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How inclusive are the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU)? The enlargement of both organisations seems to give some substance to the vision of a ‘Europe whole and free’ articulated at the Cold War's end. Yet more recently, enlargement's limits have increasingly come to be recognised, bringing an important debate on the balance to be struck between inclusion and exclusion. This book examines that sometimes awkward balance. Its analytical starting point is the characterisation of much of Europe as a security community managed by a system of security governance. The boundary of this system is neither clear nor fixed, but a dynamic of inclusion and exclusion can be said to exist by reference to its most concrete expression—that of institutional enlargement. On this basis, the book offers an elaboration of the concept of security governance itself, complemented by a historical survey of the Cold War and its end, the post-Cold War development of NATO and the EU, and case studies of two important ‘excluded’ states: Russia and Turkey.
This book analyses the MH17 catastrophe as a prism that refracts the broader historical context in which it occurred, arraying its distinct strands and their interrelations in a rare moment of clarity. It argues that in the new Cold War with Putin's Russia, the West operates from a perspective inspired by the mentality of extreme risk-taking that stems from the dominant role of finance in contemporary capitalism. The book also argues that the dividing lines established by the enlargement of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in 1922 and the addition of Crimea to it in 1954, remained operational after independence. The armed seizure of power on 22 February 2014 occurred on the back of the demonstrations and put state power in the hands of Ukrainian ultra-nationalists and actual fascists. Based on the unpublished government and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) documents, the book offers an analysis of global political economy and contemporary debates about Russia and East-West relations. It reviews the results of the official investigations into the MH17 disaster, which Ukraine delegated to the Netherlands. Both were profoundly compromised by granting the coup government in Kiev a veto over any outcomes, a novelty in the history of aviation disaster investigation that was considered shameful even in Ukraine. The book investigates how the coup regime, encouraged by its backers in Washington and Brussels, responded to the anti-Maidan movement among Russian-Ukrainians with extreme violence.
Eurasian security governance has received increasing attention since 1989. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the institution that best served the security interests of the West in its competition with the Soviet Union, is now relatively ill-equipped resolve the threats emanating from Eurasia to the Atlantic system of security governance. This book investigates the important role played by identity politics in the shaping of the Eurasian security environment. It investigates both the state in post-Soviet Eurasia as the primary site of institutionalisation and the state's concerted international action in the sphere of security. This investigation requires a major caveat: state-centric approaches to security impose analytical costs by obscuring substate and transnational actors and processes. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon marked the maturation of what had been described as the 'new terrorism'. Jervis has argued that the western system of security governance produced a security community that was contingent upon five necessary and sufficient conditions. The United States has made an effort to integrate China, Russia into the Atlantic security system via the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation has become engaged in disseminating security concerns in fields such as environment, energy and economy. If the end of the Cold War left America triumphant, Russia's new geopolitical hand seemed a terrible demotion. Successfully rebalancing the West and building a collaborative system with Russia, China, Europe and America probably requires more wisdom and skill from the world's leaders.
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on 22 April 1999, in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bulletin , no. 19, 23 April 1999, p. 193. 80 ‘The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept’, agreed at the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7–8 November 1991, section 15, available online: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c911107a
and difficult period in our history.’1 What Palliser had in mind in referring to a transition was the intention of the British government to withdraw its armed forces from east of Suez, and henceforth to concentrate Britain’s defence priorities on Europe, and to seek once again membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). Whilst Britain’s relationship with the United States would continue to be important and the United States’ involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) would remain central to Britain’s security strategy, Europe would
Russia in terms of business, but also in sensitive areas including in the military and intelligence domains. Another interpretation draws attention to the persistent friction between the West, particularly in its institutional forms such as the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Russia, whether over questions of wider Euro-Atlantic security, such as that caused by the
. 35 Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (19–20 November 2010), www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm . A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy , Brussels (12 December 2003), www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
, rather, is to examine and assess the impact of the Kosovo crisis on the continuing evolution and development of key issues relating to post-Cold War European security overall. In measuring this impact the discussions begin, logically, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This was the chosen instrument through which its member states sought to achieve their objective of compelling the government of President
, from the inter-war period, to be one of ideological division and confrontation – no longer mainly between fascism and communism, but between communism on the one hand, and capitalism and democracy on the other. The United States’ creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949 together with eleven West European countries merely confirmed the American commitment to the old continent as manifested through the Marshall Plan. Based on the Washington agreement, NATO committed the participating countries to consider ‘an attack on one of them as an attack
, paragraph 3 at: www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9502.htm [5 January 2006]. 62 Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications (released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, US Department of State, 24