Language, politics and counter-terrorism
Author: Richard Jackson

This book is about the public language of the 'war on terrorism' and the way in which language has been deployed to justify and normalise a global campaign of counter-terrorism. It explains how the war on terrorism has been reproduced and amplified by key social actors and how it has become the dominant political narrative in America today, enjoying widespread bipartisan and popular support. The book also explains why the language of politics is so important and the main methodological approach for analysing the language of counter-terrorism, namely, critical discourse analysis. Then, it provides the comparison drawn between the September 11, 2001 attacks and World War II and the attack on Pearl Harbor. One of the most noticeable aspects of the language surrounding the attacks of September 11, 2001 is its constant reference to tragedy, grievance and the exceptional suffering of the American people. The book focuses on the way in which language was deployed to construct the main identities of the protagonists. It demonstrates how terrorism is rhetorically constructed as posing a catastrophic threat to the American 'way of life', to freedom, liberty and democracy and even to civilisation itself. The book analyses how the administration's counter-terrorism campaign has been rhetorically constructed as an essentially 'good' and 'just war', similar to America's role in World War II. Finally, the book concludes that responsible citizens have a moral duty to oppose and resist the official language of counter-terrorism.

Richard Jackson

allow them to fit into a number of pre-existing and highly popular meta-narratives: World War II (the Pearl Harbor analogy), the cold war, the struggle of civilisation against barbarism and the globalisation narrative. These fashionable political and cultural narratives assign particular meanings to the events and provide a very specific kind of contextual framework for their interpretation. Finally, I will briefly

in Writing the war on terrorism
Contemporary naval films
Jonathan Rayner

Lines (John Moore, 2001) ), the Middle East (Three Kings (David O. Russell, 1999) ) and Africa (Black Hawk Down (Ridley Scott, 2001) ) have appeared alongside new films about the Vietnam War (We Were Soldiers (Randall Wallace, 2003) ) and four major releases depicting aspects of World War II (Saving Private Ryan (Steven Spielberg, 1998), The Thin Red Line (Terence Malick, 1998), U-571 (Jonathan Mostow, 2000), Pearl Harbor (Michael Bay, 2001) ). Between the first and second Gulf Wars, the reappearance of World War TNWC07 16/11/06 11:26 AM Page 174 174 Contemporary

in The naval war film
Open Access (free)
An endangered legacy
Matteo Dian

partner and active promoter of a trans-Pacific, free market-oriented, form of regional economic order. Abe embraced this twin role, considering it essential both to the Japanese economic revival and achievement of the status of “first tier nation” in Asia and beyond. 27 Hiroshima, Pearl Harbor and the “end of the post war” The final months of the Obama administration were defined by the president’s will to leave a meaningful legacy in the realm of historical reconciliation with Japan, embodied by his visits to Hiroshima and by Abe’s visit to Pearl Harbor in 2016

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Jonathan Rayner

history (of a disastrous event dramatised as often as the sinking of the Titanic) is matched by an equally even-handed approach to the crucial (and in Japanese terms, disastrous) encounter in Battle of Midway (Jack Smight, 1976). Both films climax with extensive scenes of devastation, as the undefended Pacific fleet base at Pearl Harbor is attacked pre-emptively by Japanese carrier planes, and the Japanese fleet is caught and destroyed by US Navy aircraft. The films’ resemblance to the disaster genre is heightened by these anticipated and doom-laden spectacles, but is

in The naval war film
Jonathan Rayner

TNWC03 16/11/06 11:27 AM Page 80 3 Hollywood and the one-ocean war The contribution of the American film industry to the war effort can be divided chronologically between preparatory propagandist films made before the attack on Pearl Harbor, and combat films made after it, and formally between non-fiction (newsreels, documentary and instructional films) and feature film productions. As in Britain, a convoluted relationship between the propaganda arm of government and the filmmaking establishment was wrought to mobilise and exploit the entertainment industry

in The naval war film
Abstract only
The US Army and internal security in the Pacific, 1902–1940
Brian McAllister Linn

serious local resistance, the early army defence boards focused on external defence, which was envisioned largely as protecting Oahu’s harbours from capture by enemy raiders. Following the recommendations of the island’s first fortification board in 1901, officers agreed ‘it is of vital importance’ that the fleet anchorage at Pearl Harbor ‘be so strongly fortified that an enemy could not attack it with

in Guardians of empire
Andrew Williams

-war settlement, 1939: Pearl Harbor It was perfectly clear to all sections of American opinion in the late 1930s that Europe, and very probably Japan, was heading for another war. The question was whether the United States should get involved in it. A powerful section of this opinion opted for a strict neutrality in an American hemisphere sheltered by the Monroe Doctrine and that of ‘no entangling alliances’. Many other Americans knew that this could not be a permanent solution if there was a National Socialist takeover in Europe, but did not wish to become directly involved

in Failed imagination?
Jonathan Rayner

calculated breach of treaties and international law at Pearl Harbor [sic], had absolved the United States from observing any rule restricting methods of naval warfare . . . After 7 December 1941 combatant ships were still considered prime targets, but the employment of submarines to lance the arteries of enemy trade now became of major importance.5 TNWC04 16/11/06 11:27 AM Page 104 104 The submarine war and the submarine film American submarines could not be shown to espouse the same tactics, to the same ends, as those employed by the vilified U-boats in the

in The naval war film
Andrew Whiting

as serious as some of those confronted in the Second World War’ ( Bitdefender, 2012a ). Kevin Haley, of Symantec, even quotes Winston Churchill’s famous ‘end of the beginning’ speech, a speech that he feels is ‘quite appropriate’ in light of the Flame malware ( Haley, 2012a ). An ESET article on cybersecurity legislation references an event that is more prominent in American memories of the Second World War, arguing that we must be proactive in the face of cyber-threats and cannot simply sit around and ‘wait for a cyber Pearl Harbor’ ( ESET Research, 2010b ). The

in Constructing cybersecurity