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Chapter 6 Britain, Germany and the Non-Proliferation Treaty T hroughout the period from 1964 to 1970, an international agreement on measures that would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, not least into the hands of Germany, was a prime foreign policy objective of the Labour governments. In this context, it is significant that the day before Harold Wilson entered Downing Street as the newly elected Prime Minister, the Chinese had detonated their first nuclear weapon, a development that would be bound to cause regional anxieties, and might provoke
5 United States policy on nonproliferation and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty The history of the attitude of the United States towards the spread of nuclear weapons has been one of continuous opposition, tempered now and then by the judgement of the government of the day as to whether in particular instances the exigencies of the moment outweighed the force of the general principle. From Baruch to Eisenhower The starting point or the rough first draft for the US policy of hostility towards the spread of nuclear weapons is the Baruch Plan, presented in 1946
For decades, nuclear weapons have been portrayed as essential to the security of the few states that possess them, and as a very ‘normal’ part of national and international security. These states have engaged in enormous programmes of acquisition and development, have disregarded the humanitarian implications of these weapons, and sought to persuade their publics that national security was dependent on the promise of killing hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of civilians. The term ‘nuclearism’ has been used to describe this era, and several elements of nuclearism are explored here to identify how these states have been able to sustain their possession of nuclear arsenals. By perpetuating a discourse of ‘security’ which avoided international humanitarian law, by limiting decisions on nuclear policy to small groups of elites, by investing vast amounts of resources in their nuclear programs, and by using the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to perpetuate their privileged status as nuclear states, despite their promises to disarm, the great powers have been able to sustain a highly unequal – and dangerous – global nuclear order. This order is now under challenge, as the Humanitarian Initiative explored the implications of nuclear weapons’ use. Its sobering findings led non-nuclear states, supported by civil society actors, to create the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, making these weapons illegal, for all states. The Humanitarian Initiative has posed a challenge to all the elements of nuclearism, and has resulted in a significant rejection of the existing nuclear order. The treaty will not result in quick disarmament, and it faces several hurdles. It is, however, a notable achievement, delegitimizing nuclear weapons, and contributing to the goal of a nuclear-free world.
-language statement will usually be sufficient to allow a reader in a hurry in good conscience to take the theoretical adjunct on trust. One thing each chapter has in common is a reference, often lengthy, to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the chief global political instrument operating to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons, first opened for signature in 1968 and to which every member state of the United Nations (UN) is party, bar India, Israel and Pakistan. Thus, in the first chapter, the NPT appears in the context of the uptake of nuclear energy for commercial
Weapons. The fifth broad element supporting nuclearism detailed in Chapter 1 of this book was the domination of the global nuclear weapons debate and the construction of a global nuclear order by the P5 nuclear weapon states, who have exploited the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to produce outcomes favourable to themselves. This powerful element is now far less secure than it
weapons almost beyond question, and which has created patterns of government spending more or less impervious to change. The fifth element identified here is the way in which the P5 nuclear states have used the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its associated non-proliferation regime to ensure that the global nuclear order remains essentially static, always favouring themselves, the
countries concerned. Reliable data on defence expenditure show that in 2002 North Korea was spending 25 per cent of its gross domestic product on defence and South Korea 2.8 per cent (the global average for the year, or the NATO average, which is much the same thing, was 2.6 per cent).21 In 1992 the North Korean effort was slightly less and that of the South somewhat greater. End-point A successful nuclear non-proliferation treaty ought to resemble a successful nuclear-free zone, writ large. Certainly there is no problem concerning the identity of the reach of the NPT and
This book provides an introduction to the technical aspects of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. It considers nuclear weapons from varying perspectives, including the technology perspective, which views them as spillovers from nuclear energy programmes; and the theoretical perspective, which looks at the collision between national and international security involved in nuclear proliferation. The book aims to demonstrate that international security is unlikely to benefit from encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons except in situations where the security complex is already largely nuclearised. The political constraints on nuclear spread as solutions to the security dilemma are also examined in three linked categories, including a discussion of the phenomenon of nuclear-free zones, with particular emphasis on the zone covering Latin America. The remarkably consistent anti-proliferation policies of the United States are debated, and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty itself, with special attention paid to the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system, is frankly appraised.
The earliest specific international arrangement, at least indirectly, to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons is the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The negotiation of the treaty—originally designed to be a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing—began essentially in 1955, when the Soviet Union unbundled such an agreement from a general and complete disarmament package, starting thereby an unpicking of the all-or-nothing position on nuclear arms control and disarmament they had taken over the Baruch Plan, vestiges of which remain in the wording of Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Bargaining theory has something to add to the understanding of arms control. To take the bargain between the superpowers first, the surplus to be created was a slowing down of the arms race between them. This chapter explores bargaining for test ban treaties and discusses the Threshold Test Ban Treaty signed by the United States and USSR. It also looks at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Nuclear energy has peaceful applications and non-peaceful applications. The centrepiece of all political efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons lies in attempting to harmonise the proliferation of nuclear reactors with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. What all nuclear reactors have in common is nuclear fuel, which must contain at least some uranium in the form of the isotope uranium-235 (or very much more rarely 233), or plutonium, or both. This is usually described as ‘fissile material’. This chapter is about nuclear technology and the technical interconnections between commercial and military nuclear programmes. It also discusses the spread of nuclear technology and the use to which it has been put by a number of states, both inside and outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, to bring them close to or even take them over the nuclear weapons threshold. Moreover, the chapter provides an overview on critical mass and nuclear bombs, the differences between the United States and its natural allies over nuclear proliferation, radioactive waste and nuclear accidents and uranium enrichment.