When Khrushchev was ousted in
October 1964, Israel wondered how Soviet policies would change.
Regarding the Jews, there were no changes. Ivan Dedioulia, first
secretary of the Soviet embassy in Israel, claimed there was no
anti-Jewish discrimination in the SovietUnion. Nasser’s threats,
he stated, were ‘idle.’ The Alexandria summit proved that
confrontation with Israel
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Mutual attraction between the SovietUnion and
Afro-America became apparent soon after the 1917 October revolution. For the
African-American left, Soviet Russia seemed to be a ‘promised land’ for
national and ethnic minorities and a complete contrast to the United States with its system
of segregation and discrimination. 1 As
Claude McKay put it, ‘the Russian workers, who have won through the ordeal of
persecution and revolution, extend the hand of international brotherhood to all the
From the Gromyko declaration to the death of Stalin (1947–53)
During World War II, the Yishuv
leadership and the American Zionist leadership made a great effort to
convince the SovietUnion to be more open to Zionism, regarding the
effort as a long-term investment. The investment paid off when the
Soviet ambassador to London announced in 1943 that his country would
support Zionism. 1
Thereafter, the SovietUnion took an increasing
The archives of the SovietUnion’s two decision-making bodies, the Communist Party Central
Committee and the Politburo, cannot be accessed, so a reliable account
cannot be given of SovietUnion’s role in the crisis. However,
selected documents have been published and the issue can be discussed,
at least, on the diplomatic level. 1 The Kremlin’s view was that
Four questions stand before the historian of the cold war and the Arab-Israeli conflict: 1) Did Israel and the US have a 'special relationship'? 2) Were Soviet-Israeli relations destined for failure from 1948? 3) Was the Arab-Israeli conflict insoluble because of the cold war or in spite of it? 4)Was detente between the superpowers the key to solving the Arab-Israeli conflict? Israel failed to get a security guarantee from the US because if it were granted ally status the Arab states would turn to the Soviets. Instead of a security guarantee Kennedy used the nebulous term 'special relationship', which did not bind America politically or militarily. Relations with the USSR looked promising at first, but the Zionist ideology of the Jewish state made it inevitable that relations with would worsen , since the Kremlin rejected the notion that Soviet Jews were by definition part of the Jewish nation, and therefore candidates for emigration to Israel. As for the Arabs, they were adamant that the Palestinian refugees return en mass, which meant the destruction of of Israel. No compromise suggested by the US was acceptable to to the Arabs , who were always supported by the USSR.The Soviets demanded detente cover not only the Arab states and Israel, but Turkey and Iran as well. Consequently the Middle East remained a no-man's-land between the superpowers' spheres of influence, inexorably paving the way for the wars in 1956 and 1967.
At the time of Stalin’s death,
Israel and the SovietUnion were poles apart. For Ben-Gurion, Jewish
immigration from the SovietUnion and orientation toward the West were
conditions for Israel’s survival, while for Stalin’s heirs
it was ideologically imperative to deny the existence of a Jewish issue
in the SovietUnion and to demand Israel’s neutrality. 1 In April 1953
Watching the red dawn charts the responses of the American avant-garde to the cultural works of its Soviet counterpart in period from the formation of the USSR in 1922 to recognition of this new communist nation by USA in 1933. In this period American artists, writers, and designers looked at the emerging Soviet Union with fascination, as they observed this epochal experiment in communism develop out of the chaos of the Russian Revolution and Civil War. They organised exhibitions of Soviet art and culture, reported on visits to Russia in books and articles, and produced works that were inspired by post-revolutionary culture. One of the most important innovations of Soviet culture was to collapse boundaries between disciplines, as part of a general aim to bring art into everyday life. Correspondingly, this book takes an interdisciplinary approach by looking at American avant-garde responses to Soviet culture across several media, including architecture, theatre, film, photography, and literature. As such, Watching the red dawn considers the putative area of ‘American Constructivism’ by examining the interconnected ways in which Constructivist works were influential upon American practices.
Turkey's involvement in the Gulf War in 1991 paved the way for the country's acceptance into the European Union. This book traces that process, and in the first part looks at Turkey's foreign policy in the 1990s, considering the ability of the country to withstand the repercussions of the fall of communism. It focuses on Turkey's achievement in halting and minimising the effects of the temporary devaluation in its strategic importance that resulted from the waning of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union; the skilful way in which Turkey avoided becoming embroiled in the ethnic upheavals in Central Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East; and the development of a continued policy of closer integration into the European and western worlds. Internal politics are the focus of the second part of the book, addressing the curbing of the Kurdish revolt, the economic gains made and the strengthening of civil society. The book goes on to analyse the prospects for Turkey in the twenty-first century, in the light of the possible integration into Europe, which may leave the country's leadership free to deal effectively with domestic issues.
This book reassesses a defining historical, political and ideological moment in contemporary history: the 1989 revolutions in central and eastern Europe. It considers the origins, processes and outcomes of the collapse of communism in eastern Europe. The book argues that communism was not simply an 'unnatural Yoke' around the necks of East Europeans, but was a powerful, and not entirely negative, historical force capable of modernizing societies, cultures and economies. It focuses on the interplay between internal and external developments as opposed to an emphasis on Cold War geopolitical power struggles and the triumphalist rhetoric of how the 'freedom-loving' USA 'defeated' the 'totalitarian' Soviet Union. The book also approaches the East European revolutions from a variety of angles, emphasizing generational conflicts, socio-economic and domestic aspects, international features, the 'Gorbachev factor', and the role of peace movements or discourses on revolution. It analyses the peace movements in both parts of Germany during the 1980s from a perspective that transcends the ideological and geopolitical divides of the Cold War. The history of the East German peace movement has mostly been written from the perspective of German unification in 1989-1990. Many historians have read the history of the civil rights movement of 1989-1990 backwards in order to show its importance, or ignored it altogether to highlight the totalitarian character of the German Democratic Republic.
Mass and Propaganda. An Inquiry Into Fascist Propaganda (Siegfried Kracauer,
Written in French exile, the following text by Siegfried Kracauer from December 1936
outlines a research project that the German-Jewish intellectual undertook with
funding from the Institute for Social Research. The work outlined here would be a
study of totalitarian propaganda in Germany and Italy through sustained comparison
with communist and democratic countries, especially the Soviet Union and the United
States. Appearing in English translation for the first time, this document from
Kracauer‘s estate is crucial for a full understanding of his career as a sociologist,
cultural critic, film theorist and philosopher, demonstrating the global scope of his
engagement with cinema, mass culture and modernity.