This book provides the first comprehensive analysis of Japan’s new security
partnerships with Australia, India, countries and multilateral security
structure in East Asia, as well as with the EU and some of its member
states. Most books on Japanese bilateral relations focus exclusively on the
Japanese perspective, the debate in Japan, positions of Japanese government
leaders and parties, or the public discourse. This edited volume is organized in
pairs of chapters, one each analysing the motivations and objectives of Japan,
and a second analysing those of each of the most important new security
partners. After solely relying on the United States for its national
security needs during the Cold War, since the end of the Cold War, Japan has
begun to deepen its bilateral security ties. Since the mid-2000s under LDP and
DPJ administrations, bilateral security partnerships accelerated and today go
beyond non-traditional security issue are as and extend far into traditional
security and military affairs, including the exchange and joint acquisition of
military hardware, military exercises, and capacity building. It is argued, that
these developments will have implications for the security architecture in the
Asia-Pacific. This book is a primer for those interested in Japan’s security
policy beyond the US-Japan security alliance, non-American centred bilateral and
multilateral security cooperation through the eyes of Japanese as well as
partner country perspectives. It is also an ideal as a course reading for
graduate courses on regional security cooperation and strategic partnerships,
and Japanese foreign and security policy.
English nationalism, Brexit and the Anglosphere is the first sustained research that examines the inter-relationships between English nationalism, Brexit and the Anglosphere. Much initial analysis of Brexit concentrated on the revolt of those ‘left behind’ by globalisation. English nationalism, Brexit and the Anglosphere analyses the elite project behind Brexit. This project was framed within the political traditions of an expansive English nationalism. Far from being parochial ‘Little Englanders’, elite Brexiteers sought to lessen the rupture of leaving the European Union by suggesting a return to trade and security alliances with ‘true friends’ and ‘traditional allies’ in the Anglosphere. Brexit was thus reassuringly presented as a giant leap into the known. Legitimising this far-reaching change in British and European politics required the re-articulation of a globally oriented Englishness. This politicised Englishness was underpinned by arguments about the United Kingdom’s imperial past and its global future advanced as a critique of its European present. When framing the UK’s EU membership as a European interregnum followed by a global restoration, Brexiteers both invoked and occluded England by asserting the wider categories of belonging that inform contemporary English nationalism.
Identity is often regarded as something that is possessed by individuals, states, and other agents. In this edited collection, identity is explored across a range of approaches and under-explored case studies with a view to making visible its fractured, contingent, and dynamic features. The book brings together themes of belonging and exclusion, identity formation and fragmentation. It also examines how identity functions in discourse, and the effects it produces, both materially and in ideational terms. Taking in case studies from Asia-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America, the various chapters interrogate identity through formal governing mechanisms, popular culture and place. These studies demonstrate the complex and fluid nature of identity and identity practices, as well as implications for theorising identity.
The election of Barack Obama was a milestone in US history with tremendous symbolic importance for the black community. But was this symbolism backed up by substance? Did ordinary black people really benefit under the first black president? This is the question that Andra Gillespie sets out to answer in Race and the Obama Administration. Using a variety of methodological techniques—from content analysis of executive orders to comparisons of key indicators, such as homeownership and employment rates under Clinton, Bush, and Obama— the book charts the progress of black causes and provides valuable perspective on the limitations of presidential power in addressing issues of racial inequality. Gillespie uses public opinion data to investigate the purported disconnect between Obama’s performance and his consistently high ratings among black voters, asking how far the symbolic power of the first black family in the White House was able to compensate for the compromises of political office. Scholarly but accessible, Race and the Obama Administration will be of interest to students and lecturers in US politics and race studies, as well as to general readers who want to better understand the situation of the black community in the US today and the prospects for its improvement.
to Australia’s securityalliances. Prime Minister
John Howard was the exemplar in this regard. Shortly after the Howardled Liberal–National Coalition came to power in 1996, the government
announced a departure from the foreign policy priorities of its predecessor,
advocating an international agenda informed by a ‘hard-headed pursuit of the
national interest’ (DFAT 1997). This realist, state-centric approach to foreign
affairs that characterised Howard’s eleven years in office resulted in discernible ambivalence toward regional relations, renewed focus on security
its sovereignty. With US support it also experienced rapid economic growth for much of the Cold War and entered a close securityalliance with Washington in which it remains a willing participant today. Elsewhere, of course, US authority has been comparatively absent, more typically within continental than maritime Asia.
What more meaningfully binds the encounters of the multitudinous actors of Asia and the Pacific with the regional American presence is the United States’ centuries-long project of what is termed here imperial hegemony. As will be shown, this
Diplomacy, cross-border patronage, and the negotiation of subsidy
alliances in the north-western part of the Holy Roman Empire (late seventeenth
engaging in treaties
with foreign powers continued to regard the empire and its various
internal securityalliances – which could include foreign allies and
their subsidies – as a central point of reference.8
The present chapter focuses on the practices of diplomacy and
various cross-border negotiations concerning the formation of foreign
subsidy alliances on various levels in the north-western periphery
of the Holy Roman Empire in the first decades after the Peace of
Westphalia. This field of inquiry is explored in three case studies:
first, the attempt of the duke of
of securityalliances or Washington’s commitment to uphold the regional order into doubt. Ultimately, the Trump administration has to this point not just actively worked to tarnish some of the most significant accomplishments of Obama and the Pivot to Asia, it has also threatened the stability of the United States’ long-standing hegemonic role throughout the Asia Pacific region.
1 M. Green and N. Szechenyi , ‘ US-Japan relations: A fresh start ’, Comparative Connections , 11 : 1 ( 2009 ), pp. 1 – 9 .
2 M. Green , By More Than Providence
and ASEAN itself was centred on four aspects: strengthening securityalliances and partnerships; investing in multilateral institutions; advancing economic engagement; and promoting democracy and human rights. Though these general objectives were of course not new to US Asia policy, there were distinguishing features in each of these that were reflective of the Obama administration’s approach.
First, the Obama administration focused on strengthening alliances and partnerships. While this had long been a key part of advancing US policy, the Obama administration
The BSEC was officially transformed from an initiative into a ‘regional
economic organisation’ on 5 June 1998, when a charter was signed that
made it into a formal organisation.3 The BSEC is neither an economic
community along the lines of the EU nor a securityalliance like NATO. In
addition, its capacity for authoritative decisions over economic and political
issues is restricted. It envisages neither the creation of a preferential trading
area nor the introduction of a common external tariff. Discussions on the
establishment of a free trade area, which led to an