This book provides the first comprehensive analysis of Japan’s new security
partnerships with Australia, India, countries and multilateral security
structure in East Asia, as well as with the EU and some of its member
Most books on Japanese bilateral relations focus exclusively on the Japanese perspective, the debate in Japan, positions of Japanese government leaders and parties, or the public discourse. This edited volume is organized in pairs of chapters, one each analysing the motivations and objectives of Japan, and a second analysing those of each of the most important new security partners.
After solely relying on the United States for its national security needs during the Cold War, since the end of the Cold War, Japan has begun to deepen its bilateral security ties. Since the mid-2000s under LDP and DPJ administrations, bilateral security partnerships accelerated and today go beyond non-traditional security issue are as and extend far into traditional security and military affairs, including the exchange and joint acquisition of military hardware, military exercises, and capacity building. It is argued, that these developments will have implications for the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific.
This book is a primer for those interested in Japan’s security policy beyond the US-Japan security alliance, non-American centred bilateral and multilateral security cooperation through the eyes of Japanese as well as partner country perspectives. It is also an ideal as a course reading for graduate courses on regional security cooperation and strategic partnerships, and Japanese foreign and security policy.
(Baviera, 2016: 204–205). Puzzled by the changes in Philippine foreign policy, the Japanese government decided to persevere with its nuanced or unique approach in dealing with the Philippines. A senior Japanese official admitted that while Tokyo and Washington share the same goal in the Philippines, Japan takes a different approach in its relations with the Philippines, as there are some things that Manila can only accept when Japan provides them ( Wanklyn and Mie, 2016 : 1). Unlike the US, which has been taken aback by President Duterte’s anti-American pronouncements
, 2003: 171). While many observers argued that ASEAN was primarily concerned about China’s reaction (Green, 2003: 171; Tanaka, 2000 : 282–284), a more accurate characterisation would be that ASEAN was no longer interested in having a special relationship with Japan that was closer than its relationship with China. Indeed, ASEAN members have always been leery about having anything other than an equidistant relationship with the great powers. According to a senior Philippine foreign policy intellectual, ASEAN wants ‘an equidistant relationship with all the big powers