The West of which we speak is defined by the values of liberal democracy,
individual freedom, human rights, tolerance and equality under the rule of law.
This book explores how Islamist terror and Russian aggression as companion
threats to the West when terrorists target Russia as well as the United States
and its allies. The threats posed by Islamist terror and Russian aggression
present themselves in very different ways. In the time of transatlantic traumas,
the Islamist terrorist threat and the Russian threat have worked diligently and
with some success. The book examines the hatred of Islamists towards Western
democracies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union for
their involvement in the Middle East politics for several decades. There is no
single explanation for the rising popularity of illiberalism in the Western
democracies; a combination of factors has produced a general sense of malaise.
The book discusses the sources of discontent prevailing in the Western
countries, and looks at the rise of Trumpism, Turkey and its Western values as
well as the domestic tensions between Turkey's political parties. It
suggests a radical centrist populist Western strategy could be applied to deal
with the threats and challenges, reinvigorating the Western system. The book
also touches upon suggestions relating to illiberalism in Europe, Turkey's
drift away from the West, and the Brexit referendum.
This book blends analysis of Eastern European security needs, foreign threats, domestic political events, and public opinion, in theoretical ways to understand how they lead to future defense postures and commitments for each country in the region. How has NATO and EU membership improved their overall regional defense protection, and what ingredients are still missing for them on an individual state basis? Separate chapters treat clusters of states that make up the various regions of Eastern Europe. For example, the three threatened Baltic states in the north will receive careful analysis. Second, the complex array of states in the Balkan area of Southeastern Europe merit examination, for their security conditions have been quite varied and diverse. For some, NATO and EU membership has become a reality, and for others that possibility does not yet exist. Third, three of the four geographically central states were the ones that first gained full membership in NATO at the earliest possible moment in 1999. At present, Poland in the north has perceived clear threats from Russia since 2014, while the three other East-Central European states possess greater sense of security.
Origins of the NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1981), 119.
For a discussion of the concerns raised by senators and administration efforts to deal with those concerns, see Phil Williams, The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe (London: Macmillan, 1985), 12–27.
Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The United States and NATO: The Relevance of History,” in NATO After Fifty Years , ed. S. Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay, and Mark R. Rubin (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2001), 246.
Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance
consistent political ideology. Historically, Trump has bounced back and forth between declared affinity for the Democratic and Republican parties.
We will not look here for an ideological or even policy-based explanation for Donald Trump’s approach to the NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization and its members, or to Western values in general. Rather, this chapter traces the evolution of Trump’s approach from his candidacy for the Republican nomination, to the election campaign, and finally during his first year as president.
Before surveying the
In the time of transatlantic traumas, the Islamist terrorist threat and the
Russian threat have worked diligently and with some success. This chapter
analyses how did these threats develop. It provides the answers for the
hatred of Islamists towards Western democracies, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) for their involvement in the
Middle East politics for several decades. The chapter also looks into the
internal divisions in Islam, the Sunni and Shia factions, and the conflicts
between them which has given rise to turmoil in the Middle East and fleeing
of refugees to other countries. It examines the NATO and EU responses to the
refugees problem and explains that the Islamist and Russian threats converge
in Syria, which had been a Soviet ally since 1956.
In Europe's security discourse, 'Kosovo' tends to allegorise the Balkanisation of Europe, the ultimate metaphor of chaos and disintegration which supposedly is the antithesis of the real Europe of peace and stability. The challenge for the EU has been to prevent a slow drift from a postmodern politics of family resemblance to a narcissistic policy of passive self-absorption and epistemic closure. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) air campaign has legitimised not only new European order (NEO) realism: it has made another step in legitimising the structure of meaning that circulates in the very debate on 'European security'. The discourse of 'European security' produces a parallel paradigm of European sovereignty, a paradigm that faces serious challenges of local resistance (of the still-resilient state), as well as external opposition.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) bombing campaign in Kosovo and the refusal of most Western leaders to regard it as war have prompted numerous questions about the nature of this episode in European history. The debate on 'Kosovo' indicates that there is considerable uncertainty about war as a concept. A serious critique on the concept of war has surfaced, and alternative articulations are frequently explored. A broad sphere of non-war has emerged. Within a new constellation, war remains first and foremost a memory from the past. There is the sphere of classic war, which remains based on the modern story of states, sovereignty and territoriality. In Kosovo, war has transcended its modern meaning without becoming an integral part of the new and incoming, and without altogether leaving behind the old ideas of war.
John Hutnyk argues that travel both embraces and constitutes a multitude of technologies that are deployed to make sense of the experiences that are the central purpose of travelling. The technology of the gaze allows for both the representation and the disciplining of the object of study, which is presented as lacking the agency required to articulate alternative, contradictory representations. The similarity between fieldwork and tourism is perhaps most significant in the case of 'independent' or 'adventure' tourists. Adventure tourists are also eager to get to Afghanistan. 'The main reason to go is the bragging rights', says one traveller. 'Mostly it's just cool to be in a place called "Kandahar". In Canada, the Department of National Defence's (DND) Security and Defence Forum offers annual 'field excursions' to sites of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) occupation. Tourism invokes the desire for difference because tourism is a quest for the extraordinary.
The first chancellor of the Federal Republic of German (FRG), Konrad Adenauer, inherited an occupied and provisional state that was mistrusted by its neighbours because of its recent history and its strategic weight. Adenauer's claims that Westpolitik was in the best interests of the German people. It secured democracy, human values, a thriving economy and international normalisation. In 1962 Hans von Herwarth, the state secretary in the office of the federal president, informed the Irish ambassador that he considered that religious differences underlay partition and the difficulties in Anglo-Irish relations. The Irish members interpreted the efforts at a common foreign policy within the Council of Europe as a means to extend and implement North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) policy. Between 1956 and 1959, Dr Felician Prill looked for signs of an emerging Irish awareness of the repercussions of the prolonged discussions about the economic reorganisation of Western Europe.
Chapter 8, by Katja Biedenkopf and Alexander Mattelaer, covers policy
diffusion. It argues that the analytical lens of interdependent policy
decisions and mutual influence among foreign policy-makers can add a useful
angle to FPA. More specifically, the focus of this chapter is on policy
diffusion and transfer as independent variables in the analysis of foreign
policy choices. The chapter starts with outlining policy diffusion and
transfer as public policy approaches and then has a section that proposes
how these two concepts could enrich FPA. The fourth section illustrates the
application of a policy diffusion lens to foreign policy decisions, namely
the case of planning doctrine for military crisis response operations. It
explores the historical origins of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
operational planning doctrine and how it has diffused to other international
organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN).
The concluding section provides some reflections on the contribution and
limitations of integrating policy diffusion and transfer into FPA.