of Treasury life, it offers a fascinating, alternative insight on how and why the UK economy came to function as it does today, and why a paradigm shift and institutional rethink is long overdue.

Abstract only
Mike Buckle
and
John Thompson

in principle and discuss whether, in fact, this role is necessary for the smooth running of such systems. This includes in section 5.2 consideration of the objectives of central banks, their role in the operation of monetary policy and their function as a lender of last resort. We then examine the part they may play in the regulation of the financial system and whether they

in The UK financial system (fifth edition)
Mike Buckle
and
John Thompson

-commercial mortgages. Shostak’s argument follows a similar line to that of Taylor, depicted in section 14.3.2 . His belief is that it was over-expansionary monetary policy which caused the crisis, so that central banks were responsible for the instability in the economy. We now turn to examine the specific causes of the recent crisis. 14.3   Causes of the global

in The UK financial system (fifth edition)
Mike Buckle
and
John Thompson

.5 and 9.6 . 9.5   The Bank of England’s money market operations From 3 April 2000 the Debt Management Office (DMO) took over the responsibility for managing government debt from the BofE. However, the BofE retained responsibility for the operation of monetary policy. In this section we consider intervention in

in The UK financial system (fifth edition)
The triumph of ideology over good sense
Tom Gallagher

2.6 per cent, was the biggest since 1993. It was no one-off. Professor Willem Buiter, Citibank’s chief economist, predicted the differential would widen to 3.4 per cent in 2014 and continue at abnormal levels through the latter part of the decade. 14 Journey towards monetary destiny For most of the existence of the European Union, the push towards integration has involved political leaders trying to achieve common ground around a uniform monetary policy for Europe. The catalyst had been the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates based on

in Europe’s path to crisis
João Labareda

transactional and structural arrangements are fair. As we shall see in the next section, realizing reciprocity requires different types of distributive instruments for each of these levels – labour law and economic/monetary policy, respectively. This suggests that, when discussing ways to realize reciprocity, it is better to think in terms of states and international/supranational organizations than in terms of individuals or firms. In fact, if the altruism of human beings is, indeed, limited, one should not expect reciprocity to emerge voluntarily; coercive policy

in Towards a just Europe
Tom Gallagher

Common Foreign and Security Policy was unfurled. Every state except Britain acknowledged that it would abide by common Community standards in the field of social policy. Cooperation was institutionalised in sensitive policy areas like justice, policing and immigration. Perhaps the key departure was that, under Maastricht, every member state, except Britain and Denmark, in principle relinquished its long-term right to make its own monetary policy. 80 It was agreed to create a European Central Bank to take the lead in managing a new single currency that would replace

in Europe’s path to crisis
Uwe Puetter

and economic considerations, on the one hand, and a historical-descriptive perspective on the other, this chapter argues that the Eurogroup is both the product of political compromise and an innovative attempt to establish a new working method for enhanced policy coordination in Stage 3. EMU’s institutional architecture was set up with the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on economic and monetary policy. These provisions defined the legal and technical coordinates within which European governments were preparing their countries for the final phase of the EMU

in The Eurogroup
Open Access (free)
The evolving international financial architecture
Shalendra D. Sharma

differentials created by the swap limits. The flow of ringgit funds offshore led to further increases in domestic rates, accelerating the economic contraction (some 5 per cent in the first half of 1998), and exacerbating the difficulties in the corporate and banking sectors.31 303 The Asian financial crisis Malaysia’s initial response to the crisis was to mimic faithfully the IMF prescription of tight fiscal and monetary policies – referred to as a case of “virtual IMF policy without the IMF loans” (Jomo 2001a, xl). Interest rates were raised (from 6 per cent in June 1997 to 35

in The Asian financial crisis
Harry Blutstein

point represented an important victory in the ‘war of ideas’, which neoliberals had been waging against Keynesian economic planning since the 1930s, spreading from academe to the political and business elites. Attacks on Bretton Woods from free market zealots undoubtedly accelerated its descent, but it was already in trouble, burdened by its inherent flaws. The Bretton Woods monetary policies were run by the IMF, largely as a technical operation. According to Robert Leeson, an associate professor in economics at Murdoch University, hubris infected the technocrats who

in The ascent of globalisation