Joseph Heller

When Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964, Israel wondered how Soviet policies would change. Regarding the Jews, there were no changes. Ivan Dedioulia, first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Israel, claimed there was no anti-Jewish discrimination in the Soviet Union. Nasser’s threats, he stated, were ‘idle.’ The Alexandria summit proved that confrontation with Israel

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
From the Gromyko declaration to the death of Stalin (1947–53)
Joseph Heller

During World War II, the Yishuv leadership and the American Zionist leadership made a great effort to convince the Soviet Union to be more open to Zionism, regarding the effort as a long-term investment. The investment paid off when the Soviet ambassador to London announced in 1943 that his country would support Zionism. 1 Thereafter, the Soviet Union took an increasing

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Joseph Heller

The archives of the Soviet Union’s two decision-making bodies, the Communist Party Central Committee and the Politburo, cannot be accessed, so a reliable account cannot be given of Soviet Union’s role in the crisis. However, selected documents have been published and the issue can be discussed, at least, on the diplomatic level. 1 The Kremlin’s view was that since early

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Superpower rivalry
Author: Joseph Heller

Four questions stand before the historian of the cold war and the Arab-Israeli conflict: 1) Did Israel and the US have a 'special relationship'? 2) Were Soviet-Israeli relations destined for failure from 1948? 3) Was the Arab-Israeli conflict insoluble because of the cold war or in spite of it? 4)Was detente between the superpowers the key to solving the Arab-Israeli conflict? Israel failed to get a security guarantee from the US because if it were granted ally status the Arab states would turn to the Soviets. Instead of a security guarantee Kennedy used the nebulous term 'special relationship', which did not bind America politically or militarily. Relations with the USSR looked promising at first, but the Zionist ideology of the Jewish state made it inevitable that relations with would worsen , since the Kremlin rejected the notion that Soviet Jews were by definition part of the Jewish nation, and therefore candidates for emigration to Israel. As for the Arabs, they were adamant that the Palestinian refugees return en mass, which meant the destruction of of Israel. No compromise suggested by the US was acceptable to to the Arabs , who were always supported by the USSR.The Soviets demanded detente cover not only the Arab states and Israel, but Turkey and Iran as well. Consequently the Middle East remained a no-man's-land between the superpowers' spheres of influence, inexorably paving the way for the wars in 1956 and 1967.

Joseph Heller

At the time of Stalin’s death, Israel and the Soviet Union were poles apart. For Ben-Gurion, Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union and orientation toward the West were conditions for Israel’s survival, while for Stalin’s heirs it was ideologically imperative to deny the existence of a Jewish issue in the Soviet Union and to demand Israel’s neutrality. 1 In April 1953

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Joseph Heller

Following the Kremlin, the Soviet press published articles attacking Zionism and accusing Israel of manufacturing nuclear weapons in the interests of Middle Eastern imperialism. 1 Nevertheless, Israel’s foreign ministry was optimistic because the Kremlin also attacked Nasser. 2 While the Soviet Union did call for the return of the Arab refugees and recognized only

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Abstract only
Joseph Heller

Histories of the modern Middle East, and of the Arab–Israeli conflict in particular, generally focus on regional participants. Some work has been done about the relations between the region and the two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union), but little has put the Arab–Israeli conflict into the context of the Cold War. Both East and West sought influence and

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Joseph Heller

weakened the Baghdad Pact and would increase Soviet involvement in the Middle East, 7 but that in the long run the United States could not compete with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of the Arabs. 8 The Eisenhower administration was more concerned with preserving the balance between pro-Western Arab states and the region’s radical regimes. The status of the Middle East was upgraded, having become

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
From Truman to Eisenhower (1948– 53)
Joseph Heller

United States as their principal enemy. Soviet anti-Semitism reinforced opposition in principle to the establishment of a Jewish state. 2 The CIA and the Pentagon were concerned that the United States and the Soviet Union might have to send military forces into Palestine following the British evacuation, gravely endangering regional security. 3 There was other opposition to partition. The State Department

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Joseph Heller

After the Suez War, Ben-Gurion, fearing Soviet ‘volunteers’ would participate in hostilities against Israel, tried to persuade the West that the Soviet Union was committed to Arab radicalism. The Israeli left warned against doing anything that would be tantamount to declaring war against the Soviet Union; rather, it was proposed, Israel should concentrate on defending

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67