the less, the relative roles of London and major provincial cities like
Liverpool, Manchester or Glasgow in Britain’s commercial and
financial relationship with regions such as SouthAmerica remain
In analysing Liverpool’s business connections with SouthAmerica in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, therefore,
this chapter examines these two
Liverpool occupies a prominent position in the contemporary popular imagination. In spite of decades of economic decline, urban decay and a name associated by some with poverty and crime, the city's reputation is by no means a negative one. The book is a collection of essays that focuses on the strength of Liverpool's merchant marine, representing both informal and formal empire over centuries. It discusses the interracial relationships in 1950s and 1960s Liverpool to demonstrate that many African and Afro-Caribbean sailors (and others) married or had relationships with white women. Given existing deficiencies in the historiographies of both Liverpool and the British Empire, the book aims to reassess both Liverpool's role within the British imperial system and the impact on the port city of its colonial connections. Liverpool's success has often been attributed to, and marred by, its being the leader in the slave trade after 1750. Napoleonic Wars were a period of great turbulence and difficulty for the Liverpool commercial community. Liverpool is perceived as a diasporic city, however, its ambiguous nineteenth-century identity reflected the tensions of its complex migrant connections. An analysis of Liverpool's business connections with South America reveals its relative commercial decline and the notion of 'gentlemanly capitalism'. The African ethnology collection of National Museums Liverpool's (NML) ethnology collections are displayed in the 'World Cultures' gallery of the World Museum Liverpool, which opened in 2005. Liverpool is perhaps not exceptional, though its networks are notable and striking.
An Interview with Celso Amorim, Former Brazilian Foreign Minister
economic power. At the same time, we always sought to be guided in our politics by values. In our relations
with SouthAmerican countries. When we were in Haiti. Was everything perfect? I don’t
know. Sometimes things don’t go exactly as you want. I’ve often spoken about the role of generosity in foreign policy. It might sound
naïve but I don’t think it is. Generosity requires a capacity to think about your
interests in the long term. Generosity in foreign policy doesn’t mean doing everything
that other countries want but it means addressing just demands
Latin America more broadly and SouthAmerica specifically provide the platform on which Brazilian foreign policy architects positioned their main lever for attempting to shift structural power frameworks and the pursuit of their country’s particular brand of international insertion. Central to this has been a continental strategic reality particularly propitious for the consensual hegemonic style of leadership sought by Brazil over the last quarter century. While there have been occasional armed contretemps between SouthAmerican states, the most serious
As former Brazilian ambassador to Washington Rubens Barbosa succinctly put it in 2007 , ‘Security is not an item on the agenda in SouthAmerica… The problem here in the region is poverty… Security is an agenda performed by the US’ (Barbosa, 2007 ). When examined through the frame of mainstream international relations theory Brazil sits in a remarkably luxurious security situation. Although there are petty bureaucratic squabbles with the neighbours from time to time, there is no argument about the demarcation of national borders. Rio Branco’s success in
more explicit stand with respect to opposing outside interference in SouthAmerica and the wider South, which is viewed as its natural sphere of influence. Only in cases where Brazil sees a real prospect of controlling and directing the institution for its own ends can one expect sustained and concentrated attempts to create functioning multilateral structures.
Brazil consequently displays a somewhat rebellious attitude towards existing multilateral arrangements, which has progressively solidified as the country has gained increased international recognition and
, the FTAA negotiations, and the WTO. Wrapped around this domestic political dynamic were the foreign policy considerations of maintaining relations with neighbours in SouthAmerica, particularly Argentina, and latterly the efforts of the PT governments to expand Brazilian influence and access throughout the Global South.
Turning to the outside
In many respects the import-substitution industrialization policies followed by Brazil from the 1950s to the 1980s worked. High tariff barriers on imports worked as incentives for international firms to establish local
about a related strain of brain fever, one whose earliest cases can be diagnosed about two centuries ago. Its symptoms have included poems, novels, travel books, translations, inscriptions, artefacts, archaeological digs, legislation, films, comic books, video games, statues, restaurants, music camps, racism, and even a theme park. Having gripped Canada, the United States, and SouthAmerica, the fever now has spread across the globe. To paraphrase Burton, it might be called Vinland on the brain.
Vinland, of course, is the area that Norse sagas and other medieval
political and financial assistance by building on regulatory changes initiated in 2000 and 2001.
A clear foreign policy element was thus revealed inside Brazil’s neodevelopmentalist model, with actions from Itamaraty, the presidency and other state agencies like the BNDES working with the country’s emerging multinationals to push the economy out into the global sphere, particularly SouthAmerica and Africa. This is in turn brought expanded influence for Brazilian foreign policy makers throughout the Global South as Brazil became an important source of FDI and economic
exhibitions were staged all over the world, in Africa,
Asia, Australasia and SouthAmerica as well as Europe and North America.
This text could not hope to examine in any meaningful way the whole
tradition, nor does it attempt to. Rather, it is a study of how the
events emerged, how they gained legitimacy as a medium of national
expression and how they maintained it through one of the most traumatic