This book explores how a candidate who broke with almost every single norm governing candidate behaviour, appeared to eschew the professionalised forms of campaigning, and who had been more or less disowned by Republican elites, prove victorious? The focus is on Trump and his campaign; the account does not go beyond the November election and its immediate aftermath. The book argues that the Trump campaign, like earlier populist insurgencies, can be explained in part by considering some defining features of US political culture and, in particular, attitudes towards government. It explains the right-wing populism that has been a recurrent and ingrained feature of the political process over a long period. The book discusses structural characteristics of the American state that appear to be of particular significance in shaping attitudes, as well as some other ideas and frames brought to the forefront by the Trump campaign during the course of 2015 and 2016. It also considers the shifts and swings amongst voters and suggests that these, alongside ideas about the state and the 'entrepreneurial' efforts of the campaign, form part of the explanation for Trump's eventual victory. The book assesses Trump's ascendancy as a function of, and reaction to, the strategies and discourses pursued in the years preceding 2016 by Republican Party elites. 'Trumpism' and European forms of populism are still in some ways weakly embedded but they may intensify the battles and processes of group competition between different constituencies.
another line of explanation. It assesses Trump's ascendancy as a function of, and reaction to, the strategies and discourses pursued in the years preceding 2016 by Republican Party elites. Arguably, Trump's victory was the product of a chain reaction. In other words, it may be that Republican elites, through the discourses that they adopted in pursuit of given electoral logics , set off particular sets of reactive sequences that culminated, over time, in the emergence of the Trump campaign. The concept of reactive sequences is a form of path dependence. Nonetheless
regional elites. Russia’s ‘federation’ without ‘federalism’ has simply allowed the authoritarianism of the centre to be replaced by local level authoritarianism. As we discussed in chapter 3 regional and republican elites have been able to adopt constitutions/charters and other laws which violate the federal constitution. And a number of the bilateral treaties signed between Moscow and the regions have sanctioned the transfer of unconstitutional rights and powers to the republics.1 Thus, authoritarian leaders have been able to use the federal system as a protective
did a candidate who broke with almost every single norm governing candidate behaviour, appeared to eschew the professionalised forms of campaigning that have been adopted in recent years, and who had been more or less disowned by Republican elites, prove victorious? This book seeks to answer that question. It argues that the Trump campaign, like earlier populist insurgencies, can be explained in part by considering some defining features of US political culture and, in particular, attitudes towards government. Having said that, ‘culture’ is a term that must
’. These were exposed in their most visible form during efforts by Tea Partiers to dislodge Republican incumbents, most notably the defeat of House Majority Leader Eric Cantor in June 2014. Having said that, the term ‘establishment’ (which was popularized by the movement and figures such as former Alaska governor, Sarah Palin) should be used with caution. There are certainly Republican elites. Some are based in particular institutional locations, most notably Congress or the different state legislatures. Others control funding or the campaigning and mobilizing resources
republicanism. They testify that, by 1875, the republican elite spanned the political, cultural and professional domains of French society: tout Paris was becoming republican. Twenty-four republican Deputies and five members of municipal or general councils were among the signatories. The presence of nine doctors (including society doctor Samuel Pozzi and the bridegroom’s colleague Paul Broca
By expanding the geographical scope of the history of violence and war, this volume challenges both Western and state-centric narratives of the decline of violence and its relationship to modernity. It highlights instead similarities across early modernity in terms of representations, legitimations, applications of, and motivations for violence. It seeks to integrate methodologies of the study of violence into the history of war, thereby extending the historical significance of both fields of research. Thirteen case studies outline the myriad ways in which large-scale violence was understood and used by states and non-state actors throughout the early modern period across Africa, Asia, the Americas, the Atlantic, and Europe, demonstrating that it was far more complex than would be suggested by simple narratives of conquest and resistance. Moreover, key features of imperial violence apply equally to large-scale violence within societies. As the authors argue, violence was a continuum, ranging from small-scale, local actions to full-blown war. The latter was privileged legally and increasingly associated with states during early modernity, but its legitimacy was frequently contested and many of its violent forms, such as raiding and destruction of buildings and crops, could be found in activities not officially classed as war.
Republican elites what they want to hear? If this is the case, then it would mean that these intellectuals correspond to the Gramscian notion of intellectuals who reproduce cultural hegemony, since they seem to operate within a broader narrative of consensus: consensus about the desirability of laïcité, universalism and the legacy of the Enlightenment. However, as Chantal Mouffe (2013) argues, the danger in consensus is that it can produce a sort of ‘post-politics’ or ‘post-democracy’ whereby the absence of ‘agonistic’ or positive conflict between different sections of
Republican elites generally kept Trump at arm's length. Nonetheless, as early voting took place and the election drew near many Republican and Republican-leaning voters clearly decided that, whatever their reservations, criticisms and dislike of Trump they would back him. They may well have been heavily represented among the large numbers (13 per cent) who were late deciders and only came to a conclusion in the final week before Election Day. In the end 90 per cent of voters defining themselves as Republican voted for Trump (fractionally higher than the proportion of
, through a process of exclusionary nation-building. The Irishness invoked by Mansergh is grounded in a republicanism which claims a moral authority to act on behalf of the ‘Irish people’. This can be distinguished from another nationalist tradition of pragmatic, democratic parlimentarianism where, as put by Garvin, ‘the players are the flesh and blood “people of Ireland” rather than the “mystical Irish People”’.16 Rouseau’s distinction between the general will (interpreted by the republican elite) and the ‘will of all’ (determined by a counting of heads) perhaps applies